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Law and Economics—Five Core Principles in the Cloud

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Big Data, Databases and "Ownership" Rights in the Cloud

Part of the book series: Perspectives in Law, Business and Innovation ((PLBI))

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Abstract

By its very nature, the study of cloud computing transformations is an interdisciplinary endeavor, drawing on complex technical and legal issues that include a variety of other social disciplines. Consequently, structuring a coherent theoretical framework requires careful scrutiny that goes beyond the capacity of any single discipline. Therefore, in order to gain a holistic understanding of these complex issues and to resolve adequately some of these problems, this chapter focuses on the contributions and synergies across the disciplines of law and economics.

“We are all law and economics now” [Lawrence Lessig (The work of Lawrence Lessig. See Oppenheimer and Mercuro 2004, p. 3)].

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Smith (1776).

  2. 2.

    Sutherland (1993) (ed).

  3. 3.

    Some commentators believe that this categorization is partly misleading. According to Nicolas Georgakopoulos: “The deployment of the methods used by economic analysis of law does not depend on acceptance of a utilitarian moral philosophy …is not a methodological slave to any form of utilitarianism.” Some jurists think that they can combine moral philosophical arguments with the economic analysis of law. From this perspective, law and economics is “agnostic.” See Georgakopoulos (2005, p. 3).

  4. 4.

    Burrows and Veljanovski (1981, p. 3) (eds).

  5. 5.

    Bentham (1781).

  6. 6.

    Sandel (2010, p. 23), Driver (2010).

  7. 7.

    Malloy (1990, pp. 14–15), Duggan (1982, pp. 4–6).

  8. 8.

    Malloy (1990, pp. 14–15).

  9. 9.

    Veljanovski (1990, p. 34).

  10. 10.

    Coase (1960, pp. 1–44).

  11. 11.

    Calabresi (1961, pp. 499–553).

  12. 12.

    Posner (1983, p. 4).

  13. 13.

    Veljanovski (1990, pp. 21–22).

  14. 14.

    Posner (1983, p. 4).

  15. 15.

    Elkin-Koren and Salzberger (2013), Stray Ryssdal (1995), preface, Veljanovski (1982), Riis and Nielsen (1998) (eds), introduction.

  16. 16.

    Parisi (2004, pp. 259–272).

  17. 17.

    Medema (2015, pp. 70–74).

  18. 18.

    Malloy (1990, p. 2).

  19. 19.

    See, generally, Posner (1998).

  20. 20.

    Mercuro and Medema (1997, pp. 51–54).

  21. 21.

    Reder (1982, p. 6), Medema (2010, pp. 46–48).

  22. 22.

    Mercuro and Medema (1997, p. 55).

  23. 23.

    See, generally, Becker (1971).

  24. 24.

    See, generally, Becker (1968, pp. 169–217), Benson and Zimmerman (2010).

  25. 25.

    Becker (1978).

  26. 26.

    The works of Alchian and Demsetz. See Mercuro and Medema (1997, pp. 51–57).

  27. 27.

    Here I take the shared properties of a firm as analogical inference and from this basis I infer that cloud service providers also share further property. See, generally, Mercuro and Medema (1997, p. 57).

  28. 28.

    Schmalbeck (1983, p. 491), Miceli (1997), introduction. Some critics to the normative economic analysis claim that it lacks the moral and ethical values such as personal integrity that are overturned by the cost and benefits analysis. See, i.e., generally, Zerbe (2001, p. 8).

  29. 29.

    Caplin and Schotter (2010).

  30. 30.

    Parisi (2004, pp. 259–272), Backhaus (2005) (ed), introduction.

  31. 31.

    Miceli (2004, pp. 2–3).

  32. 32.

    Parisi (2004, pp. 262–263). According to Posner and Parisi: “Law and economics rely on the standard economic assumption that individuals are rational maximizers, and study the role of law as a means for changing the relative prices attached to alternative individual actions. Under this approach, a change in the rule of law will affect human behavior by altering the relative price structure—and thus the constraint —of the optimization problem. Wealth maximization, serving as the paradigm for the analysis of law, can thus be promoted or constrained by legal rules.” The work of Richard Posner and Francesco Parisi. See Sandeen (2010, p. 47). See, also, generally, Posner and Parisi (2003) (eds).

  33. 33.

    Mercuro and Medema (1997, p. 57).

  34. 34.

    Coase (1960, pp. 1–44).

  35. 35.

    Williamson (1985, p. 16).

  36. 36.

    Veljanovski (1982, p. 61).

  37. 37.

