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The AB Crisis as Symptomatic of the WTO’s Foundational Defects or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the AB

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The Appellate Body of the WTO and Its Reform

Abstract

The Appellate Body (AB) of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body is in crisis as a result of attacks on the AB’s processes, decisions and approaches. These attacks are predominantly, but not entirely, being brought by the United States. The crisis is being brought to a head by the refusal of the US to agree to the appointment of new AB members. If the US approach is not countered or reversed, this will result in the AB being unable to operate, effectively permitting WTO rule breaking to go unchecked. The very rule of law character of the WTO is consequently under threat. Most critically, it is not inconceivable that the demise of the AB could quickly and all too easily lead to the death or death-like stagnation of the WTO. This chapter’s fundamental thesis is, however, that the current concerns about the AB and the WTO more generally reflect deeper fundamental flaws and disconnects within the WTO and therefore suggests that proposed AB reforms by some WTO members are too superficial and hence likely irrelevant to the real, inevitable and likely fatal challenges to the WTO. This chapter argues that the crisis therefore is not really the fault of the AB, neither in its structure, function or outputs, but rather a result of deeper fundamental faults within the WTO. This chapter further argues that for the most part the AB structure, function and outputs are generally without serious fault, and instead represent acceptable and effective approaches to the resolution of trade disputes between sovereign states in the context of the WTO. Critically, the chapter also notes that the AB’s behaviours and approaches are entirely consistent with what one would expect from a rule of law Dispute Settlement Body—be it international or domestic.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, e.g., 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Trade_Policy_Agenda_and_2018_Annual_Report.pdf. Accessed 30 May 2019.

  2. 2.

    Id.

  3. 3.

    Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes Article 17(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].

  4. 4.

    Id. Article 16(4).

  5. 5.

    A “death-like” stagnation being worse than the last twenty years of “normal” stagnation caused by the almost complete inability within the WTO to update or revise the WTO agreements.

  6. 6.

    See, e.g., Panels established to rule on US, Turkish tariff measures. https://www.wto.org/english/newse/news19_e/dsb_28jan19_e.htm. Accessed 30 May 2019. See also, Gantz (2018).

  7. 7.

    See Gantz, supra note 6, at p. 2.

  8. 8.

    See WTO General Council, Communication from the European Union, China, Canada, India, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, Australia, Republic of Korea, Iceland, Singapore and Mexico to the General Council, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/752 (11 Dec 2018).

  9. 9.

    See Brand (2007).

  10. 10.

    See, e.g., Picker (2014a, pp. 54–83). See also, Picker (2010).

  11. 11.

    Picker (2014b).

  12. 12.

    See WTO General Council, supra note 8.

  13. 13.

    One could quibble about the exact applicability of the definition, but for purposes of this chapter it is sufficient, after all Constitutional courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, tasked with interpreting the constitutive laws—including structural and rights questions. This is what we see with the DSB, the ICJ, etc.

  14. 14.

    See, e.g., WTO Dispute Settlement Body developments in 2012. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/bashir_13_e.htm. Accessed 30 May 2019. (“My investigations led me to conclude that there is no objective means of determining whether and when Members comply with DSB recommendations … Bearing all of this in mind, I am pleased to report that my investigations revealed that all Members generally comply with their DSB recommendations and rulings and that the overall compliance rate for WTO disputes is remarkably high. In fact, I estimate the compliance rate to be about 90 percent.”).

  15. 15.

    Arie Reich, The effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement system: A statistical analysis 31 (European Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. 2017/11, 2017) (“We found that the average duration from the request for consultations to adoption of the DSB recommendations was much longer than the maximum prescribed by the DSU, namely: 23.21 months for disputes that started between 1995–1999, and 28 months for those that started between 2007–2011. What is worrying is that the duration of proceedings is increasing steadily over the years, and has reached an average of almost 34 months for disputes that started in 2013.”).

  16. 16.

    See, e.g., Gantz, supra note 6, at p. 9.

  17. 17.

    See, e.g., González (2016).

  18. 18.

    See Gantz, supra note 6, at p. 7.

  19. 19.

    DSU, supra note 3, Article 3(2) (“Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.”).

  20. 20.

    See DSU, supra note 3, Article 16(4) (“Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.”).

  21. 21.

    See, e.g., Howse (2016).

  22. 22.

    E.g., The Place of the WTO in the International Legal Order. https://www.wto.org/engish/news_e/sppl_e/sppl94_e.htm. Accessed 30 May 2019.

  23. 23.

    See, e.g., (2016) Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/us_statment_dsbmay16_e.pdf. (statement by the US explaining the decision not to support the reappointment of AB member Seung Wha Chang). Accessed 30 May 2019.

  24. 24.

    In addition, the secretariat could also have been considered—they could be viewed a little like the civil servants of an executive branch. But, the powers of the secretariat are quite limited and while there have been occasional concerns raised about their actions it is hard to see that it rises to the level that it could be sufficient cause to play a role in the development of the current crises. See, e.g., Howse, supra note 21, at p. 41.

  25. 25.

    See U.N. Charter Articles 10, 14 (referring to “recommendations” only).

  26. 26.

    See id. at ch. VII (especially Article 48(1) “The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.”).

  27. 27.

    See, e.g., Picker (2017).

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Picker, C.B. (2020). The AB Crisis as Symptomatic of the WTO’s Foundational Defects or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the AB. In: Lo, Cf., Nakagawa, J., Chen, Tf. (eds) The Appellate Body of the WTO and Its Reform. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0255-2_4

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