Bayesian Network Analysis of Explosion Events at Petrol Stations

  • Guowei MaEmail author
  • Yimiao Huang
  • Jingde Li


This chapter illustrates a Bayesian-network-based quantitative risk analysis method for VCE accidents at small oil and gas facilities, such as petrol stations. Meanwhile, to reduce uncertainties by data shortage, three types of data, i.e. practical information, computational simulations and subjective judgements are introduced to quantify the proposed BN. A case study using the proposed method to model the complete explosion process is presented.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Civil and Transportation EngineeringHebei University of TechnologyTianjinChina
  2. 2.Department of Civil, Environmental and Mining Engineering, School of EngineeringUniversity of Western AustraliaPerthAustralia
  3. 3.Centre for Infrastructural Monitoring and ProtectionCurtin UniversityPerthAustralia

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