Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

China’s Achilles’ Heel pp 1–35Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Introduction: The BRI as Strategic Camouflage

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

Abstract

Belt and Road Initiative was proposed as a grand plan to link the global and regional economies to China through infrastructural projects. Indian objections and threat perceptions towards BRI initially centered around CPEC later strengthened by the Chinese taking control of the Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port and Pakistan’s Gwadar port, as well as the looming “debt trap” of other South Asian countries induced by the BRI. BRI was a narrative using which China wanted to weave a story over its many economic and strategic activities all over the world. Using BRI China wanted to tell a “good story” to the outside world about itself and its engagements with the world. Indian objections and resistance to BRI helped to reveal the strategic intentions concealed in the BRI narrative of China.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   59.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    “Xi Jinping tong Yindu zong li Modi zai Wu han ju xing fei zheng shi hui wu” [Xi jinping held an informal meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Wuhan.], Zhongguo zhengfu wang [The website of the Central People’s Government of the PRC], April 28, 2018, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-04/28/content_5286667.htm (accessed May 3, 2018).

  2. 2.

    “Xi Jinping hui jian Yindu zongli Modi” [Xi Meets Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi], Zhongguo zhengfu wang [The website of the Central People’s Government of the PRC], April 27, 2018, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-04/27/content_5286462.htm (accessed May 3, 2018).

  3. 3.

    “India-China Informal Summit at Wuhan,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, April 28, 2018, http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29853/IndiaChina_Informal_Summit_at_Wuhan (accessed on May 5, 2018).

  4. 4.

    “Zhong Yin ling dao ren fei zheng shi hui wu da cheng guang fan gong shi (quan wen)” [The informal meeting between Chinese and Indian leaders reached broad consensus.], Zhongguo Zhengfu Wang [The website of the Central People’s Government of the PRC], April 28, 2018, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-04/28/content_5286684.htm (accessed May 3, 2018).

  5. 5.

    “China Defends Terrorist Masood Azhar, Justifies UN Veto of India’s Move,” NDTV, September 29, 2018, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/china-defends-terrorist-masood-azhar-justifies-its-veto-of-indias-move-at-united-nations-1924157 (accessed October 6, 2018).

  6. 6.

    “India-China Informal Summit at Wuhan,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, April 28, 2018, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29853/IndiaChina_Informal_Summit_at_Wuhan (accessed October 6, 2018).

  7. 7.

    “Zhong Yin ling dao ren fei zheng shi hui wu da cheng guang fan gong shi (quan wen)” [The informal meeting between Chinese and Indian leaders reached broad consensus].

  8. 8.

    Mary Lovely, “Narendra Modi’s rise in import tariffs will hurt India’s economy,” Financial Times, 20 February 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/25900f14-1564-11e8-9c33-02f893d608c2 (accessed May 3, 2018).

  9. 9.

    “mao yi da bang yin fa Zhong nu ge guo zheng mouduo bian he zuo Mei guo dang xin pei le fu ren you zhebing” [The trade club has provoked a lot of anger among all the countries in the fight for multilateral cooperation: US worry that it had “thrown the helve after the hatchet”], Zhongguo Zhengfu Wang [The website of the Central People’s Government of the PRC], May 1, 2018. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-05/01/content_5287173.htm (accessed May 7, 2018).

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    K. Subrahmanyam, “Befriending the Dragon: An Objective Approach to Sino-Indian Ties,” The Times of India, July 5, 2004, p. 12.

  12. 12.

    Gen. (Dr) V. K. Singh (Retd) (The Minister Of State In The Ministry Of External Affairs, India), “Chinese Intervention In Pok,” Ministry Of External Affairs, Government Of India, Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question No.712, December 20, 2017, http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/13/AU712.pdf (accessed January 2, 2018).

  13. 13.

    M.J. Akbar, “Belt and Road Initiative of China,” Government Of India, Ministry Of External Affairs, Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question No-2735, Answered On August 10, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/qsearch/QResult.aspx (accessed January 3, 2018); By the end of December 2017, seven questions had been asked in the Indian parliament’s lower house about the CPEC and its impact on India. As of April 5, 2018, twelve questions have been asked in the Indian parliament’s upper house about the CPEC. The similarity of these questions and answers lies in the fact that most of them concern the CPEC’s impact on the security of India.

  14. 14.

    The cultural association that awarded the Confucius Peace Prize was affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Culture. However, following widespread criticism, in September 2011, the association was ordered to scrap the award, and it was announced that the ministry had decided to shut down the association. According to one Chinese critic of the Confucius Peace Prize, Ma Liming, “the Confucius Peace Prize has soured. It represents an outdated and naive worldview, carrying some kind of populism. Such a thing is hurting our country. I think that such a farce needs to be ended”; Lien Chan, the former chairman of the Kuomintang in Taiwan and the first recipient of the prize, had never heard about the prize or accepted it. See Huang Jingjing, “War over peace,” Global Times, November 3, 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/950348.shtml (accessed February 3, 2018).

