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Free Trade Agreements and National Constitutional Law—From CETA and TTIP Onwards

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Abstract

Once again, in some countries for the first time ever, CETA and TTIP as Free Trade Agreements are at the heart of political debate in Canada, Europe, and the United States of America. Many arguments in this debate are derived from national constitutional law. Therefore, this chapter elaborates the boundaries (German) national constitutional law sets for the conclusion of Free Trade Agreements. For that purpose, CETA and TTIP are taken as examples.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This is highlighted by the continuing impasse in the Doha Development Agenda of the WTO, cf. S. Lester, ‘Is the Doha Round Over? The WTO’s Negotiating Agenda for 2016 and Beyond’ (2016) 64 Free Trade Bulletin <http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/ftb64.pdf> accessed 19. October 2016.

  2. 2.

    Cf. A. Shah et al. (2015), 1; H. Mayer (2015); for the German critique see further R. Streinz (2015); Bode (2015).

  3. 3.

    The most recent chapter to this attempt was added by a (rejecting) order of the Vice-President of the CJEU, cf. Case C-400/16 P(R) Efler and Others v Commission (2016) ECLI:EU:C:2016:735; a decision on the merits of the case is still pending. On the political stage, the negotiations on CETA have been stalled over another annex regarding the rights of the European regions, especially Wallonia.

  4. 4.

    For the exact contents of this initiative, cf. Efler Commission Decision C (2014) 6501 final.

  5. 5.

    For a summary of the complaint cf. B. Kempen, ‘Constitutional Complaint against CETA’ (2016) <www.mehr-demokratie.de/fileadmin/pdf/2016-08-30_Prof._Kempen_Constitutional_Complaint_CETA.pdf> accessed 19 October 2016.

  6. 6.

    2 BvR 1368/16 and others, CETA einstweilige Anordnung (2016).

  7. 7.

    For the following cf. H. Mayer (n. 2), 48 seqq. Petersmann (2015).

  8. 8.

    Cf. B. Kempen (n. 5), 4 seqq.

  9. 9.

    For these definitions see U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ‘Regulatory Coherence & Cooperation in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)’ <www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/regulatory_coherence_regulatory_cooperation_-chamber_ttip_paper-final_2.pdf> accessed 19 October 2016, 1 seq.

  10. 10.

    Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 6), para. 59–65; for a detailed analysis of this point of criticism see Weiß (2016b); cf. further A. Fisahn and R. Ciftci, ‘Rechtliche und politische Probleme von Freihandelsabkommen am Beispiel von CETA’ (2015) 12 Ad Legendum 177, 180.

  11. 11.

    Cf. H. Mayer (n. 2), 49.

  12. 12.

    A non-binding text version of CETA for information purposes can be found at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/September/tradoc_152806.pdf> accessed 19 October 2016.

  13. 13.

    Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 6), para. 39.

  14. 14.

    Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 6), para. 60.

  15. 15.

    The 14th round of negotiations took place in June 2016, main fields of TTIP are still open to discussion to the negotiators, cf. European Commission (2016).

  16. 16.

    All negotiating texts of the European Union on TTIP can be found at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230> accessed 19 October 2016.

  17. 17.

    De Baere (2011).

  18. 18.

    Cf. Art. 4, para. 1; Art. 5, para. 2 Treaty on European Union (TEU).

  19. 19.

    For a confirmation of this principle by the European Court of Justice with regard to external competences, see Opinion 2/00 Cartagena Protocol (2001) ECR I-9713.

  20. 20.

    See Weiß (2016a).

  21. 21.

    Cf. Maresceau (2010).

  22. 22.

    See the Commission’s press release at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1524> accessed 12 September 2016.

  23. 23.

    Cf. on the following German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 6), para. 52–58; and the convincing paper of F. C. Mayer (2014); S. Mayer (2015); Grezszick and Hettche (2016).

  24. 24.

    Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

  25. 25.

    See P. Eckhout, EU External Relations Law (2nd ed., OUP 2011), 70 seqq.

  26. 26.

    For an in-depth analysis see the works cited above n. 20 and German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 6), para. 52–57.

  27. 27.

    See Albi (2005), 9.

  28. 28.

    Cf. inter alia for Poland Trybunal Konstytucyjny, K 32/09, Treaty of Lisbon (2010) 30 Polish YB of Intl L 304 (excerpts).

  29. 29.

    See Fowler and Bunck (1995), 11 seqq.

  30. 30.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 and others, Treaty of Lisbon (2009), BVerfGE 123, 267, para. 220, 223; also available in English at <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2009/06/es20090630_2bve000208en.html> accessed 19 October 2016.

  31. 31.

    For an in-depth analysis see Albi (n. 27), passim; C. Grabenwarter, ‘National Constitutional Law Relating to the European Union’, in v. Bogdandy and Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd ed., Hart, C. H. Beck, and Nomos 2010), 83, 95 ff.; see also Trybunal Konstytucyjny (n. 28); for the Czech Republic Ústavni Soud, Pl. ÙS 19/08, Treaty of Lisbon I (2008); Pl. ÙS 29/09, Treaty of Lisbon II (2009); French Conseil constitutionnel, 92-308 DC, Treaty of Maastricht (1992), Grandes décisions du Conseil constitutionnel, no. 45; cf. for further countries D. Shelton (ed.), International Law and Domestic Legal Systems. Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (OUP 2011).

  32. 32.

    See n. 29 and the German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 30), para. 226; Starck (2015).

  33. 33.

    See—inter alia—German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 30), para. 226.

  34. 34.