    Barzel (1997, p. 4).

  38. 38.

    Friedman (2000, pp. 8–18).

  39. 39.

    Rutherford (2013, p. 603), see, also, Coase (1937, pp. 386–405), Commons (1934), Demsetz (1968, pp. 33–53), Williamson (1975). For an analysis of the effects of transaction costs between common law and other civil law based legal systems i.e., in Luisiana, see, generally, Brown (1997, pp. 2–3).

  40. 40.

    McCloskey (1998, pp. 367–371).

  41. 41.

    Dittrich (2001, p. 35), Michie (2000, p. 117) (ed), Schmidtchen (2009, p. 32), Epstein (2011, p. 27).

  42. 42.

    Veljanovski (1982, p. 49).

  43. 43.

    Naughton (2013a, b).

  44. 44.

    Gray (2012, p. 665) (ed), Posner (2003), Rittich (2002, p. 138). On the contrary, some commentators are very critical to the “market-based transaction cost” approach proposed by Posner and other proponents of the Chicago-style school of economics. According to i.a., Schlag, this approach does neither have the sort of “theoretical intelligibility nor the operational applicability to make the market-based transaction costs approach plausible.” See Schlag (1989, pp. 1662–1700). See, also, generally, Williamson (1993, pp. 98–118).

  45. 45.

    Perkins (2010), see, also, Cacciola and Gibbons (2012, pp. 1–32).

  46. 46.

    DiMatteo and Janssen (2014, p. 99).

  47. 47.

    Cooter and Ulen (2008, p. 220).

  48. 48.

    Ayres and Gertner (1989, pp. 87–130).

  49. 49.

    Ayres and Gertner (1989, pp. 91–92), Ayres (2006), De Geest (2011, pp. 228–229) (ed). But see Posner (2005, pp. 1–34), Maskin (2005, pp. 1–11).

  50. 50.

    Noll (2005, p. 21), Harrison (2003, p. 39).

  51. 51.

    Weigel (2008, p. 44).

  52. 52.

    Mercuro and Medema (1995, p. 101).

  53. 53.

    Lewin (1995, p. 254).

  54. 54.

    Mercuro and Medema (1995, p. 101).

  55. 55.

    Coase (1960, pp. 1–3), see, also, Huang and Gao (2013, p. 124), Berderman (2010, p. 48).

  56. 56.

    Coase (1960, pp. 1–3).

  57. 57.

    See, generally, Pigou (1932).

  58. 58.

    Hacket (2001, p. 130).

  59. 59.

    Ver Eecke (2008, p. 65).

  60. 60.

    Cavalcanti (2015, p. 73).

  61. 61.

    Mankiv (2007, p. 2010), Beito et al. (2002, p. 406) (eds).

  62. 62.

    See Nerlove et al. (1987, pp. 38–39); Cheung (1980).

  63. 63.

    Frame (2013, pp. 173–175).

  64. 64.

    Corrales Compagnucci (2010, pp. 5–13).

  65. 65.

    Nicholson and Snyde (2010, pp. 598–599), Peterson (2009, p. 30).

  66. 66.

    Cheung (1973, pp. 11–33), Newmark (2009, pp. 195 et seq.) (ed), McCall (2010, pp. 166–167).

  67. 67.

    Sandler (2001, pp. 65–67).

  68. 68.

    Corrales Compagnucci (2010, pp. 5–13).

  69. 69.

    Autor (2010, p. 4).

  70. 70.

    Hirsch (1988, pp. 18–19).

  71. 71.

    Maata (2010, p. 133).

  72. 72.

    Rutherford (2013, p. 208).

  73. 73.

    Coleman (1983, p. 110).

  74. 74.

    Richardson and Hadfield (1999, p. 34) (eds).

  75. 75.

    www.Nobelprize.org, All Prizes in Economic Sciences [online]. Available at: http://www.nobelprize.org/no-belprizes/economic-sciences/laureates/ [Accessed 10 December 2018].

  76. 76.

    See, generally, Williamson (1981a, b, pp. 548–577), (2002, pp. 171–195), (1996).

  77. 77.

    Rose (1999, p. 64).

  78. 78.

    Mair and Marti (2009, p. 422).

  79. 79.

    Schrammel (2010, p. 508).

  80. 80.

    See, generally, Schrammel (2014, p. 203).

  81. 81.

    Yahklef (2000, pp. 39–55).

  82. 82.

    Williamson (1981a, b, p. 41); see also Samuels and Schmid (1981) (eds).

  83. 83.

    Ostrom (1990, 2000, pp. 29–52).

