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India as Jealous Foe and the BRI

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China’s Achilles’ Heel

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Abstract

Convinced that India will not join BRI directly or Indirectly Chinese critics explore the reasons behind India’s rejections. They come up with several reasons. One is India’s deep-rooted threat perceptions towards China. Chinese accuse that India inherited colonial thinking from British Indian Empire and attribute it to India’s perceptions of Indian Ocean and South Asian region as its backyard resulting in Indian view of Chinese “intrusions” into its backyard. However the most important reason for India’s rejection of BRI is attributed to India’s great power mentality, and Nehru’s words which Chinese perceive as attesting to Nehru’s great power aspirations and expansionism was quoted to prove the contemporary India’s great power aspirations. Chinese scholars also argue that U.S media also greatly influenced Indian perceptions towards BRI.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Liu Zhen, Liu Yingtian, Cheng Binxiu and Ceng Fengwei, ““yi dai yi lu” bei jing xia Meng Zhong Yin Mian jingji zoulang jianshe jinzhan, wenti yu duice yanjiu” [In the context of One Belt And One Road, A study on the problems facing the development of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor and its countermeasures], Bianjie yu haiyang yanjiu [Journal of Boundary and Ocean Studies], No. 6 (2017), p. 50.

  2. 2.

    Feng Chuanlu, ““yi dai yi lu” yu “ji feng ji hua” zhanlue duijie: youxiao zhengce xuanxiangyi huo weimingti” [The strategic linking between“One Belt And One Road”and“Mausam plan”: Effective policy options or false proposition], Nanya yanjiu [South Asian Studies], No. 2 (2016), p. 50.

  3. 3.

    Ibid., p. 46.

  4. 4.

    Ibid., p. 55.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., p. 57.

  6. 6.

    Chen Shuisheng and Xi Guigui, ““yi dai yi lu”changyi de zhanlue duijie wenti: yi Zhongguo yu Yindu de hezuo weili” [Strategic linking issues of “One Belt And One Road” Initiative: China-India cooperation as an example], Nanya yanjiu [South Asian Studies], No. 4 (2015), p. 75.

  7. 7.

    Gan Junxian, ““yi dai yi lu”: long xiang du xing yi huo gong wu?” [The Belt and Road Initiative: Dragon and Elephant going alone or dancing together?], Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], No. 4 (2015), p. 104.

  8. 8.

    Li Xiao, ““yid ai yi lu” zhanlue shishi zhongde “Yindu kunju”-Zhong guo qi ye tou zi yindu de kun jing yu dui ce” [“Indian dilemma” in the implementation of “One Belt And One Road” strategy- the dilemma and countermeasures of Chinese enterprises investing in India], Guoji jingji pinglun [International Economic Review], No. 5 (2015), p. 25.

  9. 9.

    Yang Siling, “Yindu ruhe kandai yi dai yi lu xia de Zhong Yin guanxi” [How does India view China-India relations in the context of “One Belt And One Road”], Xueshu qianyan [Frontiers], No. 5 (2015), p. 42.

  10. 10.

    Gan Junxian, p. 105.

  11. 11.

    Some readers may consider this as a contradiction to the China’s stance in South China Sea, however, China long before claimed South China Sea and have capabilities to control as well as dominate it. This is different from Indian Ocean, India never claimed a substantial portion of Indian Ocean as its territory, or even claimed Indian Ocean as India’s Ocean. Nevertheless, the view exists among Indian elites that India should strive for a dominant position in the Indian Ocean region and it is vital for India’s security.

  12. 12.

    Gan Junxian, p. 106.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., p. 107.

  14. 14.

    K.M. Panikkar, India and The Indian Ocean (London: George Allen & Unwin ltd, 1951), pp. 1–2, 82–84; in this work K.M. Panikkar argue that whoever control Indian Ocean will control India, and for this reason India should build up a strong Navy.

  15. 15.

    Yang Siling, p. 41.

  16. 16.

    Chen Shuisheng and Xi Guigui, p. 74.

  17. 17.

    Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 56.

  18. 18.

    Li Xiao, p. 26.

  19. 19.

    Gan Junxian, p. 96.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., p. 101.

  21. 21.

    Yang Siling and Gao Huiping, “yi dai yi lu: Yindu de jue se ban yan ji tiao zhan” [One Belt And One Road: India’s role play and challenge], Dongnanya nanya yanjiu [Southeast Asian and South Asian Studies], No. 3 (2015), p. 2.

  22. 22.

    Yang Siling and Gao Huiping, p. 5.

  23. 23.

    Mao Yue, “cong Yindu dui “yi dai yi lu” de renzhi yu fanying kan Yindu waijiao siwei moshi” [Analysing India’s diplomatic thinking model from India’s perception and reaction to “One Belt And One Road”], Guoji luntan [International Forum], No. 1 (2017), p. 36.

  24. 24.

    Yang Siling, p. 38.

  25. 25.

    Ibid., p. 39.

  26. 26.

    Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 56.

  27. 27.

    Yang Siling, p. 40.

  28. 28.

    Huang yongming (guan Lin) and WenYong, “Zhong Yin jiujie de shenceng wu jie” [India and China entangled in a deep misunderstanding], Rencai ziyuan kaifa [Exploration of Talent resources], No. 23 (2014), p. 93.

  29. 29.

    Yang Siling, p. 41.

  30. 30.

    Gan Junxian, p. 102.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., p. 104.

  32. 32.

    Li Xiao, p. 25.

  33. 33.

    Mao Yue, p. 37.

  34. 34.

    Yang Siling and Gao Huiping, p. 4.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., p. 5.