    German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 30), para. 226; for the other European states—each regarding the European Union—see: for Denmark Højesteret, Judgment of 6 April 1998—I 361/1997, Section 9.8; for Estonia Riigikohus, Judgment of 12 Juli 2012—3-4-1-6-12, para. 128, 223; for France Conseil Constitutionnel, decision No. 2006-540 DC of 27 July 2006, 19. recital; decision No. 2011-631 DC of 9 June 2011, 45. recital; Conseil d‘État, judgment of 8 February 2007, No. 287110 Ass., Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine, 43 Europarecht (2008) 57, 60 seq. for Ireland Supreme Court of Ireland, Crotty v. An Taoiseach (1987), I.R. 713, 783; S.P.U.C. (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan (1989), I.R. 753, 765; for Italy Corte Costituzionale, decision No. 98/1965, Acciaierie San Michele, 2 Europarecht (1966) 146; decision No. 183/1973, Frontini, 10 Europarecht (1974) 255; decision No. 170/1984, Granital; decision No. 232/1989, Fragd; decision No. 168/1991; decision No. 117/1994, Zerini; for Latvia Satversmes tiesa, judgment of 7 April 2009—2008-35-01, para. 17; for Poland Trybunal Konstytucyjny, judgments of 11 May 2005—K 18/04, para. 4.1., 10.2.; of 24 November 2010—K 32/09, para. 2.1. ff.; of 16 November 2011—SK 45/09, para. 2.4., 2.5.; for Spain Tribunal Constitucional, declaration of 13 December 2004, DTC 1/2004, recital 2; decision of 13 February 2014, STC 26/2014, recital 3, 34 HRLJ 475, 477 f.; for the Czech Republic Ústavni Soud, judgment of 8 March 2006, Pl. ÚS 50/04, part VI.B.; judgment of 3 May 2006, Pl. ÚS 66/04, para. 53; judgment of 26 November 2008, Pl. ÚS 19/08, para. 97, 113, 196; judgment of 3 November 2009, Pl. ÚS 29/09, para. 110 ff.; judgment of 31 January 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12, part VII.; for the United Kingdom High Court, Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council 2002, EWHC 195 (Admin), para. 69; UK Supreme Court, R (on the application of HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v. The Secretary of State for Transport (2014) UKSC 3, para. 79, 207; Pham v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2015) UKSC 19, para. 54, 58, 72–92.

  35. 35.

    See C. Grabenwarter (n. 31), 100 ff.

  36. 36.

    See, for example, German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1107/77 and 195/79, Eurocontrol I (1981), BVerfGE 58, 1.

  37. 37.

    See German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvL 52/71, Solange I (1974), BVerfGE 37, 271, 280.

  38. 38.

    Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court, 1 BvR 248/63 and 216/67, EEC Regulations (1967), BVerfGE 22, 293, 298; a worldwide analysis can be found in Reinisch (2013); for Germany: A. Proelß, Bundesverfassungsgericht und überstaatliche Gerichtsbarkeit (Mohr Siebeck 2014).

  39. 39.

    See German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 36).

  40. 40.

    See German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1058/79, Eurocontrol II (1981), BVerfGE 59, 63.

  41. 41.

    For a detailed analysis of European law see C. Görisch, ‘Effective Legal Protection in the European Legal Order’, in Szente and Lachmayer (eds.), The Principle of Effective Legal Protection in Administrative Law (Routledge 2016), 29 ff.

  42. 42.

    See Czech Republic Ústavni Soud, Pl. ÙS 19/08 (n. 31), para. 103.

  43. 43.

    For the above see German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 30), para. 210.

  44. 44.

    German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 30), para. 219.

  45. 45.

    German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 30), para. 226; for the other European states see C. Grabenwarter (n. 31), 100 ff.

  46. 46.

    For the treaties establishing the European Union see Czech Republic Ústavni Soud, Pl. ÙS 19/08 (n. 31), para. 98; German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 30), para. 227.

  47. 47.

    See Trybunal Konstytucyjny (n. 28); German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 30), para. 231.

  48. 48.

    See Czech Republic Ústavni Soud, Pl. ÙS 19/08 (n. 31), para. 106; German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 30), para. 233.

  49. 49.

    German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 30), para. 236.

  50. 50.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134/92 and others, Maastricht (1993), BVerfGE 89, 155, 212.

  51. 51.

    German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 30), para. 236.

  52. 52.

    German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 30), para. 262.

  53. 53.

    See German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2728/13 and others, OMT-Programm (2016), 69 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2473, 2476; Trybunal Konstytucyjny (n. 28).

  54. 54.

    See German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 53), 2477.

  55. 55.

    For the German “Identitätskontrolle” see German Federal Constitutional Court, ibid.

  56. 56.

    German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 53), 2478.

  57. 57.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, ibid.

  58. 58.

    For the following see German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 6), para. 60 ff.

  59. 59.

    See German Federal Constitutional Court (n. 6), para. 65.

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  1. University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany

    Ralph Zimmermann

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  1. Center for Comparative Law, National Law University, Delhi, New Delhi, India

    Mahendra Pal Singh

  2. Juristische Fakultät, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Wolfram Cremer

  3. Centre for Comparative Law, National Law University, Delhi, New Delhi, India

    Niraj Kumar

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Zimmermann, R. (2019). Free Trade Agreements and National Constitutional Law—From CETA and TTIP Onwards. In: Singh, M., Cremer, W., Kumar, N. (eds) Open Markets, Free Trade and Sustainable Development. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7426-5_12

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