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Case Study: The Territorial Evolution of Australia and the United States

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Axial Shift

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Abstract

In 1949, David Henry Drummond noted:

It is significant that since the Imperial Parliament handed over the control of Australia to the Commonwealth, no new State has been created, notwithstanding that Sir Henry Parkes, the founder of the Federation, said—‘that as a matter of reason and logical forecast, the division of the existing colonies into smaller areas to equalize the distribution of political power, will be the next great constitutional change.’

This chapter provides ‘broad brush’ analysis to inspire this ‘next great constitutional change.’ Although a proviso is in order: No matter how persuasive the rationale for new States is, there is still a need for further evaluation.

An earlier version of this chapter appeared as Gussen Benjamen Franklen, ‘On the Territorial Evolution of the Australian Federation in the 21st Century’ (2017) 22 James Cook University Law Review 15.

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Change history

  • 10 September 2019

    The below corrections have been made after first publication of the volume:

Notes

  1. 1.

    David Henry Drummond, The Australian Constitution and New States: The Case for Constitutional Review (The NSW Constitutional League, 1949) 7.

  2. 2.

    Parliamentarians that supported the referendum included Katter’s Australian Party (KAP) MP for Mount Isa, Robbie Katter; independent MP Rob Pyne; and the federal minister for Northern Australia, Matt Canavan.

  3. 3.

    Brigid Andersen, Split Queensland in Two or Face ‘A Reckoning Across Australia’, Katter MP says (1 April 2016) ABC News http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-01/push-for-north-queensland-to-become-a-separate-state/7293548.

  4. 4.

    Ibid.

  5. 5.

    Ibid.

  6. 6.

    Ibid.

  7. 7.

    See, for example, John Cole, ‘The Historical Context of Australia’s Federation’ in A Federation for the 21st Century Research Report of the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA, 2014) 28, 36–37 http://www.ceda.com.au/research-and-policy/research/2014/10/27/federalism.

  8. 8.

    The Commonwealth Constitution as promulgated under s 9 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp).

  9. 9.

    For an analysis of new state proposals relative to other governance structures (such as regional governments or unification), see Mark Lea Drummond, Costing Constitutional Change: Estimates of the Financial Benefits of New States, Regional Governments, Unification and Related Reforms (PhD Thesis, University of Canberra, 2007). Drummond suggests that ‘New States appear likely to cost in the order of $1 billion per annum per New State, and possibly more if costs associated with State-Territory borders are taken into account, but their financial viability could be vastly improved if New State formation follows or is accompanied by functional transfers to achieve national systems in areas such as health and education’ (at ii). Drummond goes on to suggest that ‘a small number of New States would appear to be affordable, at least, and would probably be most viable for regions in the central and northern parts of Western Australia and Queensland with populations ranging from 100,000 to 500,000 or so. Such regions have large land areas and associated potential for mineral wealth, and could avoid significant border costs if borders were placed through areas with little or no population’ (at 441).

  10. 10.

    See Mark Lea Drummond, Costing Constitutional Change: Estimates of the Financial Benefits of New States, Regional Governments, Unification and Related Reforms (PhD Thesis, University of Canberra, 2007) app 2A.

  11. 11.

    This number of States and Territories found merit in the scholarship of some commentators. See, for example, J I Moorehead, ‘Why New States’ in F A Bland (ed), Changing the Constitution (NSW Constitutional League, 1950) 111. Moorehead suggests that ‘[t]he existence of about 16 States, each guaranteed a definite proportion of loan and tax moneys and each entitled to special grants from the Grants Commission, would immeasurably strengthen the Federation [and] see the proper and full development of our resources’ (at 115–16). Cited in Mark Lea Drummond, Costing Constitutional Change: Estimates of the Financial Benefits of New States, Regional Governments, Unification and Related Reforms (PhD Thesis, University of Canberra, 2007) 2A-2.

  12. 12.

    However, Rienstra and Williams suggest that the most insurmountable hurdles remain political and that a constitutional amendment replacing Parliament consent with referenda would be more conducive to the introduction of new States. See Anna Rienstra and George Williams, ‘Redrawing the Federation: Creating New States from Australia’s Existing States’ (2015) 37 Sydney Law Review 357, 360.

  13. 13.

    See D Crowe, ‘Federation “Starving” States’, The Australian (Surry Hills), 27 October 2014, 1. There is also the contrary view that the States have contributed to this ‘starving’ through policies leading to bloated public sectors, and through refusing to apply State assets to maximum advantage. The tension is reminiscent of that seen in New Zealand in the lead-up to abolishing the provincial system in that country.

