Abstract
China’s experience with economic transition from central planning to a more market-oriented economy is unique, Vietnam being the only other country that most closely resembles China’s experience almost a decade later. Because of the gradualist approach adopted—Deng Xiaoping’s famous characterization of “feeling the stones to cross the river”—parts of the economy had remained unreformed at any time.
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Notes
- 1.
More information please see “Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies” (in Chinese), released in 2002 by CSRC. Retrieved from http://www.csrc.gov.cn/tianjin/tjfzyd/tjjflfg/tjbmgz/201210/t20121015_215801.htm.
- 2.
More information please see “Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentives of Listed Companies (trial)” (In Chinese), which was first released in 2005 by CSRC, and revised in 2016. Retrieved from http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/shenzhen/xxfw/tzzsyd/ssgs/sszl/ssgsxx/201410/t20141024_262284.htm.
- 3.
The sharing of corporate income taxes: except for the part belonging to the central government as ruled, 60% and 40% of the rest is shared by the central government and the local government, respectively. See more details from “Tax System of The People’s Republic of China” by Liu (2014), and “Income Tax Revenue Sharing Reform Plan” issued by Chinese state Council source from http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61880.htm (in Chinese).
- 4.
There are at least two reasons why no distinction is made between technically legal tax planning and illegal aggressive tax evasion. First, most of the behavior in question surrounds transactions that are often technically legal. Second, the legality of a tax management transaction is normally determined after the fact. Therefore, those avoidance activities may include both certain tax positions and uncertain tax positions that may or may not be challenged and determined illegal.
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Zhang, C., Rasiah, R., Cheong, K.C. (2019). Introduction. In: Governing Corporate Tax Management. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9829-2_1
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