Abstract
This chapter revolves around Sino-Soviet cooperation during the Korean War. The Sino-Soviet alliance demonstrated its political, military, diplomatic, and economic functions during the war. The dispatch of Chinese troops to Korea not only saved Pyongyang but also smoothed over Moscow’s erroneous decision to permit Kim Il-sung to attack South Korea. It defended the east gate of the socialist bloc. To a large extent, it had the effect of influencing and changing Stalin’s view of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Mao Zedong. The Soviet Union provided significant and comprehensive aid to China. Thus, the Sino-Soviet alliance safeguarded the success of the Korean War for the socialist bloc, and the war consolidated the political and economic foundation of the Sino-Soviet alliance.
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Notes
- 1.
On Soviet estimates of the prewar US position, see Shen, Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War, pp. 53–54.
- 2.
Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept.16–Oct.15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 6–7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 105.
- 3.
For Stalin’s hesitation from July to September 1950 about Chinese troops becoming involved in the Korean War, see Shen and Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, pp. 72–77.
- 4.
Because the Russian version of Mao’s 2 October cable indicates that the Chinese leaders were not yet ready to send troops to Korea, Alexander Mansourov argues that Chinese leaders might have completely backed away from their original intention of sending troops to Korea by early October 1950. For debate on the authenticity of the Chinese version of Mao’s 2 October 1950 cable, see Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War,” pp. 94–119; Shen Zhihua, “The Discrepancy between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao’s 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar’s Reply,” CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 8–9 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 237–42. This author concludes that “Mao did not change his goals but rather the tactics he would use to achieve them. Instead of replying directly and positively to Stalin’s request, Mao adopted a more indirect and ambiguous response so that he would be able to reconcile his own determination to enter the war with the disagreements still existing among other CCP leaders, while at the same time keeping the door for further communication (and bargaining) with Stalin open” (p. 241).
- 5.
Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War,” pp. 94–107.
- 6.
“The Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party,” July 14 and 15, 1960, in Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989), vol. 2, p. 308.
- 7.
Jung-chen Nieh, Inside the Red Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Beijing: New World Press, 1988), p. 640.
- 8.
For a study of the Korean armistice negotiations, see Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, pp. 43–75.
- 9.
For the text of the proposal, see FRUS, 1951, vol. 7, p. 64; For the background of the proposal, see William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 152–54.
- 10.
Ciphered Telegram, Roshchin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 13 January 1951, in CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 6–7 (Winter 1995/96), p. 54.
- 11.
“Editorial Note, Chou Enlai to the Acting Secretary General of the UN,” 17 January 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. 7, pp. 90–91; Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 30.
- 12.
David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), pp. 225–56.
- 13.
Jung-chen Nieh, Inside the Red Star, p. 641.
- 14.
Ibid.
- 15.
William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 139. In reality, Kim Il-sung had lost much of his power to command the North Korean troops after December 1950 when Chinese and North Korean forces signed an agreement to establish a joint Chinese–North Korean headquarters. This put the commanding power of all Communist forces in Korea into the hands of the Chinese commanders.
- 16.
Editorial Note, “Malik’s Radio Address on Korean Ceasefire,” 23 June 1951, in FRUS, 1951, vol. 7, p. 547; Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), p. 191; Stueck, The Korean War, p. 208. On the next day, Stalin wrote to Mao, “[Y]ou must always know from Malik’s speech that our promise about raising the question of an armistice has already been fulfilled by us. It is possible that the matter of an armistice will move forward.” See Ciphered Telegram, Filippov [Stalin] to Mao Zedong, 2 June 1951, CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 6–7 (Winter 1995/96), p. 62.
- 17.
Acheson to the Embassy in the USSR, 25 June 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. 7, pp. 553–54; Kirk to the Secretary of State, 26, 27 June 1951, ibid., vol. 7, pp. 555, 560–61; Stueck, The Korean War, p. 209; Foot, A Substitute for Victory, p. 37.
- 18.
Ciphered Telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin); Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong, 30 June 1951, CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 6–7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 64–65.
- 19.
Ciphered Telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Razuvaev, with Message for Kim Il-sung, 1 July 1951, in ibid., p. 65.
- 20.
Author’s interview with Wang Yazhi from June to September 2001. Wang Yazhi had been Zhou Enlai’s military secretary and in the 1950s he served on Peng Dehuai’s staff. He was later transferred to the National Science and Technology Commission for Defense.
- 21.
For Soviet military aid to China during the Korean War, see Shen and Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, pp. 85–88.
- 22.
On Soviet economic aid to China during the Korean War, see ibid., pp. 88–91.
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Shen, Z. (2020). Differences and Cooperation During the Korean War, 1950–1953. In: Shen, Z. (eds) A Short History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1991. China Connections. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8641-1_9
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