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Organisation, Actors and Member States’ Interests

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The Arctic Council

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Abstract

This chapter outlines the three levels of work in the Council: ministerial level, the senior Arctic official (SAO) level and working group level. It also introduces the reader to the work of Council by outlining key accomplishments by the six working groups and provides an overview on the role of the observers and the permanent participants (indigenous groups). The chapter also discusses the attitude of the member states to Arctic developments and the Arctic Council and argues that the Arctic Council has created an arena and network of different players (observers, indigenous groups and scientists) that the member states cannot ignore when the future of the Arctic is discussed.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Arctic Council (1998) “Arctic Council Rules of Procedure”. Available from https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/940. Last visited 25 April 2019. The procedures were last updated in 2013.

  2. 2.

    The procedural rules can thus be changed by consensus. The Arctic Council can be different from what it is today if that is what the member states want. There is a formal dynamic here. Ibid. Art. 48.

  3. 3.

    Previously, the secretariat rotated between the member states.

  4. 4.

    That said, the SAO meetings often have a rather broad agenda. There are many things to discuss. The meetings have thus been criticised for being slightly too formalistic and of doing little to foster good, practical discussions.

  5. 5.

    An exception is the American SAO, Julie L. Gourley, who has been in post for over ten years.

  6. 6.

    Heather Conley and Matthew Melino (2016), “An Arctic Redesign Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Arctic Council”, CSIS Report. p. 6.

  7. 7.

    Olav Schram Stokke: “An inner circle in the Arctic Council?” Opinion piece in Nordlys 28 April 2013.

  8. 8.

    Two of the most active researchers are Timo Koivurova and Oran Young. See, for example, Timo Koivurova (2010): “Limits and possibilities of the Arctic Council in a rapidly changing scene of Arctic governance”, Polar Record, 46 (2), pp. 146–156, Oran Young (2009) “Whither the Arctic? Conflict or cooperation in the circumpolar north”. Polar Record, 45 (232), pp. 73–82. and Oran Young (2011) “If an Arctic Ocean treaty is not the solution, what is the alternative?” Polar Record, 47 (4), pp. 327–334.

  9. 9.

    Paula Kankaanpää and Oran Young (2012): “The effectiveness of the Arctic Council”. Polar Research, 31.

  10. 10.

    The biggest conference organised by the Arctic Council was, on the other hand, under the auspices of CAFF and took place in Trondheim in the autumn of 2016.

  11. 11.

    For an overview of this work, see: Christian Prip (2016): “The Arctic Council and Biodiversity Need for a Stronger Management Framework?” Nordisk Miljörättslig Tidskrift, No. 2, 2016, pp. 37–53.

  12. 12.

    Ecosystem services is a collective term for the basic goods and services we can harvest from nature, such as food and other resources, but also outdoor activities and the like.

  13. 13.

    Christian Prip (2016): “The Arctic Council and biodiversity need for a stronger management framework?”

  14. 14.

    The debate on protected areas is also linked to the discussion of a possible “Arctic treaty”, inspired in part by the Antarctic Treaty. The Arctic Coastal States refuse to contemplate any such idea (see Chap. 5).

  15. 15.

    Christian Prip (2016): “The Arctic Council and biodiversity—need for a stronger management framework?”.

  16. 16.

    IMO is the UN’s maritime safety organisation and was established in 1948 to promote maritime safety and prevent pollution of the marine environment. IMO has 170 member states and a number of specialised committees drafting international legislation and regulations. For more information, see: http://www.imo.org/en/Pages/Default.aspx.

  17. 17.

    IMO adopted an international code for ships operating in polar regions in November 2014. The Polar Code provides binding rules for the protection of ships, crews and passengers in challenging polar waters. For more information, see: http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx.

  18. 18.

    This work is highlighted on EPPR’s website, see: https://www.eppr.org/sar/ and http://www.eppr.org/mer/.

  19. 19.

    In 2018 an external evaluation was conducted. It is, however, not available for the public.

  20. 20.

