Abstract
After one century of humiliations, the recovery of China started already during the Mao era. However, it is especially thanks to Deng that China’s long march towards prosperity and world power gained momentum.
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08 January 2020
The original publication can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8879-8_7
Notes
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In their conclusion Ma and Zhang (2009) consider that NPM ‘at best provides an incomplete picture of the inherent logic of rebuilding the Chinese administrative state during the reform era’, ibidem, p. 246. Granted. But, as they admit, the logic of Chinese reforms (especially the process of marketization, a typical NPM policy device) has been the dominant policy option followed by the Chinese leadership since 1978 and up to about the mid-1990s.
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That is, organizations based upon formal and technical rules, hierarchies, competence and the practice of secrecy. See on this important point based upon the works of Max Weber, Urio (1984), pp. 45–59 and 217–282.
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The economic actors acquire goods at the low prices set by the plan, and then sell them at the market price when the quantity set by the plan has been sold.
- 7.
It goes without saying that the causal links suggested are purely qualitative in most cases. To our knowledge there is today no quantitative model able to take into consideration the complexity of these links. There is nevertheless sufficient empirical evidence that the arrows connecting the sets of variables, represented in the figure by the rectangles, are reasonably based upon a causal relationship.
- 8.
I understand that taxation is more important, and in any case must precede expenditures. This has become a crucial point when the fiscal decentralization of the 1980s showed that the central government did not possess the financial means needed to finance the policies necessary not only for sustaining the economic development, but also and above all in order to finance the policies needed to correct the unwanted consequences of the introduction of market mechanisms. Only an efficient economic system can provide the state with the financial basis from which it can draw the financial resources it needs.
- 9.
Of course, another way of realizing this objective would be to hire talents from the private sector in China and abroad, both foreigners and (more likely) Chinese people who received university training abroad and have also been working in Western countries. It seems that, at least for the moment, this strategy is practiced more frequently by Chinese private companies and SOEs than by public bureaucracies.
- 10.
The world Bank further explains that ‘under the planned economy of the Mao era the communes were responsible not only for organizing production and distribution, but also for providing social services including health care. These services were financed by contributions from rural families (about 0.5 to 2% of their income), by the villages (from their income from agriculture and rural enterprises), and subsidies from higher-level government used mostly to pay for health workers’ salaries and medical equipment.’ (p. 125). The fundamental institutional change introduced by the reforms in the rural areas was ‘the land reform characterized by the implementation of the household responsibility system in rural China, whereby farm households became residual claimants to output by receiving land use rights in return for delivery of a certain quota of grain to the village and meeting their tax obligations.’ (p. 78).
- 11.
Li Qiang (2002) comments: ‘According to my prestige and status surveys since 1996, peasant-workers are at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Peasants doing business in cities are ranked 92 in 100 occupations, while peasants finding employment in cities, 94. The last 10 in the list are typical occupations for peasant-workers, such as gatekeepers, carters, waste collectors, housemaids, porters and guards. Ironically, these peasant-workers are elites with apparently better personal qualities and abilities than those remaining in villages. They belong to a most active age group. They usually have a higher level of education, and are particularly capable in economic activities.’ (p. 3 of the electronic version).
- 12.
Tang and Yang comment: ‘while migrant workers continue to occupy more blue-collar and service jobs than urban residents, their economic, social and political status has improved’, p. 759. It is also interesting to note that the Chinese Trade Unions have admitted to the national congress of October 2008 47 representatives of migrant workers (China Daily, October 17, 2008) which shows that their status and needs are being recognized.
- 13.
Let us remark that at the same time the Government has publicly declared that it will take measures to accelerate the urbanization process in China. This is very likely because the urban areas are supposed to create more relatively well-paid jobs than the rural areas, and in any case the process of urbanization is the inevitable consequence of the development of a modern economy.
- 14.
For a detailed history of the emergence and implementation of family planning in China see Hu Angang and Zou Ping 1991, pp. 67–109. The information mentioned above is on page 93.