  14. 14.

    The 1804 territory also covered the eastern part of Minnesota.

  15. 15.

    See generally Mark Stein, How the States Got Their Shapes (HarperCollins, 2009); M I Glassner, Political Geography (John Wiley & Sons, 1993); Carol Berkin et al, Making America: A History of the United States (Cengage Learning, 7th ed, 2014); Robert D Johnston and Douglas Brinkley, The Making of America: The History of the United States from 1492 to the Present (National Geographic, revised ed, 2010). See also Michael J Trinklein, Lost States: True Stories of Texlahoma, Transylvania, and Other States That Never Made It (Quirk Books, 2010).

  16. 16.

    It is also instructive to look at other large countries. In Russia, the largest subdivision, the Sakha Republic, is 18 percent of the total area (17 million km2). In Canada, the largest province is 21 percent of the area of Canada (roughly 10 million km2). The largest state in Brazil accounts for 18 percent of the total area (8.5 million km2). Even in China (a unitary state), the largest region is only 17 percent of the area of China (9.6 million km2).

  17. 17.

    See, for example, Masahisa Fujita and Jacques-Francois Thisse, Economics of Agglomeration: Cities, Industrial Location, and Globalization (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2013).

  18. 18.

    See David Dreyer Lassen and Søren Serritzlew, ‘Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform’ (2011) 105(2) American Political Science Review 238; J E Oliver, ‘City Size and Civic Involvement in Metropolitan America’ (2000) 94 (2) American Political Science Review 361.

  19. 19.

    Martin Bækgaard, Søren Serritzlew and Kim M Sønderskov, ‘The Hunt for the Optimal Jurisdiction Size: Looking for Simpler Questions that Can Be Answered’ (Working Paper, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, October 2013). However, see also J Blom-Hansen, K Houlberg and S Serritzlew ‘Size, Democracy, and the Economic Costs of Running the Political System’ (2014) 58 American Journal of Political Science 790. Blom-Hansen et al suggest an inverse proportionality between size and administrative costs.

  20. 20.

    While the research relates to population size, given the agglomeration benefits discussed earlier, the territorial extent of states should also adjust downwards.

  21. 21.

    Charles Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’ (1956) 64(5) The Journal of Political Economy 416. See also B F Gussen, ‘On the Problem of Scale: Spinozistic Sovereignty as the Logical Foundation of Constitutional Economics’ (2013) 7 (1) The Journal of Philosophical Economics; B F Gussen, ‘On the Problem of Scale: Hayek, Kohr, Jacobs and the Reinvention of the Political State’ (2013) 24 (1) Constitutional Political Economy 19; B F Gussen ‘On the Problem of Scale: A General Theory of Morphogenesis and Normative Policy Signals for Economic Evolution’ (2015) 12 (1) Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review 81.

  22. 22.

    Australian Government, Our North, Our Future: White Paper on Developing Northern Australia (2015) http://northernaustralia.gov.au.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., 1.

  24. 24.

    SGS, Australian Cities Accounts 2014–15 (SGS Economics and Planning, 2015).

  25. 25.

    Australian Government, Northern Australia: Emerging Opportunities in an Advanced Economy (2015).

  26. 26.

    Australian Government, Our North, Our Future, 140.

  27. 27.

    Ibid.

  28. 28.

    Ibid., 14.

  29. 29.

    Ibid., 12.

  30. 30.

    Asher Judah, The Australian Century (Connor Court Ballan, 2014). Judah argues that Australia is not a continent but an archipelago of urban islands. For example, he reimagines greater Brisbane as the ‘Oxley’ island, greater Sydney as ‘Cumberland,’ greater Melbourne as ‘Yarra,’ greater Adelaide as ‘Vincent,’ and greater Perth as ‘Swan.’ These islands account for 60 percent of the population of Australia. A secondary chain of around 100 urban ‘islets’ accounts for another 25 percent. Judah’s key point is that the governance of Australia should be based on this archipelago, rather than the existing continental model. Australia’s political organization should be aligned with this reality by introducing new Commonwealth States that cater to the needs of these islands and islets.

  31. 31.

    Cell division in living organisms enables growth. The same mechanism applies to societies and their governance. See, for example, Mario Bunge, The Sociology-Philosophy Connection (Transaction Publishers, 1999).

  32. 32.

    The information in this section comes from the Official Hamburg Website english.hamburg.de.

  33. 33.

    SGS, Australian Cities Accounts 2014–15 (SGS Economics and Planning, 2015).