    SDWG (2004), The Arctic Human Development Report, Available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/51?show=full. Last visited 25 April 2019. SDWG (2015) The Arctic Human Development Report II, Available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1653?show=full. Last visited 2 April 2019.

  21. 21.

    Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot and Joël Plouffe (2016), The Arctic Council: 20 Years of Regional Cooperation and Policy-Shaping, Arctic Yearbook, p. 11.

  22. 22.

    For a more comprehensive list, see: https://www.sdwg.org/activities/project-reports-from-completed-sdwg-projects-1998-to-2015%20/.

  23. 23.

    Ida Folkestad Soltvedt and Svein Vigeland Rottem (2017): Challenges of the Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development Working Group: How to Improve? FNI Report 2. Lysaker, FNI.

  24. 24.

    Pekka Haavisto (2001), Review of the Arctic Council Structures. Available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/449/ACSAO-FI01_6_AC_Structure_final.pdf?sequence=1. Last visited 25 April 2019. and the Office of the Auditor General’s Undersøkelse av myndighetenes arbeid med Arktisk råd, Dokument 3:3 (2014–2015).

  25. 25.

    Ibid.

  26. 26.

    For a complete list, see the Arctic Council website: https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/subsidiary-bodies/task-forces. Last visited 25 April 2019.

  27. 27.

    Svein Vigeland Rottem (2016): The Arctic Council: Vision, Structure and Participation. FNI report 4. Lysaker, FNI.

  28. 28.

    Two expert groups with a more limited mandate have been appointed. They are the Expert Group in Support of the Implementation of the Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane and the Ecosystem-Based Management Expert Group (terminated in 2013). The establishment of these groups follows the same pattern as the establishment of task forces, and therefore will not be dealt with separately here. It can also be mentioned that the working groups operate with expert groups with a limited mandate. There isn’t the space in this relatively short description of the Arctic Council to pursue these groups further.

  29. 29.

    Svein Vigeland Rottem (2016): The Arctic Council: Vision, Structure and Participation. FNI report 4. Lysaker, FNI.

  30. 30.

    Ibid.

  31. 31.

    Arctic Council (1998). “Arctic Council Rules of Procedure”.

  32. 32.

    It is possible that others can be included. Ibid.

  33. 33.

    For a detailed account of this discussion, see English: Ice and Water. Politics, Peoples, and The Arctic Council.

  34. 34.

    For a complete list, see: https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers. Last visited 24 April 2019.

  35. 35.

    Arctic Council 2013, The Revised Arctic Council Rules of Procedure. Available from https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/940. Last visited 25 April 2019.

  36. 36.

    Arctic Council 2013, The Arctic Council Observer Manual (last updated 2016). Available from https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/939. Last visited 25 April 2019.

  37. 37.

    Arctic Council (2017), Exploring Common Solutions, Finland’s Chairmanship Programme for the Arctic Council 2017–2019.

  38. 38.

    Finland (2013), Finland’s Arctic Strategy. Available from https://um.fi/finland-s-arctic-strategy-and-northern-policy. Last visited 25 April 2019.

  39. 39.

    Canada (2010), Canada’s Northern Strategy. Available from https://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/index-eng.asp. Last visited 25 April 2019.

  40. 40.

    Canada (2013), The Canadian Arctic Council Chairmanship. Available from https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/226-canadian-chairmanship-program-2013-2015. Last visited 25 April 2019.

  41. 41.

    These worries were expressed in a series of interviews I conducted in connection with a project on Norway’s role in the Arctic Council in the winter and spring of 2013. In the view of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was an issue of prime importance in its work with the Council. Interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 30 April 2013.

  42. 42.

    US (2009) HSPD 25: Arctic Region Policy. Available from https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=232474. Last visited 25 April 2019 and US (2013) National Strategy for the Arctic region. Available from http://polarconnection.org/us-national-strategy-arctic-region-may-2013/. Last visited 25 April 2019.

  43. 43.

    For a detailed account of US involvement in the Arctic Council during this period see in addition Torbjørn Pedersen (2012): “Debates on the role of the Arctic Council”.