  84. 84.

    Ostrom cites, for example, a forest reserve in Uganda. See Wall (2014, p. 89); see also Moran and Ostrom (2005) (eds).

  85. 85.

    Ostrom (2009, pp. 419–421).

  86. 86.

    Harrison (2003, p. 40).

  87. 87.

    Keohane and Ostrom (1995) (eds).

  88. 88.

    Hardin (1968, pp. 1243–1248).

  89. 89.

    Warren (2006, p. 1).

  90. 90.

    Crowe (1969, p. 1103).

  91. 91.

    Ostrom et al. (1999, pp. 278–282).

  92. 92.

    Hess and Ostrom (2007, pp. 3–5).

  93. 93.

    Felice and Vatiero (2012).

  94. 94.

    Rose (1986).

  95. 95.

    Bricklin (2006).

  96. 96.

    See Warren (2006, p. 1).

  97. 97.

    Cox Buck (1985, pp. 49–62), see, generally, Dahlman (1991, pp. 285–296). In this piece, Dhalman submits that in Hardin’s syllogism there was actually no tragedy and that the problems were more complex.

  98. 98.

    OECD (2015, pp. 187–188).

  99. 99.

    Borgman (2015, pp. 73–75).

  100. 100.

    OECD (2004).

  101. 101.

    OECD (2006).

  102. 102.

    Global Pulse White Paper (2012).

  103. 103.

    OECD (2015, pp. 187–188).

  104. 104.

    See, generally, Lane et al. (2014) (eds).

  105. 105.

    See, more specifically, Chap. 8 with regards to the contractual framework and “Use Case Scenario 2” of Chap. 9. This scenario is about genetic research projects within clinical trials.

  106. 106.

    Komesar (1994).

  107. 107.

    Pierce (1995, p. 941), Komesar (1994, pp. 3–6), Hartmann and Kjaer (2015, pp. 157–158) (eds), Barani (2007, p. 118).

  108. 108.

    Kersch (1996, pp. 13–15).

  109. 109.

    Kersch (1996, pp. 13–15).

  110. 110.

    Kersch (1996, pp. 13–15).

  111. 111.

    Komesar (2001), preface.

  112. 112.

    Komesar (2001, p. 9).

  113. 113.

    See, generally, Ellickson (1994). In this book, Ellickson demonstrates that the law is not that important and that people can generally govern themselves by means of informal rules and social norms without the need for governmental control and coercive power.

  114. 114.

    Ellickson (1994, p. 27).

  115. 115.

    Ghosh (2014, p. 455).

  116. 116.

    See Carolan (2009, p. 139).

  117. 117.

    See generally, Purnhagen and Rott (2014, p. 833) (eds). In this book, the authors refer to the Komesarian approach as it can contribute “to the further development of European law on remedies that offers EU citizens access to basic services.” As an analogy, I think that the Komesarian framework may serve to further develop contract law . With regard to the Komesarian approach in the context of the European Union , see, generally, Maduro (1998, p. 117).

  118. 118.

    See, generally, Komarek (2012, p. 241).

  119. 119.

    Cross and Thomas (2009).

  120. 120.

    Giuffre (2013).

  121. 121.

    The work of Knoke and Yang. See Giuffre (2013).

  122. 122.

    Özyer et al. (2013) (eds).

  123. 123.

    Marsden (2005).

  124. 124.

    Prell (2012, pp. 1–10).

  125. 125.

    Gunduz-Oguducu and Etaner-Uyar (2014, pp. 14–15) (eds).

  126. 126.

    Actors are connected to each other by “social ties.” This means that the relationship between two actors represents a tie. See Wasserman and Faust (2009). See also Berkowitz (1982, pp. 20–21, 119), Pryke (2012, pp. 87, 228).

  127. 127.

    Tsvetovat and Kouznetsov (2011, pp. 4, 19), Prell (2012, pp. 140–141).

  128. 128.

    Rees and Gallagher (2013), Freeman (2004, p. 24).

  129. 129.

    Giuffre (2013).

  130. 130.

    Pinheiro (2011).

  131. 131.

    See Sodeur and Taube (2008, p. 100).

  132. 132.

    Prell (2012, pp. 140–144).

  133. 133.

    Teramoto (2013).

  134. 134.

    Teramoto and Jurčys (2014, pp. 116–119).

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Corrales Compagnucci, M. (2020). Law and Economics—Five Core Principles in the Cloud. In: Big Data, Databases and "Ownership" Rights in the Cloud. Perspectives in Law, Business and Innovation. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0349-8_4

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