Abstract
This paper surveys the patterns of elite mobility of executives from the large central SOEs in China in the reform era between the companies and state institutions at the central and provincial levels. It shows that inter-system appointments of executive leaders became a common practice around 2000. Since then, executives have been appointed to state institutions in charge of China’s large central SOEs, mainly State-owned assets and supervision commission (SASAC), as well as the supervisory boards for large key enterprises. Such practice has transformed the profit-seeking managers of a company into bureaucrats in charge of the oversight of these companies and the overall reform of the SOE system. At the provincial level, corporate executives from the state sector have been appointed as provincial leaders. The chapter demonstrates that this specific pattern of inter-system appointments of SOE executives is the result of the regime’s cadre management system, aimed at enhancing the overall quality of public human resources in the state institutions and generally strengthening the state capacity.
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Notes
- 1.
The companies for the data sample were selected based on the survey of career backgrounds of regular or alternate members of the CCP Central Committee (CCP CC) (from the 12th to the 18th, i.e. from 1982 to 2012) assuming that individuals with managerial experience in business entities (or industries) that the regime deemed to be important would be recruited to the CCP CC at a certain point in time. To cover up for the underrepresentation of coal industry after 1993, when China National Coal Mine Corporation was closed down, China National Coal Industry Import and Export (Group) Corporation, which later changed its name to China National Coal Group Corporation (China Coal), was also included. The companies were first selected disregarding the shareholders structure. As expected, the survey revealed that mostly managers from SOEs or their subsidiaries (with the exception of Chunlan (Group) Corporation and Haier Group Corporation) have ever held membership in the CCP CC.
- 2.
Career data was collected using China Directory (1981–2015), People’s Daily, and online resources, mainly company websites and news reports, which were also used to crosscheck the data.
- 3.
Meritocratic principles appear to explain the majority of these appointments to the highest-level state institutions other than the ones discussed below. For example, in regards to Xiao Yaqing, former chairman of Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. appointed as the deputy secretary-general of the State Council in 2009, Downs and Meidan (2011) note that “the secret of Xiao’s success was his ability to simultaneously promote corporate and national interests” as demonstrated by the deal to purchase nine percent of Anglo-Australian mining company Rio Tinto by his company and in this way prevent one company from controlling one-third of the global iron ore market. Similarly, Miao Wei, in 2008 appointed as vice minister and in 2010 as minister of industry and information technology, was known for having turned China’s second largest automobile group Dongfeng Motor Corporation from a heavily indebted company into a highly profitable automobile maker in less than ten years (Zhang and Alon 2009). Jiang Jiemin, appointed as director of SASAC in 2013, had been praised for his achievements as a manager of Petro China.
- 4.
For the explanation on the problems that occured when the party substituted itself for the government and China’s return to the expanded discretion of state bureaucracy see Shirk (1992).
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Appendices
Appendix 6.1. Inter-system Appointments from SOEs to Central Government Institutions
Company (observation year) | Central government institution (year of appointment) |
|---|---|
Economic policy-related institutions | |
China State Shipbuilding Corporation (1992) | State Council Economic and Trade Office, deputy director (1992) |
China Petrochemical Corporation (1992) | State Economic and Trade Commission, director (1998) |
SOE supervisory institutions | |
China Petrochemical Group Corporation (Sinopec) (1992, 2000) | SASAC, deputy director (2003) |
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (2005, 2010) | SASAC, director (2013) |
Petro China Company Ltd. (2000, 2005, 2010) | SASAC, director (2013) |
China Shenhua Energy Company (2000, 2005, 2010) | SASAC, deputy director (2014) |
Aluminum Corporation of China (2005), Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (2000) | SASAC, director (2016) |
Chinese General Company of Aeronautics Industry (1992) | Inspector to Key Large SOEs (1998) |
Chinese General Company of Aeronautics Industry (1992) | Supervisory Board for Key Large SOEs (2000) |
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (2000, 2005) | Supervisory Board for Key Large SOEs (2000) |
Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (2000) | Supervisory Board for Key Large SOEs (2010) |
China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC) (2010) | Supervisory Board for Key Large SOEs (2010) |
China Nuclear Engineering Construction Corporation (CNECC) (2000, 2005, 2010) | Supervisory Board for Key Large SOEs (2012) |
Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (2000, 2005, 2010) | Supervisory Board for Key Large SOEs (2014) |
State Council , ministries | |
China National Coal Mine Corporation (1992) | State Council Leading Group of Poverty Alleviation and Development, deputy director (1999) |
China National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation (1992) | Ministry of Public Security, minister (2002) |
China National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation (1992) | State Council, councilor (2003) |
China Petrochemical Group Corporation (Sinopec) (1992, 2000) | Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, vice minister (2008) |
Dongfeng Motor Corporation (2000, 2005) | Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, vice minister (2008); minister (2010) |
Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (2005) | State Council, deputy secretary general (2009) |
Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (2000) | Ministry of Public Security (2012) |
Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. (2000) | State Council, Councilor (2013) |
Other institutions | |
