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Deployment on the Consumer’s Interaction Research: Behavioral Game Theory and Problems of Happiness

  • Kazuhisa TakemuraEmail author
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Abstract

Nowadays, people are communicating more efficiently in an economic society. Communication is typically a two-way interaction, but as the number of members increases from tripartite to quadripartite, the combination of interactions increases dramatically and the means of communication have become complicated as well. Communication can also be done strategically in situations, wherein the interests of the parties involved are in conflict and they are assumed to behave strategically as in game theory. Nonetheless, mutual communication can increase trust and cooperation as well as suppress the emergence of social dilemmas to a certain extent. This chapter explains game theory as a theoretical viewpoint to examine consumer interaction and discusses the research on happiness in relation to people’s social welfare.

Keywords

Decision making process Interaction Diffusion process Game theory Happiness 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PsychologyWaseda UniversityTokyoJapan

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