Abstract
This chapter discusses the political and economic foundation of the Sino-Soviet alliance. It focuses on the 1948–1949 period. Against the backdrop of an emerging global Cold War, Soviet policy toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) changed from limited contact to active support in 1948. Anastas Mikoyan’s trip to the CCP headquarters at Xibaipo in early 1949 and Liu Shaoqi’s visit to Moscow in the summer of 1949 proved to be important steps toward the formation of strategic cooperation between Communist China and the Soviet Union.
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Notes
- 1.
The Soviet Communist Party was called the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) from 1925 to 1952. It was renamed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1952.
- 2.
In this context, the Chinese Changchun Railway consisted of the Chinese Eastern Railway (from Manzhouli to Harbin to Suifenhe) and the South Manchuria Railway (from Changchun to Dalian).
- 3.
Chen Yun, “Some Suggests Concerning Our Work in Manchuria,” 30 November 1945, in Chen Yun, 1926–1949 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1988), pp. 214, 216.
- 4.
Ivan Kovalev was minister of transportation during World War II. He was the CPSU CC representative to the CCP from January 1949 to January 1950. He also served as leader of the Soviet experts in China until January 1950 when he was replaced by Ivan Arkhipov.
- 5.
For an analysis of Soviet policies toward China from 1945 to 1948, see Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), pp. 12–15.
- 6.
On Mao’s numerous requests to visit the USSR, see Shen and Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, pp. 16–20.
- 7.
For reactions to this report, see Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners, Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 41–43; Dieter Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945–1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), pp. 135–36.
- 8.
On the various issues CCP leaders discussed with Mikoyan in Xibaipo, see Shen and Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, pp. 20–27.
- 9.
“On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” 30 June 1949, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), pp. 416–417.
- 10.
The delegation also included CCP CC member Wang Jiaxiang, who was designated as New China’s first ambassador to the Soviet Union. See Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China, pp. 174–230.
- 11.
Zhihua Shen, Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s, tr. Neil Silver (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 79.
- 12.
For a detailed analysis, see Shen and Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, pp. 28–30.
- 13.
According to Soviet diplomat Mikhail Kapitsa, “One of the most serious reasons for Stalin’s distrust of Mao was Lüshun, Dalian, and the Chinese Changchun Railway.” See Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War, p. 67.
- 14.
After the failure of the battle of Jinmen in October 1949, during his visit to Moscow Mao asked the USSR to send a volunteer air force or clandestine forces to assist in attacking Taiwan. Stalin told Mao that the Soviet Union would provide military equipment and advisers, but the Soviet air force and navy could not take part in any military operations. The CCP never again made such a request, but it did ask the USSR to provide air force and naval equipment. For an analysis, see Shen and Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, pp. 30–32.
- 15.
Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into the Korean War,” Cold War International History Project (hereafter cited as CWIHP) Working Paper, no. 2 (1992), p. 15.
- 16.
Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p. 415.
- 17.
For example, Dieter Heinzig notes, “Apparently in order to create a favorable atmosphere for the talks, Mao Zedong published what was up to that time the most decisive public declaration in favor of an alliance with the USSR shortly after the Chinese delegation arrived.” See Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China, p. 178.
- 18.
A careful reading of Mikoyan’s twelve reports during his visit to Xibaipo indicates that Mao asked the CPSU to clearly state its position regarding the CCP, but to no avail. Although he expressed support for some concrete issues, Mikoyan failed to elaborate on the CPSU’s comprehensive policy toward the CCP.
- 19.
For details, see Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949–1972 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), pp. 12–42.
- 20.
For an English account of Huang Hua’s contacts with Andrei Ledovskii, see Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China, pp. 232–46.
- 21.
Andrei Ledovskii, Nanjing zhaji [Random Notes in Nanjing] (unpublished ms.), pp. 47, 52, 54, as cited in Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China, pp. 232–45.
- 22.
For the “lost chance” debate in Western scholarship, see Warren I. Cohen, intro., “Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China,” Diplomatic History, vol. 21, no. 1 (January 1997), pp. 71–115; John W. Garver, “The Opportunity Costs of Mao’s Foreign Policy Choices,” China Journal, no. 49 (January 2003), pp. 127–36; Chen Jian, “Response: How to Pursue a Critical History of Mao’s Foreign Policy,” China Journal, no. 49 (January 2003), pp. 140–41.
- 23.
Heinzig notes that President Harry S Truman accepted a recommendation from the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “it would be about a quarter of a century before Washington would again be able to pursue a successful and active China policy.” Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China, p. 255.
- 24.
It is a coincidence that the Soviet embassy in China submitted a memorandum on 30 June 1949, titled “U.S. and UK Reactionaries Hope that Bourgeois Nationalism Will Appear in Democratic China.” From recently published articles, we can see that US and UK propaganda pay special attention to the inclusion of articles that might arouse nationalistic feelings among the Chinese, especially CCP members. The main purpose is to create enmity between democratic China and the Soviet Union, the CCP, and the CPSU.
- 25.
See, for example, “Farewell, Leighton Stuart,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 4, pp. 433–39; “Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle,” 14 August 1949, in ibid., pp. 425–32.
- 26.
Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, p. 64.
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Shen, Z. (2020). The Political and Economic Foundations of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1948–1949. In: Shen, Z. (eds) A Short History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1991. China Connections. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8641-1_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8641-1_7
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