  15. 15.

    Meghnad Desai, “Financial crises and global governance,” in Meghnad Desai and Yahia Said ed., Global Governance and Financial Crises (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 7.

  16. 16.

    Ibid.

  17. 17.

    Gabriel Palma, “Mexico, Korea and Brazil: three paths to financial crises,” in Meghnad Desai and Yahia Said ed., Global Governance and Financial Crises (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 139.

  18. 18.

    Zhu Junqing and He Jing, “Yearender: Multiple crises-ridden West faces uncertainties,” Xinhua General News Service, December 27, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-12/27/c_135936164.htm (accessed December 23, 2017).

  19. 19.

    “China’s Xi injects vitality into G20 mechanism,” China Daily, September 2, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016hangzhoug20/2016-09/02/content_26683178.htm (accessed December 23, 2017).

  20. 20.

    “China’s Xi injects vitality into G20 mechanism,” China Daily, September 2, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016hangzhoug20/2016-09/02/content_26683178.htm (accessed December 23, 2017).

  21. 21.

    “Xi calls for reforms on global governance,” China Daily, September 29, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-09/29/content_26931697.htm (accessed December 26, 2017).

  22. 22.

    “Xi: China to contribute wisdom to global governance,” People’s Daily, July 01, 2016, http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0701/c90785-9080390.html (accessed December 26, 2017).

  23. 23.

    “Xi opposes monopolization of global governance,” Xinhua General News Service, July 1, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/01/c_135482043.htm (accessed December 23, 2017).

  24. 24.

    Rupert Cornwell, “1989: The Year of Revolution (1),” The Independent, December 28, 1989, p. 13.

  25. 25.

    Robert B. Cullen, “The Cautious Bully,” Newsweek, November 22, 1982, p. 48.

  26. 26.

    Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe, “Narrative In Political Science,” Annual Review of Political Science, No.1 (1998), pp. 315–317.

  27. 27.

    Shaul R. Shenhav, “Political Narratives and Political Reality,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2006), pp. 245–246.

  28. 28.

    “Chinese journalists encouraged to tell stories to world,” Xinhua General News Service, November 9, 2017.

  29. 29.

    “Political advisors discuss building cultural confidence,” Xinhua General News Service, May 23, 2017.

  30. 30.

    “CPC publicity chief calls for telling China stories well,” Xinhua General News Service, April 8, 2016.

  31. 31.

    Sajjad Akbar Shah, “Chinese workers thrash policemen in Khanewal,” Dawn, April 4, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1399531 (accessed April 7, 2018).

  32. 32.

    Ejaz Hussain, “Pakistan: a Chinese colony?,” Daily Times, April 8, 2018, https://dailytimes.com.pk/225183/pakistan-a-chinese-colony/ (accessed April 9, 2018).

  33. 33.

    Editorial, “China needs more than biryani”, Daily Times, April 6, 2018, https://dailytimes.com.pk/224340/china-needs-more-than-biryani/ (accessed April 8, 2018).

  34. 34.

    Farrukh Saleem, “Sri Lanka for sale?”, The News, June 4, 2017, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/208448-Sri-Lanka-for-sale (accessed April 9, 2018).

  35. 35.

    Kamal Monnoo, “CPEC: Should Pakistan be worried?”, Pakistan Today, November 8, 2017, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/11/08/cpec-should-pakistan-be-worried/ (accessed April 9, 2018).

  36. 36.

    Iftikhar A. Khan, “China to get 91pc Gwadar income, minister tells Senate,” Dawn, November 25, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1372695 (accessed January 6, 2018); F.M. Shakil, “Bad terms: Pakistan’s raw deal with China over Gwadar port,” Asia Times, November 29, 2017, http://www.atimes.com/article/bad-terms-pakistans-raw-deal-china-gwadar-port/ (accessed January 6, 2018).

  37. 37.

    “Karachi attack: China consulate attack leaves four dead,” BBC, November 23, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46313136 (accessed November 23, 2018).

  38. 38.

    “China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): A sustainable partnership for Sri Lanka?,” Daily Financial Times, November 14, 2018, http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=194476 (accessed December 3, 2018); Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port,” The New York Times, June 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html (accessed August 8, 2018); Sam Parker and Gabrielle Chefitz, “Debtbook Diplomacy: China’s Strategic Leveraging of its Newfound Economic Influence and the Consequences for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Massachusetts: Harvard Kennedy School, May 14, 2018, pp. 9–10.

  39. 39.