  44. 44.

    Nevertheless, the US, it should be noted, is the member state that has attended most meetings under the auspices of the Arctic Council. For a breakdown of the participation of member states, permanent participants and observers in the Arctic Council, see: Sebastian Knecht (2016): “The Politics of Arctic International Cooperation: Introducing a Data Set on stakeholder participation in Arctic Council meetings, 1998–2015” in Cooperation and Conflict, 52 (2), pp. 203–223.

  45. 45.

    Interview with a member of the EPPR team 22 April 2013 and AMAP team 02 May 2013.

  46. 46.

    Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2013.

  47. 47.

    Interview with Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, 27 June 2013.

  48. 48.

    Russia (2008), Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints. Available from https://archive.org/stream/563663-russias-arctic-strategy/563663-russias-arctic-strategy_djvu.txt. Last visited 25 April 2019.

  49. 49.

    Mention can also be made of Norway’s eagerness to get the newly created Arctic Economic Forum (AEC) and the Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat (IPS) located in Tromsø. Norway, of course, is an important economic contributor.

  50. 50.

    There is no complete breakdown of who finances the working groups or how it is done, but several of the people I have interviewed in recent years describe Norway as the most important financial contributor to the Arctic Council and the working groups. This commitment was evident during the important formative period around 2013, when interest in the Arctic among non-Arctic States was particularly visible. Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs 30 April 2013, interview with AMAP 02 May 2013, interview with EPPR 22 April 2013. See also Elana Wilson Rowe (2013): “Arctic hierarchies? Norway, status and the high north”. Polar Record. Published online February 2013. This trend seems set to continue, with Norway being the main funder of the permanent secretariat in Tromsø.

  51. 51.

    This despite the diplomatically tense relationship between China and Norway after the Peace Prize was awarded to Liu Xiaobo in 2011. Norway wanted, for example, China to be given status as a permanent observer in 2011. Interview with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 30 April 2013.

  52. 52.

    The permanent secretariat was formally opened during the Arctic Frontiers conference in the winter of 2013. During the joint Nordic presidency from 2006 to 2013, there was a temporary secretariat in Tromsø. The opening of the permanent secretariat itself took place in May 2013.

  53. 53.

    Svein Vigeland Rottem (2017): “The Use of Arctic Science: POPs, Norway and the Stockholm Convention”, Arctic Review on Law and Politics 8.

  54. 54.

    Svein Vigeland Rottem (2017): “The Use of Arctic Science: POPs, Norway and the Stockholm Convention”, Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 8.

  55. 55.

    Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report 2016. Available from http://um.dk/en/. Last visited 25 April 2019.

  56. 56.

    For a more detailed analysis of this initiative, see Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen and Gry Thomasen (2018): “Learning from the Ilulissat Initiative: State Power, Institutional Legitimacy, and Governance in the Arctic Ocean 2007–2018”, University of Copenhagen, Centre for Military Studies.

  57. 57.

    Iceland (2011), Arctic Policy of Iceland. Available from https://arcticiceland.is/en/stefna-islands-i-malefnum-nordhurslodha. Last visited 25 April 2019.

  58. 58.

    However, where competition is in fact greater is between Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle. It is no secret that Norway has wanted to come across as the optimal place to be in when the future of the Arctic is discussed. The idea of Tromsø as the Arctic capital has led to the location of the Arctic Council’s secretariat here, together with secretariats of AMAP, ACAP and EPPR, as well the Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat (IPS). Nothing should interfere with this thought. The Arctic Circle is thus rightly or wrongly perceived as a competitor.

  59. 59.

    Sweden (2011), Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region. Available from https://www.government.se/country-and-regional-strategies/2011/10/swedens-strategy-for-the-arctic-region/. Last visited 25 April 2019.

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  1. Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, Norway

    Svein Vigeland Rottem

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Rottem, S.V. (2020). Organisation, Actors and Member States’ Interests. In: The Arctic Council. Palgrave Pivot, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9290-0_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9290-0_2

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