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Economic Modernization and the Rise of Restricted Legislative Representation in China: A Case Study of Shenzhen

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State Capacity Building in Contemporary China

Part of the book series: Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies ((EESIPS))

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Abstract

How do we explain the resilience of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party in the process of economic modernization? Based on a case study of Shenzhen, this chapter reveals that economic modernization increases the legislative representation of the People’s Congresses by influencing the ideas, demands and capacities of the local authorities, officials, deputies, and society. Moreover, it also illustrates that the legislative representation in China is a form of restricted representation. Its development, on the one hand, improves the government’s responsiveness, thus relieving much of the social conflict and increasing the satisfaction with the government; on the other hand, it does not challenge the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, which is beneficial to regime consolidation in China.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Lipset (1959), p. 69.

  2. 2.

    See, e.g., Barro (1999), p. 158, Bollen (1979), p. 572, Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), p. 903, Huntington (1991), Jackman (1973), p. 611, Lipset (1959), p. 69, Londregan and Poole (1996), p. 1.

  3. 3.

    Boix and Svolik, “The foundations of limited authoritarian government,” 300; Brancati, “Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects,” 313; Escribà-Folch, “Do authoritarian institutions mobilize economic cooperation?,” 71; Ezrow and Erica, “State institutions and the survival of dictatorships,” 1; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, “A dictator’s toolkit Understanding how co-optation affects repression in autocracies,” 332; Gandhi, “Dictatorial institutions and their impact on economic growth,” 3; Gandhi, Political institutions under dictatorship; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, “Elections under authoritarianism,” 403; Gandhi and Przeworski, “Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats,” 1279; Magaloni, “Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule,” 715; Miller, “Electoral authoritarianism and human development,” 1; Reuter and Robertson. B., “Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes,” 235; Schedler, “The logic of electoral authoritarianism”; Milan W. Svolik, The politics of authoritarian rule; Wright and Escriba-Folch, “Authoritarian institutions and regime survival,” 283.

  4. 4.

    Cho (2009).

  5. 5.

    He and Wang (2011).

  6. 6.

    He and Liu (2013).

  7. 7.

    Huang and Chen (2015).

  8. 8.

    O’Brien (1994).

  9. 9.

    Huang and Chen (2015).

  10. 10.

    Cho (2009).

  11. 11.

    Manion (2014, 2015).

  12. 12.

    Truex (2016).

  13. 13.

    Lai (2001).

  14. 14.

    Li (2015).

  15. 15.

    Sun (2011).

  16. 16.

    Manion (2015, 2016).

  17. 17.

    Huang and Chen (2015).

  18. 18.

    Manion (2015) and Truex (2016).

  19. 19.

    The data are from the Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2018.

  20. 20.

    The data are collected by the author.

  21. 21.

    Interviewee 1; see 163.com (2010).

  22. 22.

    163.com (2010).

  23. 23.

    Interviewee 5; see Yang (2014).

  24. 24.

    Interviewee 5; see Zhang (2014) and 163.com (2010).

  25. 25.

    Interviewee 2.

  26. 26.

    Shenzhen CCP Committee (2015).

  27. 27.

    Zou and Chen (2007).

  28. 28.

    Ibid.

  29. 29.

    Interviewee 4; see also Zou and Chen (2007).

  30. 30.

    Ibid.

  31. 31.

    Fang (2008).

  32. 32.

    Gdrd.cn (2013).

  33. 33.

    General Office of Shenzhen MPC Standing Committee (2008).

  34. 34.

    Xu (2011).

  35. 35.

    Interviewee 5.

  36. 36.

    “Guanyu tuiguang guochan yiliao qixie zai woshi yingyong de jianyi 〈关于推广国产医疗器械在我市应用的建议〉” (No. 20100036). Deputy Proposal of the Shenzhen MPC in 2010.

  37. 37.

    Calculated according to the contents of Shenzhen MPC Proposals, 2010–2012.

  38. 38.

    Zhang (2014) and 163.com (2010).

  39. 39.

    Interviewee 5.

  40. 40.

    See, e.g., Cai (2002), Sun (2013).

  41. 41.

    General Office of Shenzhen MPC Standing Committee (2013).

  42. 42.

    Interviewee 5.

  43. 43.

    Interviewee 2.

  44. 44.

    Interviewee 5.

  45. 45.

    Szlh.gov.cn (2014).

  46. 46.

    Interviewee 5.

  47. 47.

    Liang (2014).

  48. 48.

    Guancha.cn (2013) and Nanfang ribao (2013).

  49. 49.

    Ibid.

  50. 50.

    A social media channel which is very popular in China.

  51. 51.

    Zhou (2014).

  52. 52.

    Xiao and Ge (2014).

  53. 53.

    Interviewee 5; see Xiao and Ge (2014); PC Standing Committee of Luohu. “‘Rendadaibiao jinshequ’ zhiduhua yunzuo de shijian yu sikao 〈《人大代表进社区》制度化运作的实践与思考〉”.

  54. 54.

    “Guanyu jiaqiang shi renda changweihui gangxing jiandu de jianyi 〈关于加强市人大常委会刚性监督的建议〉” (No. 20100490). Deputy Proposal of Shenzhen MPC in 2010.

  55. 55.

    “Guanyu xuanba youxiu lvshi danren faguan, jianchaguan de jianyi 〈关于选拔优秀律师担任法官, 检察官的建议〉” (No. 20110179). Deputy Proposal of Shenzhen MPC in 2011.

  56. 56.

    “Guanyu zhengfu bumen, rendadaibiao kaitong weibo de jianyi 〈关于政府部门人大代表开通微博的建议〉” (No. 20120280). Deputy Proposal of Shenzhen MPC in 2012.

  57. 57.

    See, e.g., Barro1999), Bollen (1979), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Huntington (1991), Jackman (1973), Lipset (1959), pp. 69–105, Londregan and Poole (1996).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Political Science and Public Administration, East China University of Political Science and Law, No. 555, Longyuan Road, Shanghai, 201620, China

    Chuanmin Chen

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  1. Chuanmin Chen
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Correspondence to Chuanmin Chen .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Northeast Asian Studies, Tohoku University, Sendai, Miyagi, Japan

    Hiroko Naito

  2. Graduate School of International Relations, International University of Japan, Niigata, Japan

    Vida Macikenaite

Interviewee List

Interviewee List

  1. 1.

    Shenzhen MPC Deputy A, Shenzhen, 7 May 2013.

  2. 2.

    District-level PC official B in Shenzhen, Shenzhen, 27 January 2015.

  3. 3.

    Deputy Liaison C in Shenzhen, Shenzhen, 27 January 2015.

  4. 4.

    Deputy Liaison D in Shenzhen, Shenzhen, 2 February 2015.

  5. 5.

    Shenzhen MPC Deputy E, Shenzhen, 11 February 2015.

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Chen, C. (2020). Economic Modernization and the Rise of Restricted Legislative Representation in China: A Case Study of Shenzhen. In: Naito, H., Macikenaite, V. (eds) State Capacity Building in Contemporary China. Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8898-9_2

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