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With a total population of about 32 million, distributed between about 6 million in the urban centre, and 26 million in the countryside, with many of them emigrating to the urban area in search of better employment opportunities, Chongqing is a good example. Chongqing initiated a pilot programme for poor people, including migrant workers and poor urban people in the late-1990s, providing them, in particular, with affordable and adequate lodgings. (Urio 2012, pp. 182–185).
- 17.
And Lin Chun comments: This is one of the cases which prove that positive results can be attained through management and organizational reforms rather than property transfer, p. 24, note 42. Lin Chun further comments that ‘the nation’s largest SOEs turned around from struggling over losses to making $78.5 billion in profits in 2005 (…) In 2006, central SOEs earned $88 billion in the first 11 months, up 18.9% over the same period in 2005 (…) In fact large SOEs are rarely loss-makers; a large share of SOEs losses in China is concentrated in a small number of sectors, p. 24, note 43.
- 18.
For example: Liu Chuanzhi (Lenovo), Zhang Ruimin (Haier), Ren Zhengfei (Huawei), and Li Dongsheng (TCL).
- 19.
For example; Neil Shen (Ctrip), Chen Tianqiao (Shenda), Jason Jiang (Focus Media), Jack Ma (Alibaba.com), and Robin Li (Baidu.com). Remark the Americanization of their names.
- 20.
Nevertheless, I should like to point out the Haier University I visited in 2005 that, at that time, combined modern management tools with traditional Chinese strategies and wisdom.
- 21.
The distinction between these two components of the power elite (political and economic) is rather artificial, as there is a considerable overlapping between them. Nevertheless, I use here the accepted distinction based upon the main role played by members of these two groups (politicians or managers/owners of companies). The same phenomenon of overlapping exists in the West, even if with different modalities.
- 22.
In addition to many updates, this section is mainly based upon Joan Bastide and Alexandre Sonnay, Le role de la Chine dans le protocole de Kyoto, unpublished Master dissertation for the Master degree in Asian Studies, University of Geneva, 2005, under the supervision of Prof. Paolo Urio.
- 23.
To produce one ton of steel requires up to one hundred tons of water, an average factory of electronic chips consumes 18 million tons of water per day, equal to the annual consumption of a city of 60,000 inhabitants.
- 24.
For a historical analysis of the development and problems of the Chinese population see Hu Angang and Zou Ping (1991), pp. 14–15 for statistical data.
- 25.
Scientists who dared sustain Malthus’s argument are disqualified and targeted as ‘rightists’. Thus, Ma Yinchu, a prominent Chinese scholar and president of Peking University has suffered from a two-decade propaganda campaign, and was dismissed from his academic post after the publication in 1957 of a report entitled ‘New demography’, the product of years of in-depth research, which concluded that a too large population is detrimental to the development of China. See Hu and Zou 1991, especially Chaps 2 and 3.
- 26.
Data kindly provided by Hu Angang, Tsinghua University, based upon the World Bank database and the European Union.
- 27.
According to IMF Data Bank 2009 for 2008, National Bureau of Statistic of China (NBSC) for 2009 and World Bank’s Quarterly Update, November 2010 for the forecast for 2010.
- 28.
It is interesting to take the Trilateral commission into consideration, because it was set up by David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski in July 1973, to develop cooperation between North America, Western Europe and Japan. The Commission has attracted criticism from both the right and the left. From the right, Republican Senator Barry Goldwater criticized the Commission for being a skilful, coordinated effort to seize control and consolidate the four centres of power: political, monetary, intellectual and ecclesiastical, and to promote the creation of a worldwide economic power superior to the political governments of the nation-states involved. People of the left have been even more critical: Noam Chomsky has described the Trilateral Commission as being the liberal wing of the intellectual elite, i.e. liberal internationalists from Europe, Japan and the United States. […] [The Trilateral Commission] was concerned with trying to induce what they called ‘more moderation in democracy’—turn people back to passivity and obedience so they don’t put so many constraints on state power and so on. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trilateral_Commission (accessed 12 February 2017).
- 29.
