Abstract
A simple game social decision rule is defined by the condition that under it an alternative x is socially preferred to another alternative y iff all individuals belonging to some winning coalition unanimously prefer x to y. This chapter provides a characterization for the class of social decision rules that are simple games as well as for the subclass that are strong simple games and derives Inada-type necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity under the rules belonging to the class.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
This chapter relies on Jain (1989).
References
Gibbard, Allan. 1969. Social choice and the Arrow conditions. Discussion Paper: Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan.
Jain, Satish K. 1989. Characterization theorems for social decision rules which are simple games. Paper presented at the IX World Congress of the International Economic Association, Economics Research Center, Athens School of Economics & Business, Athens, Greece, held on Aug 28 - Sep 1, 1989.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Jain, S.K. (2019). Social Decision Rules Which Are Simple Games. In: Domain Conditions and Social Rationality. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-13-9671-7
Online ISBN: 978-981-13-9672-4
eBook Packages: Mathematics and StatisticsMathematics and Statistics (R0)