  34. 34.

    Peter Karl Kresl, Planning Cities for the Future: The Successes and Failures of Urban Economic Strategies in Europe (Edward Edgar, 2007) 132.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., 105.

  36. 36.

    Ibid., 106.

  37. 37.

    Ibid., 132.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., 132.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., 102.

  40. 40.

    N Parsons, Vienna: A Cultural History (Oxford University Press, 2009) 13.

  41. 41.

    V Redak, A Novy and J Becker ‘Modernizing or Polarizing Vienna?’ in F Moulaert et al (eds), The Globalized City: Economic Restructuring and Social Polarization in European Cities (Oxford University Press, 2005)167. Note that the social and Christian democratic movements register similar politics domination in Hamburg.

  42. 42.

    Parsons, Vienna, xvii.

  43. 43.

    P Pelinka, Eine kurze Geschichte der SPÖ. Ereignisse, Persönlichkeiten, Jahreszahlen (Ueberreuter, 2005).

  44. 44.

    Asher Judah, The Australian Century (Connor Court Ballan, 2014).

  45. 45.

    Henri Lefèbvre, La Production de L’Espace (Anthropos, 1974).

  46. 46.

    See L Adkins and R A Adkins, Handbook to Life in Ancient Rome (Oxford University Press, 1994); M Bunson, ‘Colonia (Roman)’ in M Bunson (ed), Encyclopedia of the Roman Empire (Facts on File, 1994).

  47. 47.

    J Lendering, Coloniae (2006) Livius.org.

  48. 48.

    Ibid.

  49. 49.

    See Victor Ferreres Comella, The Constitution of Spain: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2013).

  50. 50.

    See Donald Sassoon, Contemporary Italy: Politics, Economy and Society Since 1945 (Routledge, 2nd ed, 1997).

  51. 51.

    See Cornelia Cecilia Eglantine (ed), West Lothian Question: England, Federalism, Greater London (TypPRESS, 2012).

  52. 52.

    The proposition is for new states at the size of cities and their hinterland. This creates non-contiguous jurisdictions that continue to require the ‘glue’ of a second-tier, federal jurisdiction. This proposition is therefore different from what is seen today in Spain and is prophylactic to secessional tensions from regions. See Chaps. 13 and 14 for an elaboration on the proposed constitutional design.

  53. 53.

    While the matter has not been judicially considered, the preferable view is that s 123 does not impose a condition on the formation of new states. See Anna Rienstra and George Williams, ‘Redrawing the Federation: Creating New States from Australia’s Existing States’ (2015) 37 Sydney Law Review 357, 366.

  54. 54.

    See John Quick and Robert Randolph Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (LexisNexis Butterworths Australian, revised edition, 2015) § 474 (975). Compare Quick and Garran at § 475, where they suggest that s 124 ‘does not contain a fresh grant of power, but merely indicates several methods according to which the power granted by s 121 may be exercised’ (at 977). In contrast, s 123 is ‘worded, not as a limitation of powers elsewhere conferred, but as an additional and substantive power’ (at 975).

  55. 55.

    See Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (LexisNexis Butterworths Australian, revised edition, 2015) 967–968.

  56. 56.

    Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 8 February 1898, 694–698.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., 696.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., 697.

  59. 59.

    Examples of the entities that could be admitted are given by Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, § 470 (967–969).

  60. 60.

    On the influence of the United States Constitution on s 111, see Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 941.

  61. 61.

    For example, in 1911, South Australia surrendered the Northern Territory to the Commonwealth through an agreement approved and ratified by the legislature of South Australia and the Commonwealth Parliament. The surrender took effect under s 111 of the Constitution, without a referendum. Under the agreement, the Commonwealth took over South Australia’s loans in respect of the Territory. See Chief Justice Robert French, ‘The Northern Territory—A Celebration of Constitutional History’ (Speech delivered at the Kriewaldt Lecture for the centenary of the Northern Territory Supreme Court, 23 May 2011) http://www.hcourt.gov.au. See also Paterson v O’Brien (1978) 138 CLR 276, 280 and 281 where the HCA specifically refers to the fact that any surrender of territory can be ‘accepted’ by the Commonwealth through either legislation or simply by executive act without legislation:

    Not only, in our opinion, is the power of the State legislature under s 111 unconditioned upon the approval of the electors of the State, but the ability of the Commonwealth to accept a surrender of State territory is unconditioned. Acceptance rests in the unconditioned discretion of the Commonwealth. Further, we are of opinion that that acceptance can be effected by an executive act of the Commonwealth. Acceptance within s 111 does not have to be by an act of the Parliament. Thus no statute approving or ratifying the acceptance is necessary, though because of the terms of a particular agreement, such a statute may be passed as was in fact the case in each of the surrenders of territory with which these cases are concerned.

