Abstract
As the seas have been increasingly used by drug smugglers, the Colombian Navy has played a central role in the interdiction of illicit drug flows. The author provides evidence of the many spaces in which the technologies and practices for interdiction are shaped. Long-term plans are an attempt to crystalise the role of the Navy as an able agency in the War on Drugs, there, visions and images of the enemy are entangled. During a Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO), the Navy personnel deploy diverse forms of knowledge. The patrol boat is key, and its qualities and characteristics are constantly reviewed and adjusted by the Navy personal in the field according to the perception of the enemy capabilities. Intelligence is crucial for the Navy actions, and helps to reduce uncertainty. The author argues that Ignorance Studies are useful to understand the paradoxical results of the Navy actions.
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Notes
- 1.
The participation of the US military in interdiction operations was sanctioned in 1989 by the National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989. To know more about the militarisation of the WoD in Latin America, see McDermott (2018).
- 2.
The certification is a unilateral decision of the US Government, specifically the executive branch. As a matter of internal policies, the US Government established a series of legal mechanisms through administrative and congressional procedures that require the President to annually provide his/her judgment on the efforts of different countries regarding issues affecting the security of the United States, such as nuclear security, terrorism, and narcotrafficking.
- 3.
The US Navy, in its Naval Operational Concepts, establishes two different concepts for Maritime Interdiction Operations: ‘Maritime Interception Operations: monitor, query, and board merchant vessels to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolutions and prevent the transport of restricted goods.’ Moreover, interception operations are carried out by LEAs, mainly the Coast Guard Unit (U.S. NAVY, 2010). According to the NATO, a Maritime Interdiction Operation ‘encompasses seaborne enforcement measures to intercept the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specific area’ (NATO, 2005).
- 4.
COMANDO ARMADA, Disposición 016/ 06 de COARC, Normas de Procedimiento Operacional.
- 5.
Development Plan for the Coast Guard of the National Navy.
- 6.
The company in charge of building the Colombian version of the Dolphin was Eduardo Londoño e Hijos Sucesores S. A. (Eduardoño S.A.), based in Medellin with offices in Bogota, Buenaventura, and Cartagena. This company mostly built small boats in polyester and GFRP (Glass-Fiber Reinforced Plastic) between 4 m and 13 m long to be used in transport, fisheries, and sports activities, until it was commissioned by the Navy to construct the Dolphin.
- 7.
Maritime infantry and the Antinarcotics Police also used the Dolphins and equipped them with 1×12.7 mm or 2×7.62 mm automatic guns.
- 8.
Each boat cost 40 million pesos in 1997, compared to 80 million pesos for a similar model off the shelf.
- 9.
The design and building process took five months, with a month of trials and adjustments.
- 10.
As noted in Chap. 3, smugglers also used a vast array of artisanal vessels, built in makeshift shipyards.
- 11.
In Spanish, Corporación de Ciencia y Tecnología para el Desarrollo de la Industrial Naval, Marítima y Fluvial.
- 12.
Together with a reliance type boat discarded by the US Coast Guard, where it was on service from 1968 to 2001. It was renamed Valle del Cauca and refitted to perform patrol duties in the Pacific Ocean.
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Guerrero C., J. (2020). How Do You Catch Drug Smugglers in the Open Sea?. In: Narcosubmarines. Palgrave Pivot, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9023-4_4
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