China Petrochemical Corporation (1992) | State Administration of Work Safety, director (2005) |
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) (2010) | China Atomic Energy Authority, director (2013) |
Appendix 6.2. Inter-system Appointments from SOEs to Provincial Governments (Positions of Party-Committee Secretaries are Included for Reference Only)
Company | Local government position (year of appointment) |
|---|---|
China National Coal Mine Corporation | Shanxi Province governor (1992) (Shanxi Provincial Party Committee deputy secretary (1992)) |
Wuhan Iron and Steel Company (WISCO) | Beijing Municipality deputy governor (1998), governor (1999) (Beijing Municipal Party Committee dep. secretary (1998), secretary (2002)) |
Petro China Company Ltd. | Qinghai Province deputy governor (2000) (Qinghai Province Party Committee deputy secretary (2003)) |
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) | |
China National Offshore Oil Corporation | Hainan Provincial Party Committee deputy secretary (2003) |
Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. | Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region deputy governor (2004), governor (2008) (Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Party Committee deputy secretary (2004), secretary (2007)) |
Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation (Baosteel) | Shanghai Municipality deputy mayor (2007) |
China Electronics Corporation (CEC) | Hunan Province deputy governor (2007) |
China FAW Group Corporation | Jilin Province deputy governor (2007) (Jilin Provincial Party Committee deputy secretary (2012)) |
Taiyuan Iron and Steel (Group) Corporation (TISCO) | Shanxi Province deputy governor (2008) |
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) | Hebei Province deputy governor (2011–2012), governor (2012) (Hebei Provincial Party Committee deputy secretary (2011)) |
Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd. | Hebei Province acting governor (2011) Hebei Province governor (2012) |
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) | Fujian Province governor (2011) (Fujian Province Party Committee deputy secretary (2011)) |
Petro China Company Ltd. | |
China Petrochemical Group Corporation (Sinopec) | |
China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) | Liaoning Province deputy governor (2012) |
China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO) | Chongqing Municipal Party Committee deputy secretary (2013) Chongqing Municipality deputy mayor (2016), mayor (2017) |
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) | Guangdong Province deputy secretary (2013) Guangdong Province acting governor (2016), governor (2017) |
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) | Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region deputy governor (2013) (Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Party group deputy secretary (2013)) |
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) | Zhejiang Province deputy governor (2014) |
China Three Gorges Corporation | Hubei Province deputy governor (2014) (Hubei Provincial Party Committee deputy governor (2014)) |
Aviation Industry Corporation of China | Liaoning Province governor (2015) |
China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) | Hunan Province governor (2016) |
China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO) | Tianjin Municipal Party Committee deputy secretary (2017) Tianjin Municipality deputy mayor, mayor (2018) |
Appendix 6.3. Estimated Links Between the Surveyed Companies and Provincial Governments with Leaders/Former Corporate Managers
Company | Province of appointment | Company’s connection to the province |
|---|---|---|
China National Coal Mine Corporation | Shanxi Province | Major industry/resource deposits (China’s biggest coal-producing province) |
Wuhan Iron and Steel Company (WISCO) | Beijing Municipality | |
Petro China Company Ltd. | Qinghai Province | Major industry/resource deposits (one of the major locations of China’s oil and natural gas deposits) |
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) | ||
China National Offshore Oil Corporation | Hainan Province (party committee) | Resource deposits (the state’s intention to develop oil and gas resources in the South China Sea) |
Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. | Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region | Resource deposits (major site of China’s bauxite reserves) |
Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation (Baosteel) | Shanghai Municipality | Location (company base) |
China Electronics Corporation (CEC) | Hunan Province | One of the larger industries |
China FAW Group Corporation | Jilin Province | Major industry (automobile production is one of the dominant industries) |
Taiyuan Iron and Steel (Group) Corporation (TISCO) | Shanxi Province | Location (company base) |
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) | Hebei Province | |
Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd. | Hebei Province | |
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) | Fujian Province | Location (construction of the West–East Gas Pipeline III terminating in Fujian scheduled to start in 2012) |
Petro China Company Ltd. | ||
China Petrochemical Group Corporation (Sinopec) | ||
China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) | Liaoning Province | Location (Liaoning province – one of the locations for China’s geographically dispersed shipbuilding industry) |
China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO) | Chongqing Municipality | |
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) | Guangdong Province | |
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) | Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region | |
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) | Zhejiang Province | |
China Three Gorges Corporation | Hubei Province | Location (Three Gorges Dam in the province) |
Aviation Industry Corporation of China | Liaoning Province | |
China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) | Hunan Province | |
China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO) | Tianjin Municipality |
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Macikenaite, V. (2020). Elite Mobility Between the SOEs and State Institutions: A State-Centered Approach. In: Naito, H., Macikenaite, V. (eds) State Capacity Building in Contemporary China. Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9_6
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