  62. 62.

    Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (LexisNexis Butterworths Australian, revised edition, 2015) 969.

  63. 63.

    Paterson v O’Brien (1978) 138 CLR 276.

  64. 64.

    Ibid., 280.

  65. 65.

    Ibid., 281.

  66. 66.

    Coyle v Smith, 221 US 559, 567 (1911).

  67. 67.

    See Pollard’s Lessee v Hagan, 3 How (44 US) 212, 224–225, 229–230 (1845); Coyle v Smith, 221 US 559, 573–574 (1911). See also Bolln v Nebraska, 176 US 83, 89 (1900); Ward v Race Horse, 163 US 504, 514 (1895); Escanaba Co v City of Chicago, 107 US 678, 688 (1882); Withers v Buckley, 20 How (61 US) 84, 92 (1857). For further details, see the Congressional Research Services (CRS) Annotated Constitution, 882–884 (art IV, Doctrine of the Equality of the States); available from the Legal Information Institute (LII) https://www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/.

  68. 68.

    Escanaba Co v Chicago, 107 US 678, 689 (1883).

  69. 69.

    Compare § 471 (970) where Quick and Garran expand on the approach in the United States. See also John Pyke, Government Powers under a Federal Constitution: Constitutional Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2017) 602.

  70. 70.

    See Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (LexisNexis Butterworths Australian, revised edition, 2015) § 226 (652).

  71. 71.

    On the exercise of the royal prerogative, see H V Evatt, The Royal Prerogative (Thomson Reuters, 1987).

  72. 72.

    For a discussion of the US counterpart, the eminent domain under art I § 8(18) of the US Constitution, see Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 761.

  73. 73.

    Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (LexisNexis Butterworths Australian, revised edition, 2015) 942.

  74. 74.

    Ibid., 941. Writing in 1901, they suggest that the acquisition of territory for the seat of government ‘seems to be provided for’ by s 124, while the power to acquire territory by surrender and acceptance ‘seems sufficiently implied by s 122’ (at 942). Citing authorities from the United States, they also suggest that s 111 is for acquiring territories for ‘special public purposes,’ and hence territories thus acquired cannot be erected into new states (at 942). However, the language of these sections does not seem to support this conclusion. Section 51(xxxi) refers to a wide acquisition power: ‘for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws.’ The language of ‘for any purpose’ is substantially different from ‘special public purposes.’ Similarly, s 111, the alternative to s 51(xxxi), talks about the ‘exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth,’ which could only be limited by the Constitution itself. Where the Constitution bestows a clear power on the Commonwealth Parliament to admit new States into the Federation under s 121, it cannot be said that territory surrendered under s 111 limits the Commonwealth (Parliament) power to delegate the exclusive jurisdiction to a local legislature. If there is a limitation in s 111, it would be on the Commonwealth executive rather than on the Commonwealth Parliament.

  75. 75.

    Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (LexisNexis Butterworths Australian, revised edition, 2015) § 217 (641).

  76. 76.

    See Clunies-Ross v The Commonwealth (1984) 155 CLR 193, 202.

  77. 77.

    See Peter Hanks, Frances Gordon and Graeme Hill, Constitutional Law in Australia (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2012) 569.

  78. 78.

    See Quick & Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (LexisNexis Butterworths Australian, revised edition, 2015) §218 (642). See also the comments in Clunies-Ross v The Commonwealth (1984) 155 CLR 193, 200–202.

  79. 79.

    However, compare the assertive approach of Latham CJ in PJ Magennis Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1949) 80 CLR 382, 397, with the reserved approach of Starke J in Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel (1944) 68 CLR 261, 291.

  80. 80.

    See Nelungaloo v The Commonwealth (1948) 75 CLR 495, 569 (Dixon J).

  81. 81.

    See Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 976.

  82. 82.

    See Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 975.

  83. 83.

    Ibid.

  84. 84.

    Daryl Passmore, ‘Referendum Queensland: MPs Will Force Referendum to Split Queensland in Two’, The Courier Mail (online), 26 March 2016 http://www.couriermail.com.au.

  85. 85.

    Eliza Borrello, Malcolm Turnbull Scraps Federation White Paper After $5 Million Work (28 April 2016) ABC http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-28/malcolm-turnbulls-$5-million-tax-white-paper-scrapped/7367204.

