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A General Construction for Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange from Witness PRFs

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Frontiers in Cyber Security (FCS 2019)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 1105))

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Abstract

In cyber security, authenticated key exchange (AKE) can be used to achieve the privacy and authentication of data. As a relevant cryptographic protocol, password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) has been studied for its convenience. Recently, Katz and Vaikuntanathan proposed a round-optimal PAKE from smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs). However, the instantiation of smooth projective hash functions depends on the underlying NP-relation which is a CCA-secure encryption relation in their construction. In this paper, we apply a new cryptographic primitive named witness PRFs to construct PAKE. In our settings, the concrete construction of witness PRFs is independent of the underlying NP-relation. At this point, our construction is more general, and furthermore, we have a discussion on some possible NP-relations, which could be used to construct secure PAKE in our settings.

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Acknowledgment

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions. This work was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61632013).

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Correspondence to Jiehui Nan or Honggang Hu .

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Nan, J., Zheng, M., Wang, Z., Hu, H. (2019). A General Construction for Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange from Witness PRFs. In: Shen, B., Wang, B., Han, J., Yu, Y. (eds) Frontiers in Cyber Security. FCS 2019. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1105. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0818-9_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0818-9_17

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