  36. 36.

    Liu Zhen, Liu Yingtian, Cheng Binxiu and Ceng Fengwei, p. 57.

  37. 37.

    Feng Chuanlu, p. 44.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., p. 51.

  39. 39.

    Shang Xuenan, “Jiwuxing shijiao xia yingyu xinwen yupian de pipingxing huayu fenxi- yi “Yindu shibao” dui “yi dai yi lu” de baodao weili” [from the perspective of transitivity an analysis of the critical discourse in the English news texts], Henan gongcheng xueyuan xuebao (Shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Henan University of Engineering (Social Science Edition)], No. 4 (2017), pp. 65–69.

  40. 40.

    Feng Chuanlu, p. 55.

  41. 41.

    Ibid., p. 56.

  42. 42.

    Zeng Xiangyu and Du Hong, “Yindu haishang hezuo xin changyi de neihan, yingxiang yu duice” [Emerging Maritime Cooperation Initiatives from India: Its Essence and Implication], Nanya yanjiu jikan [South Asian Studies Quarterly], No. 3 (2016), p. 23.

  43. 43.

    Feng Chuanlu, pp. 58–60.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., p. 64.

  45. 45.

    Long Xingchun, “ba wo hao Yindu dui “yi dai yi lu” de zhenshi yitu” [Grasp India’s true intentions for “One Belt And One Road”], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], July 15, 2015, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2015-07/7003501.html (accessed November 12, 2017).

  46. 46.

    Chen Shuisheng and Xi Guigui, p. 75.

  47. 47.

    Mao Yue, p. 35.

  48. 48.

    Li Xiao, p. 20.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., p. 22.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., p. 23.

  51. 51.

    Psychology of “victim mentality” plays an important part in China’s international relations. The memories of China as a victim of colonial aggression is kept fresh and institutionalized by the CCP through various campaigns. “victim mentality” influence Chinese state behaviour in its relations with Western powers and Japan. China use it as a tool for internal mobilization and also to exert pressure on West and Japan; See Liu Rupeng, “guan yu Zhong guo jueqi guanjian qi su zao daguo xintai de sikao” [Thoughts for Shaping Great Power Mentality During the Crucial Period of China’s Rise], Shengli Youtian [Journal of the Party School of Shengli Oilfield], Vol. 28, No. 1 (2015), pp. 53–56; Qian Hao, “Long wenhua, daguo xintai, Zhong Mei guanxi- dui Zhongguo “shou hai zhe xin li” de li shi yu li lun kao shi” [Dragon culture, great power mentality, Sino-US relations- Critical analysis on the history and theory of “victim psychology” in China], Guoji guancha [International Survey], No. 2 (2004), pp. 25–30. In analysing Indian state behaviour China believes that India also hold a victim mentality and its state behaviour is influenced by it when dealing with China. However unlike China, in India’s internal politics or external politics “victim mentality” is rarely a factor. For instance, India’s modern relations with England is rarely informed by “victim mentality” from the colonial aggression.

  52. 52.

    Yang Siling and Gao Huiping, p. 5.

  53. 53.

    Zhao Ruiqi, ““san ge yulun chang” yu dui Yin chuanbo zhanlue – “yi dai yi lu” xia de Zhongguo guoji huayu quan jiangou” [The construction of China’s international discourse power under One Belt And One Road: “Three public opinion field” and communication strategy towards India], Qilu xuekan [Qilu Journal], No. 1 (2016), p. 74.

  54. 54.

    Zhao Ruiqi, p. 126.

  55. 55.

    Liu Li, “Cong wenhua jiaodu kan yingguo zhimin tongzhi hou Yindu wenming de yihua [The alienation of Indian civilization after the British colonial rule- from a cultural perspective], Renmin luntan [People’s Tribune], No. 3 (2014), p. 249.

  56. 56.

    Wang Tao, “rang Yindu tong gaosu nin Zhong Yin duizhi beihou de jingtian mimi” [Let the Indian Expert tell you the terrible secret behind the standoff between China and India], Cha Wang [Observer Net], August 10, 2017, http://www.cwzg.cn/politics/201708/37756.html (accessed January 2, 2018).

  57. 57.

    Zhao Ruiqi, p. 76.

  58. 58.

    Yang Siling and Gao Huiping, p. 3.

  59. 59.

    Ibid., p. 6.

  60. 60.

    Contrary to Chinese assertions that India unnecessarily moved into South China Sea “issue”, for India freedom of navigation and unimpeded trade through South China Sea is pivotal for its economic security. For instance, over 55% of India’s trade passes through South China Sea. See The Indian Minister Of State In The Ministry Of External Affairs Gen. (Dr) V.K. Singh’s answer to Lok Sabha Question No: 2869, August 3, 2016, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=38654&lsno=16 (accessed January 3, 2018).

  61. 61.

    Mao Yue, p. 38.

  62. 62.

    Ibid., p. 39.

  63. 63.

    Ye Hailin, “Yindu nanya zheng ce ji dui Zhongguo tuijin “yi dai yi lu” de yingxiang” [India’s South Asia Policy and its impact on the Chinese efforts to advance “One Belt One Road”], Yindu Yang jingji ti yan jiu [Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review], No. 2 (2016), p. 4.

  64. 64.

    Ye Hailin, p. 11.

  65. 65.

    Ibid., p. 12.

  66. 66.

    Ibid., pp. 13–15.

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    Srikanth Thaliyakkattil

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Thaliyakkattil, S. (2019). India as Jealous Foe and the BRI. In: China’s Achilles’ Heel. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7_6

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