    International Debt Statistics 2018, Washington: World Bank Group, p. 5.

  40. 40.

    Shen Shiwei, underwater myth of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port deal, Daily Financial Times, August 10, 2018, http://www.ft.lk/opinion/Underwater-myth-of-Sri-Lanka-s-Hambantota-Port-deal/14-660586 (accessed October 9, 2018).

  41. 41.

    Wu Jianying, “Xi Zang Jin ZhuaYi dai Yi luji yu ying lai dui wai mao yi xin fa zhan” [Tibet is seizing the “One Belt And One Road” opportunity to usher in the new development of foreign trade], Tibet.cn, January 12, 2018, http://www.tibet.cn/cn/news/yc/201801/t20180112_5347074.html (accessed March 3, 2018).

  42. 42.

    “Tibet’s foreign trade rebounds in 2017,” Xinhua General News Service, February 4, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/04/c_136948758.htm (accessed June 3, 2018).

  43. 43.

    “2017 nian qian 11 ge yue Xi Zang dui wai mao yi jin chu kou zong zhi 55. 03 yi yuan” [The total value of Tibet’s foreign trade in the first 11 months of 2017 is 5.503 billion yuan], January 8, 2018, Lasa Customs district, People’s Republic of China, http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal182/tab63445/info876425.htm (accessed June 4, 2018).

  44. 44.

    “Chinese Ministry of Commerce Signs the MOU on Constructing China-Nepal Cross-border Economic Cooperation Zone with the Ministry of Industry of Nepal,” Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China, May 17, 2017, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201705/20170502577336.shtml (accessed June 4, 2018).

  45. 45.

    “Upgraded China-Nepal border point to boost trade, tourism: Nepali traders,” Xinhua General News Service, September 2, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/02/c_136577630.htm (accessed June 4, 2018).

  46. 46.

    “Nepal-China cross-border optical fiber link starts operation,” Xinhua General News Service, January 12, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/12/c_136891112.htm (accessed June 3, 2018).

  47. 47.

    “Big data center to service companies in Tibet,” Xinhua General News Service, March 27, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/27/c_136161791.htm (accessed June 2, 2018).

  48. 48.

    Sangeet Sangroula, “Nepal, China to expedite cross-border railway,” Myrepublica, September 8, 2017, http://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/27151/ (accessed June 2, 2018).

  49. 49.

    Ma Jing, “ni bo er zheng fu yao yuan zai la sa chong shen: jue bu rong xu ren he shi lili yong nib bo er ling tu” [Senior members of the Nepalese government reiterated in Lhasa that no force should be allowed to use Nepalese territory], Tibet.cn, September 30, 2015, http://www.tibet.cn/news/focus/1443573682853.shtml (accessed June 2, 2018).

  50. 50.

    “Nepal to ban March 10 Tibetan uprising day events,” Myrepublica, March 9, 2018, http://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/37684/ (accessed June 2, 2018).

  51. 51.

    “ni bo er nan cheng liu wang zang ren ‘bi nan suo’” [Nepal is hardly a haven for exiled Tibetans], Huan qiu shi bao [Global Times], March 15, 2013, http://world.huanqiu.com/depth_report/2013-03/3735051_2.html (accessed June 2, 2018).

  52. 52.

    Santosh Ghimire, “Nepal, China witness significant achievements in bilateral ties in 2017,” Xinhuanet.com , December 31, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/01/c_136864458.htm (accessed June 2, 2018).

  53. 53.

    “Nepal Armed Police Force Academy built under Chinese aid to address security challenges,” Xinhua General News Service, March 19, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/19/c_137050775.htm (accessed June 2, 2018).

  54. 54.

    Bibek Subedi, “IBN refutes govt claim on West Seti Project, Says there has been no decision to scrap pact signed with China Three Gorges on 750MW undertaking,” Kathmandupost, June 7, 2018, https://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2018-06-07/ibn-refutes-govt-claim-on-west-seti-project.html (accessed June 7, 2018); “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on June 6, 2018,” Foreign Ministry of People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1566463.shtml (accessed June 7, 2018).

  55. 55.

    Rudra Pangeni, “Project cost to reach about Rs 50 billion,” myRepublica, March 18, 2018, http://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/38221/?categoryId%3D81 (accessed June 2, 2018).

  56. 56.

    “Prime Minister Oli visits under-construction hydropower project,” PowerChina, April 13, 2018, http://en.powerchina.cn/2018-04/13/content_36185165.htm (accessed June 2, 2018).

  57. 57.

    Pushpa Raj Acharya, “Transit Transport Agreement should be utilised to enhance economic engagement between Nepal and China,” Himalayan Times, March 28, 2016, https://thehimalayantimes.com/business/transit-transport-agreement-utilised-enhance-economic-engagement-nepal-china/ (accessed June 2, 2018).