  86. 86.

    Herzl’s novel ‘Altneuland’ is credited as the source for this quote, although Herzl said ‘if you do not will it, it is and will remain a fairy-tale’ (). See Theodor Herzl, Altneuland (Hebrew) (Haifa Publishing, 1961) 226. For the original edition (in German) see Theodor Herzl, Altneuland (Hermann Seemann Nachfolger, 1902).

  87. 87.

    See Rienstra, Anna and George Williams, ‘Redrawing the Federation: Creating New States from Australia’s Existing States’ (2015) 37 Sydney Law Review 357, 373.

  88. 88.

    Although, as pointed out by one of the reviewers of an earlier draft of this chapter, referenda under the Constitution and the referenda that were conducted by the various colonies are quite different and should not be treated as one. Commonwealth referenda are much harder to pass because of the ‘passage by both Houses’ and the ‘majority overall and a majority in a majority of states’ provisions in s 128—as was reflected by the fact that the Federation referenda were passed at the first attempt in all States except NSW.

  89. 89.

    See Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 976.

  90. 90.

    Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 8 February 1898, 699–700 (James Walker).

  91. 91.

    See Imperial Acts 5 and 6 Vic c 76, sec 51; 13 and 14 Vic c 59, sec 32; 18 and 19 Vic c 54, sec 7; 24 and 25 Vic c 44, sec 2.

  92. 92.

    Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 8 February 1898, 699 (James Walker).

  93. 93.

    Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 1 March 1898, 1690 (James Walker). Mr Walker elaborated on the issue as follows (at 1690):

    We are all aware that one of the reasons why Queensland is not with us to-day [sic] is that in the Parliament of that colony the members for the Central and Northern Divisions voted against the Federal Enabling Bill because they were afraid, from the way in which the measure was introduced, that Queensland would be made one electorate, and that the members of the Federal Convention would therefore be largely elected by people resident in the Southern Division of the colony. In that case, they feared, if clause 117 [section 124] became a part of the Constitution, they would be deprived of the right of petitioning Her Majesty which they now have. It may be, perhaps, in the recollection of honorable members that on the 9th [of] April I presented at Adelaide a petition to the Convention from the Central Queensland Territorial Separation League. That petition has had the attention of the Queensland electors, and has not been dissented from. I think it would be well if I read a few extracts from it, showing the grounds on which the petitioners desire that a new clause shall be inserted in this Constitution so as to facilitate the entrance of Queensland into the Commonwealth. Before doing that I may mention that the colonies of Victoria and Queensland were separated from New South Wales on petition, and without the approval of the Parliament of New South Wales. In fact, Victoria would never have been able to secure separation from New South Wales if the consent of the New South Wales Parliament had been required. At the time Queensland was made into a separate colony, Her Majesty, as will be seen from the extracts I will presently read, reserved the right to separate Queensland into two or more colonies. The memorialists, amongst other things, made the following statements:-

    That, by Acts passed by the Parliament of Queensland, that colony has for certain administrative purposes been divided into three parts, described as the Southern Division, the Central Division, and the Northern Division respectively, with the several boundaries described in the 1st schedule to this memorial.

  94. 94.

    See Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 1 March 1898, 1690–1702 (James Walker), and 11 March 1898, 2398–2400 (James Walker).

  95. 95.

    See Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 11 March 1898, 2400 (James Walker).

  96. 96.

    United Australia Ltd v. Barclays Bank Ltd (1941) AC 1, 29 (L Atkin); Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (1985) AC 374, 417 (L Roskill); R (Bancoult) v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs (2001) 2 WLR 1219, [158] (L Hooper). Cited in Thomas Poole, ‘United Kingdom: The Royal Prerogative’ (2010) 8(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law (I CON) 146, 147.

  97. 97.

    This is especially true if we envisage introducing many new States, which would take the total number of states in Australia to between 15 and 20 States. See Cheryl Saunders, ‘The Constitutional Framework for a Regional Australia’ in Wayne Hudson and AJ Brown (eds), Restructuring Australia (Federation Press, 2004) 63.

  98. 98.

    Geoffrey Blainey, ‘Why Every Major Region Should Be its Own State’ in Wayne Hudson and A J Brown (eds), Restructuring Australia (Federation Press, 2004) 26, 28.

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  1. School of Law, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

    Benjamen Gussen

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Gussen, B. (2019). Case Study: The Territorial Evolution of Australia and the United States. In: Axial Shift. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6950-6_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6950-6_11

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