Social Decision Rules Which Are Simple Games

  • Satish Kumar JainEmail author


A simple game social decision rule is defined by the condition that under it an alternative x is socially preferred to another alternative y iff all individuals belonging to some winning coalition unanimously prefer x to y. This chapter provides a characterization for the class of social decision rules that are simple games as well as for the subclass that are strong simple games and derives Inada-type necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity under the rules belonging to the class.


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Formerly ProfessorJawaharlal Nehru UniversityNew DelhiIndia

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