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Envoi: The Need for Jarlsberg Constitutions

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Axial Shift
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Abstract

Today we see a tension in how sovereignty is shared between the local and global scales, post the nation-state. There are now two lines of attack on sovereignty. One proceeds through the idea of universitas. The other attacks the territoriality of the Westphalian contiguous-and-non-perforated state itself. A nuanced reading of the concept of sovereignty suggests that there are decisive economic arguments militating against the existence of colossal countries—at least as contiguous and exclusive jurisdictions. While some literature touches on the structure of the state and its relation to the economy, there is only an anemic treatment of what should be at the crux of constitutional designs. This clinging to the idea of the nation-state, even when moderated by decentralization, is anachronistic. It is imperative to understand that the issue is no longer the role of the nation-state. The concept of the hard-bordered nation-state is itself flawed. Not because of the ‘hard-border’ as much as the national scale. As discussed in this monograph, hard-borders could very well be still needed, but cannot function properly beyond the city-region scale (a city and its hinterland). The nation-state is moribund. It is becoming irrelevant, especially to economic activity. What is gaining ground is a new paradigm of continentalization where the global and local scales are effacing the need for national coagulations.

Wherever something is wrong, something is too big. If the stars in the sky or the atoms of uranium disintegrate in spontaneous explosion, it is not because their substance has lost its balance. It is because matter has attempted to expand beyond the impassable barriers set to every accumulation. Their mass has become too big. If the human body becomes diseased, it is, as in cancer, because a cell, or a group of cells, has begun to outgrow its allotted narrow limits. And if the body of a people becomes diseased with the fever of aggression, brutality, collectivism, or massive idiocy, it is not because it has fallen victim to bad leadership or mental derangement. It is because human beings, so charming as individuals or in small aggregations, have been welded into overconcentrated social units such as mobs, unions, cartels, or great powers.

Leopold Kohr (The Breakdown of Nations (Green Books, 2001) 1)

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Change history

  • 10 September 2019

    The below corrections have been made after first publication of the volume:

Notes

  1. 1.

    Instances of this tension can be seen in independence movements as in Catalonia and Scotland.

  2. 2.

    Although some commentators argue that the issue is in fact that hard-borders don’t work. See, for example, John Hopkins, Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union (Cavendish Publishing, 2002) 15.

  3. 3.

    Henri Lefebvre, La production de l’espace (Anthropos, 1974), and Henri Lefebvre, Le Droit à La Ville (Anthropos, 2nd ed, 1968).

  4. 4.

    See also B F Gussen, ‘On the Problem of Scale: Spinozistic Sovereignty as the Logical Foundation of Constitutional Economics’ (2013) 7(1) The Journal of Philosophical Economics (online); B F Gussen, ‘On the Problem of Scale: The Inextricable Link between Environmental and Constitutional Laws’ (2015) 13(1) New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 39; B F Gussen, ‘The Evolutionary Economic Implications of Constitutional Designs: Lessons from the Constitutional Morphogenesis of New England and New Zealand’ (2014) 6(2) Perspectives on Federalism E319.

  5. 5.

    The reader is referred to the works by Jane Jacobs for a detailed discussion of this dynamic. See, for example, Jane Jacobs, The Nature of Economies (Vintage, reprint ed, 2001); Jane Jacobs, Cities and the Wealth of Nations (Penguin Books, 1984).

  6. 6.

    See Leopold Kohr, The Overdeveloped Nations: The Diseconomies of Scale (Schocken Books, 1978) Chap. 2.

  7. 7.

    This formulation does not prevent private-public partnership in the ownership and management of such resources.

  8. 8.

    By jurisdiction, I mean all three types: legislative, executive, and judicial.

  9. 9.

    See, for example, Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy 48.

  10. 10.

    There are many others that are working in this field. These include Yaneer Bar-Yam, John Breuilly, Robin Dunbar, Peter Turchin, Ian Morris, Andreas Osiander, Siniša Maleševic, Benedict Anderson, Brian Slattery, Jennifer Neal, Jan Zielonka, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Ian Goldin, and Dani Rodrik. For a synopsis of their ideas, see Debora MacKenzie, ‘Imagine There’s No Countries …’ (2014) 223 (2985) The New Scientist 31.

References

  • B F Gussen, ‘On the Problem of Scale: Spinozistic Sovereignty as the Logical Foundation of Constitutional Economics’ (2013) 7(1) The Journal of Philosophical Economics (online).

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  • ———, ‘The Evolutionary Economic Implications of Constitutional Designs: Lessons from the Constitutional Morphogenesis of New England and New Zealand’ (2014) 6(2) Perspectives on Federalism E319.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———, ‘The Evolutionary Economic Implications of Constitutional Designs: Lessons from the Constitutional Morphogenesis of New England ‘On the Problem of Scale: The Inextricable Link between Environmental and Constitutional Laws’ (2015) 13(1) New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 39.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hopkins, John, Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union (Cavendish Publishing, 2002).

    Google Scholar 

  • Jacobs, Jane, Cities and the Wealth of Nations (Penguin Books, 1984).

    Google Scholar 

  • ———, The Nature of Economies (Vintage, reprint ed, 2001).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kohr, Leopold. The Overdeveloped Nations: The Diseconomies of Scale (Schocken Books, 1978).

    Google Scholar 

  • ———, The Breakdown of Nations (Green Books, 2001).

    Google Scholar 

  • Lefebvre, Henri, Le Droit à La Ville (Anthropos, 2nd ed, 1968).

    Google Scholar 

  • ———, La production de l’espace (Anthropos, 1974).

    Google Scholar 

  • MacKenzie, Debora, ‘Imagine There’s No Countries …’ (2014) 223 (2985) The New Scientist 31.

    Google Scholar 

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Gussen, B. (2019). Envoi: The Need for Jarlsberg Constitutions. In: Axial Shift. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6950-6_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6950-6_14

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-13-6949-0

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