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The Consensus Games for Consensus Economics Under the Framework of Blockchain in Fintech

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Game Theory (EAGT 2019)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 1082))

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to introduce a new notion called “Consensus Game (CG)” with motivation from the mechanism design of blockchain economy under the consensus incentives from Bitcoin ecosystems in financial technology (Fintech), we then establish the general existence results for consensus equilibria of consensus games in terms of corresponding interpretation based on the viewpoint of Blockchain consensus in Fintech by applying the concept of hybrid solutions in game theory. As applications, our discussion in this paper for the illustration of some issues and problems on the stability of mining pool-games for miners by applying consensus games shows that the concept of consensus equilibria could be used as a fundamental tool for the study of consensus economics under the framework of Blockchain economy in Fintech.

This research is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 11501349 and U181140002) in Part.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Digital Media, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, 214122, China

    Lan Di

  2. School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, 200433, China

    Zhe Yang

  3. Business School, Chenngdu University, Chengdu, 610106, China

    George Xianzhi Yuan

  4. School of Financial Technology, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai, 201209, China

    George Xianzhi Yuan

  5. Center for Financial Engineering, Soochow University, Suzhou, 215008, China

    George Xianzhi Yuan

  6. Business School, Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, 510275, China

    George Xianzhi Yuan

  7. BBD Technology Co., Ltd. (BBD), No. 966, Tianfu Avenue, Chengdu, 610093, China

    George Xianzhi Yuan

Authors
  1. Lan Di
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  2. Zhe Yang
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  3. George Xianzhi Yuan
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to George Xianzhi Yuan .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, Fujian, China

    Deng-Feng Li

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Di, L., Yang, Z., Yuan, G.X. (2019). The Consensus Games for Consensus Economics Under the Framework of Blockchain in Fintech. In: Li, DF. (eds) Game Theory. EAGT 2019. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1082. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0657-4_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0657-4_1

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