Abstract
The present study focuses on a relationship between NPPs (Nuclear Power Plants) and society in Japan relating to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accidents in March 2011. Analyzing the process through which NPPs are embedded in political, economic and social contexts in Japan, it is revealed that community-divide was established between sites that accepted NPPs before the 1970s and sites without NPPs. After the accidents, this community-divide expanded between these sites as well as within each site. How can the Japanese society bridge this community-divide for responsible innovation regarding to the future energy? Focusing on the National Diet Report, I will show the recommendation the report made in 2012 and will introduce the Cabinet Office’s reaction reports of 2017. After these analyses, I look into these recommendations and reactions in the context of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI). RRI implies that societal actors work together during the whole research and innovation process (Horizon 2020). Based on the essence of the RRI, such as (1) Open up questions, (2) Mutual discussions, and (3) New-institutionalization, the present situation of Japanese NPPs are examined. Through this analysis, this paper shows one example of governance, public engagement and inclusion in the responsible R&D and Innovation process, dealing with Fukushima NPP accidents. These are “societal and institutional innovations” for the future.
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Notes
- 1.
Longman dictionary of contemporary English, 1987.
- 2.
Hecht (2009) indicated that in French case, nuclear program epitomized the link between French radiance and technological prowess, which was also linked to national identity.
- 3.
Its responsibilities should be: (1) To conduct regular investigations and explanatory hearings of regulatory agencies, academics and stakeholders. (2) To establish an advisory body, including independent experts with a global perspective, to keep the committee’s knowledge updated in its dealings with regulators. (3) To continue investigations on other relevant issues. (4) To make regular reports on their activities and the implementation of their recommendations.
- 4.
This includes: (1) A reexamination of the crisis management structure of the government. A structure must be established with a consolidated chain of command and the power to deal with emergency situations. (2) National and local governments must bear responsibility for the response to off-site radiation release. They must act with public health and safety as the priority. (3) The operator must assume responsibility for on-site accident response, including the halting of operations, and reactor cooling and containment.
- 5.
(1) A system must be established to deal with long-term public health effects, including stress-related illness. Medical diagnosis and treatment should be covered by state funding. Information should be disclosed with public health and safety as the priority, instead of government convenience. This information must be comprehensive, for use by individual residents to make informed decisions. (2) Continued monitoring of hotspots and the spread of radioactive contamination must be undertaken to protect communities and the public. Measures to prevent any potential spread should also be implemented. (3) The government must establish a detailed and transparent program of decontamination and relocation, as well as provide information so that all residents will be knowledgable about their compensation options.
- 6.
(1) The government must set rules and disclose information regarding its relationship with the operators. NAIIC 23. (2) Operators must construct a cross-monitoring system to maintain safety standards at the highest global levels. (3) TEPCO must undergo dramatic corporate reform, including governance and risk management and information disclosure—with safety as the sole priority. (4) All operators must accept an agency appointed by the National Diet as a monitoring authority of all aspects of their operations, including risk management, governance and safety standards, with rights to on-site investigations.
- 7.
(1) Independent: The chain of command, responsible authority and work processes must be: (i) Independent from organizations promoted by the government (ii) Independent from the operators (iii) Independent from politics. (2) Transparent: (i) The decision-making process should exclude the involvement of electric power operator stakeholders. (ii) Disclosure of the decision-making process to the National Diet is a must. (iii) The committee must keep minutes of all other negotiations and meetings with promotional organizations, operators and other political organizations and disclose them to the public. (iv) The National Diet shall make the final selection of the commissioners after receiving third-party advice. (3) Professional: (i) The personnel must meet global standards. Exchange programs with overseas regulatory bodies must be promoted, and interaction and exchange of human resources must be increased. (ii) An advisory organization including knowledgable personnel must be established. (iii) The no-return rule should be applied without exception. (4) Consolidated: The functions of the organizations, especially emergency communications, decision-making and control, should be consolidated. (5) Proactive: The organizations should keep up with the latest knowledge and technology, and undergo continuous reform activities under the supervision of the Diet.
- 8.
(1) Existing laws should be consolidated and rewritten in order to meet global standards of safety, public health and welfare. (2) The roles for operators and all government agencies involved in emergency response activities must be clearly defined. (3) Regular monitoring and updates must be implemented, in order to maintain the highest standards and the highest technological levels of the international nuclear community. (4) New rules must be created that oversee the backfit operations of old reactors, and set criteria to determine whether reactors should be decommissioned.
- 9.
- 10.
In addition, in siting NPP, agreement by governor of local government is required.
- 11.
- 12.
In U.S., NIH introduced ELSI study using from 3 to 5% of total funds relating to Human Genome Project. ELSI study introduced not only bio-technology domain, but also new material domain, e.g. nanotechnology. In EU, ELSA is included the 6th and 7th Framework program (2002–2006, 2007–2013, respectively).
- 13.
“Umbrella terms like ‘nanotechnology’ and ‘sustainability research’ have emerged as part of the new regime of Strategic Science. As mediators between science and society they have a dual role. Their overall promise allows resources to be mobilized for new fields which can then be productive in their own right. At the same time, however, they also put pressure on these fields to take relevance considerations into account” (Rip and Voß 2013).
- 14.
A word used in the discussion in the 4S (Society for Social Studies of Science), at the session on “Responsible Research and Innovation in Academic Practice: Institutions, Careers, Evaluation and Academic Integrity”, on Sept. 2nd, 2017, Boston.
- 15.
Statement by Ulrike Felt in the 4S/EASST conference at the session on “Case studies for responsible innovation: Lessons from Fukushima” as a discussant, on Sept. 3rd, 2016, Barcelona.
- 16.
Plan for safety NPP by TEPCO, 2013.
- 17.
La loi sur la transparence nucléaire et la sécurité en matière nucléaire, 2006.
- 18.
Komayashi (2007).
- 19.
Community-divide in Japanese society should be re-considered in the characteristics of the Japanese society like: Japanese society rely on “Not rule, but hierarchical relationship,” Nakane (1967).
- 20.
For example “If the situation do not change, there will be no nuclear power plants within 50 years”, “If we cannot describe a future perspectives of nuclear energy, then good, young students will not come in this domain”, “Engineers should be mentally prepared that if we have once more accident, then, nuclear power cannot survive in the Japanese society” (Mr. Yagawa, Emeritus Professor of University of Tokyo, Fellow of Atomic Energy Society in Japan, in his statement in Symposium on Atomic Energy at Science Council in Japan, July 8th, 2017).
- 21.
For example, a Dutch sociologist at the International Joint Conference of EASST (European Association of Studies of Science and technology) and 4S (Society for Social Studies of Science) (2012) expressed that “people in European countries are curious about the future of Japanese nuclear power as well as about the effect of citizen movements on future policy.” A French social economist at the same conference showed strong interest in the effect of Japanese nuclear power policy on similar policies in Europe. In addition, a German researcher at the same conference told me that it was an epoch-making event that the agency of Energy Resource, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry concluded that “Japan should set a goal for 0% NP by the 2030s (Kumagai 2012).”
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Fujigaki, Y. (2019). Lessons from Fukushima for Responsible Innovation: How to Construct a New Relationship Between Science and Society?. In: Lechevalier, S. (eds) Innovation Beyond Technology. Creative Economy. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9053-1_10
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