Wang uses the following indicators (that are in fact obtained by combining several sub-indicators): (1) productivity and research and development; (2) education; (3) public services; (4) infrastructure; (5) institutional development; (6) human development; (7) social equity; (8) social security; (9) environmental protection; and (10) natural resources and geographical location.
- 30.
This tier comprises the majority of the Chinese provinces: Chongqing, Henan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Guangxi, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Anhui, Ningxia, Hebei, Xinjiang, Hubei, Shanxi, Hunan, Jilin, and Hainan.
- 31.
And Yang and Hu comment: ‘taking in the first tier the city Shanghai as an example: in 2005, per capita disposable income of an urban household (18,645 yuan) was nearly 2.5 times that of a rural household (8,247 yuan).’.
- 32.
Keiled explains: ‘Meaningful analysis of China’s regional disparities requires a degree of aggregation over provincial-level entities. China has 31 provincial-level administrative units (hereafter “provinces”), four of which are “municipalities.” Three of these municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai) have limited rural economies, making meaningful comparison with other entities especially difficult. Conversely, a province like Hebei, out of which both Beijing and Tianjin have been carved, has no real major urban area comparable to those of other provinces, undermining meaningful relevant comparisons.
- 33.
The seven regions are: (1) Far West (comprising Xingjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu, and Ningxia), (2) North Hinterland (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and Shaanxi, (3) South Hinterland (Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Guangxi), (4) Central Core (Henan, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, and Hunan), North Coast (Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin, and Shandong), (6) East Coast (Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Zhejiang), and (7) South Coast (Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan), in Keidel, ibidem, pp. 2–3.
- 34.
Keidel 2007, pp. 12–13, uses the revised World Bank’s one-dollar-a-day standard to measure poverty by a consumption measure. China has not made consumption size distribution data available. ‘China, however, has allowed the World Bank to post on its web site a statistical query facility called PovCal.ner, to allow approximation of China’s consumption distribution for the national rural population’. Keidel limits the analysis to data about five provinces, two coastal regions, i.e. Jiangsu (representing Central Core), and Liaoning (representing North Coast), and three inner regions, i.e. Hunan (for Central Core), Sichuan (for South Hinterland), and Shaanxi (for North Hinterland). Moreover, Keidel considers that one should take into account the changes in savings habits.
- 35.
These are: in order of magnifying poverty rate: the Chinese Poverty line, the Old World Bank PPP $1/day Line, the New World Bank PPP $1/day Line, and the New World Bank PPP $2/day Line.
- 36.
I have already mentioned the results of a research by De Brauw and John Giles (2008) that revealed that migrations from rural villages led to significant increases in consumption per capita, and this effect is stronger for poorer households within villages.
- 37.
Clark (2007) shows that during the first phase of the Industrial revolution the standard of living of the large majority of the population increased considerably, compared to the previous centuries, and that disparities between the upper class and the lowest ones diminished. Nevertheless, after the initial stage divergences between these classes developed again. This process has been further amplified after the introduction of neo-liberal policies in the 1980s and the 1990s (Urio 1999).
- 38.
- 39.
The MPI reflects both the incidence of poverty—the proportion of the population that is multidimensionally poor—and the average intensity of their deprivation—the average proportion of indicators in which they are deprived. The MPI is calculated by multiplying the incidence of poverty by the average intensity across the poor. A person is identified as poor if he or she is deprived in at least 30% of the weighted indicators (OPHI 2011).
- 40.
Information about these problems can be found in the leading journals on medicine such as the New England Journal of Medicine, and The Lancet and its The Lancet series on health system reform in China. For an overall presentation of China’s health and poverty problems: Hu (2007), with chapters on ‘China’s economic growth and poverty reduction (1978–2002)’, pp. 97–132; ‘China’s macro-economy and health’, pp. 133–151; and ‘Health insecurity: The biggest challenge to human security in China’, pp. 152–166; and Chap. 44 in Hu 2011: ‘A Healthy China: Progress and Problem’, pp. 65–81.
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Urio, P. (2019). The New Public Management Comes to China. In: China 1949–2019. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8879-8_3
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