  58. 58.

    Shristi Kafle, “Chinese organization extends support to Nepal’s education to mark third quake anniversary,” Xinhuanet.com , April 26, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/26/c_137139130.htm (accessed June 2, 2018).

  59. 59.

    Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Chinese loans may put Bangladesh in debt trap,” June 17, 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/chinese-loans-may-put-bangladesh-in-debt-trap/articleshow/59185012.cms (accessed February 3, 2018).

  60. 60.

    (BRF) Essential guide to understanding Belt and Road Initiative, Xinhua General News Service, May 13, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/13/c_136279142.htm (accessed November 3, 2018).

  61. 61.

    China Power Team, “Does China dominate global investment?” China Power, September 26, 2016. Updated July 19, 2018, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-foreign-direct-investment/ (accessed November 29, 2018).

  62. 62.

    Jodi Xu Klein, “It’s not just the US: around the world, doors are shutting on Chinese investment,” South China Morning Post, September 13, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2163974/its-not-just-us-around-world-doors-are-shutting-chinese (accessed October 6, 2018).

  63. 63.

    Humza Jilani and Amy Cheng, “Chinese Investment in the U.S. Tanks Amid Major Policy Crackdowns,” Foreign Policy, July 6, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/06/chinese-investment-in-the-u-s-tanks-amid-major-policy-crackdowns-trade-war-tariffs-china-trump/ (accessed September 9, 2018).

  64. 64.

    Alan Rappeport, “In New Slap at China, U.S. Expands Power to Block Foreign Investments,” New York Times, October 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/business/us-china-investment-cfius.html (accessed November 3, 2018).

  65. 65.

    Ibid.

  66. 66.

    Nick Whigham, “Huawei banned from Australian 5G network,” News.com.au , August 23, 2018, https://www.news.com.au/technology/gadgets/mobile-phones/huawei-banned-from-australian-5g-network/news-story/d1d6ec001747ba51e7c5c8738021f7ee (accessed September 9, 2018).

  67. 67.

    “Myanmar scales back China-funded Kyauk Pyu port project in Rakhine state due to debt concerns,” South China Morning Post, August 2, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2158015/myanmar-scales-back-china-funded-kyauk-pyu-port-project (accessed September 6, 2018).

  68. 68.

    Umesh K Bhattarai, “The BRI anxiety,” My Republica, September 17, 2018, https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/the-bri-anxiety/?categoryId=opinion (accessed November 8, 2018); Gyan P Neupane, “Avoiding debt trap,” My Republica, June 20, 2018, https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/avoiding-debt-trap/ (accessed November 9, 2018); Brahma Chellaney, “Imperial China,” My Republica, December 24, 2017, https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/imperial-china/ (accessed November 9, 2018); “Investment inefficiency can lead to ‘debt trap’,” Himalayan Times, July 25, 2018, https://thehimalayantimes.com/business/investment-inefficiency-can-lead-to-debt-trap/ (accessed November 8, 2018); Inam Ahmed, “Debt trap?,” The Daily Star, September 4, 2018, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/frontpage/debt-trap-1628839 (accessed October 6, 2018); “Chinese loans or debt-trap,” July 25, 2017, http://www.bangladeshlivenews.com/home/article-details/9320/column/Chinese+loans+or+debt-+trap/ (accessed September 6, 2018); “Gathering economic clouds,” The Financial Express (Bangladesh), October 23, 2018, https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/views/opinions/gathering-economic-clouds-1540221117 (accessed November 6, 2018). The debt trap concerns of China are not limited to the Indian Ocean region but are gradually spreading to other continents such as Africa, where China invested heavily; see Alito L Malinao, “Countries waking up to risks attached to China loans,” The Nation, October 24, 2018, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/opinion/30357044 (accessed November 6, 2018); Rizal Ramli, “Creases On the Silk,” New Straits Times (Malaysia), October 31, 2018, p. 15; Alasdair Pal, “Maldives’ Chinese debt and political risk could lead to trouble in paradise,” Reuters, September 18, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-election-debt-idUSKCN1LY1QR (accessed October 9, 2018); Shashank Bengali, “How an island nation’s new leaders are trying to unravel a web of secret deals with China,” Los Angeles Times, November 6, 2018, https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-maldives-china-20181106-story.html (accessed November 9, 2018).

Bibliography

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Independent Scholar, Kerala, India

    Srikanth Thaliyakkattil

Authors
  1. Srikanth Thaliyakkattil
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Thaliyakkattil, S. (2019). Introduction: The BRI as Strategic Camouflage. In: China’s Achilles’ Heel. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7_1

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-13-8424-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-13-8425-7

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation