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Case Study: New England and New Zealand

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Abstract

This chapter contextualizes the results from Chap. 9 by providing a comparative analysis of the constitutional instruments that prevailed in New England and New Zealand in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, respectively. The thesis is that these constitutional choices had a lasting impact on economic development (qua economic complexity) in these jurisdictions. The analysis is grounded in the historical context of New England and New Zealand and should not be interpreted as providing a general result on the effect of subsidiarity on economic development. It elaborates on normative signals from James Buchanan on the size of polities, and uses the economic complexity index, and the effect of globalization on local governance, to advocate for subsidiarity as a guiding principle for constitutional designs.

This chapter appeared earlier as Benjamen F Gussen, ‘The Evolutionary Economic Implications of Constitutional Designs: Lessons from the Constitutional Morphogenesis of New England and New Zealand’ (2014) 6(2) Perspectives on Federalism E319.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    W P Morrell, The Provincial System in New Zealand, 1852–76 (Longmans, Green and Co, 1932) 6.

  2. 2.

    The North Island alone is around 114,000 square kilometers, while the South Island is around 150,000 square kilometers.

  3. 3.

    G A Wood, The Political Structure of New Zealand, 1858 to 1861 (Thesis (PhD), University of Otago, 1965) 29; David Gordon Herron, The Structure and Course of New Zealand Politics, 1853–1858 (Thesis (PhD), University of Otago, 1959) 367.

  4. 4.

    For the nexus between economic development and economic complexity, see Ricardo Hausmann and Cesar Hidalgo et al. The Atlas of Economic Complexity (Puritan Press, 2011).

  5. 5.

    James M Buchanan ‘Constitutional Economics’ in The New Palgrave (Macmillan, 1987) 585; also see Helmut Leipold ‘Neoliberal Ordnungstheorie and Constitutional Economics: A Comparison between Eucken and Buchanan’ (1990) 1(1) Constitutional Political Economy 47, Charles M Tiebout ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure’ (1956) 64(5) Journal of Political Economics 416, and Vincent Ostrom, Charles M Tiebout, and Robert Warren ‘The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry’ (1961) 55 American Political Science Review 831. Note that Buchanan himself was a proponent of a positive strand of constitutional economics. See Stefan Voigt, Explaining Constitutional Change: A Positive Economics Approach (Edward Elgar, 1999).

  6. 6.

    My reference to CPE should be limited to the works discussed in this chapter, namely, the works by James Buchanan.

  7. 7.

    See also James M Buchanan, The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (The University of Michigan Press, 1991); James M Buchanan Europe’s Constitutional Future (Institute of Economic Affairs, 1990). Also of interest is Friedrich A Hayek, Denationalisation of Money (Institute of Economic Affairs, 1976); Michael Wiebe, ‘Toward an Anarchist Constitutional Political Economy’ (Paper presented at the Southern Economic Association Annual Meetings, Atlanta, 20–22 November 2010); Roderick T Long, ‘Market Anarchism as Constitutionalism’ in R T Long and T R Machan (eds), Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a Government Part of a Free Country? (Ashgate, 2008) 133, and J Wiseman, ‘Principles of Political Economy: An Outline Proposal, Illustrated by Application to Fiscal Federalism’ (1990) 1(1) Constitutional Political Economy 101. There are important insights on the scalar anchor in Buchanan’s works from his Clubs Theory. These however will need to be addressed in a separate monograph. For my purposes here, I focus on his contribution to constitutional economics. For a review article on Club Theory, see Todd Sandler and John Tschirhart, ‘Club Theory: Thirty Years Later’ 1997 93(3/4) Public Choice 335, and James M Buchanan, ‘Public Choice After Socialism’ 1993 77 Public Choice 67, 69.

  8. 8.

    Michel Foucault, Power (New Press, 2000) 324.

  9. 9.

    George Silberbauer, ‘Ethics in Small-Scale Societies’ in Peter Singer (ed), A Companion to Ethics (Blackwell, 1994) 14, 17–18.

  10. 10.

    See also Scot Macdonald and Gunnar Nielsson, ‘Linkages Between the Concepts of “Subsidiarity” and Sovereignty: The New Debate Over Allocation of Authority in the European Union’ (Paper presented at the Fourth European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Biennial Conference, 11–14 May 1995). See Jeremy A Rabkin, Law Without Nations? Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States (Princeton University Press, 2005) 38 and 51.

  11. 11.

    Geoffrey Brennan and James M Buchanan, The Power to Tax (Liberty Press, 2000) 13–14.

  12. 12.

    James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (University of Michigan Press, 1962) 12. See generally Chap. 2. See, in contrast, Lars Udehn, Methodological Individualism: Background, History and Meaning (Routledge, 2001) 100, and Max Weber, ‘Essay on Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology’ (1981) 22 The Sociological Quarterly 145, 159. See also Jean Bodin, Les Six Livres de la République (1576) (Blackwell Oxford, no date) IV, 6. Contrast with the work by Vincent Ostrom where not every decision by the individual is voluntary; where in the post-constitutional phase institutions exercise authority over individuals. See, for example, Roberta Herzberg, ‘Commentary on Richard Wagner’s “Self-Governance, Polycentrism, and Federalism: Recurring Themes in Vincent Ostrom’s Scholarly Oeuvre”’ (2005) 57(2) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation 189, 191. Also refer to James M Buchanan, The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (The University of Michigan Press, 1991) 40 (ft 13).

  13. 13.

    James M Buchanan, The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order (The University of Michigan Press, 1991) 109.

  14. 14.

    See K Wicksell, ‘A New Principle of Just Taxation’ in Richard Musgrave and Alan Peacock (eds), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance (Macmillan and Company, 1994) 72, 77.

  15. 15.

    I delineate the arguments based on the work by James Buchanan and others.

  16. 16.

    See Benjamen F Gussen, ‘On the Problem of Scale: Hayek, Kohr, Jacobs and the Reinvention of the Political State’ (2013) 24 (1) Constitutional Political Economy 19, Jeffrey Friedman, ‘Methodological vs Normative Individualism’ 1990 4(1/2) Critical Review 5, and Leopold Kohr, The Overdeveloped Nations: The Diseconomies of Scale (Schocken Books, 1978) 59.

  17. 17.

    Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 43–44, 62, and 107.

  18. 18.

    Ibid., 61.

  19. 19.

    Ibid., 65.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., 109.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., 110.

  22. 22.

    See Chantal Millon-Delsol, L’État Subsidiaire: Ingérence et Non-ingérence de l’État, Le Principe de Subsidiarité aux Fondements de l’Histoire Européenne (Presses Universitaires de France, 1992) 15. See also Stefan Gosepath, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity’ in Andreas Føllesdal and Thomas Pogge (eds), Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights, and Social Institutions (Springer, 2005) 157, 162; Peter J Floriani, Subsidiarity (Penn Street Productions, 2012) 82–83. Note that subsidiarity is not limited to any particular number of levels of government. A useful account of subsidiarity can also be found in Michelle Evans and Augusto Zimmermann (eds), Global Perspective on Subsidiarity (Springer, 2014).

  23. 23.

    Scot Macdonald and Gunnar Nielsson, ‘Linkages Between the Concepts of “Subsidiarity” and Sovereignty: The New Debate over Allocation of Authority in the European Union’ (Paper presented at the Fourth European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Biennial Conference, 11–14 May 1995). See also Jürgen G Backhaus, ‘Subsidiarity’ in Jürgen G Backhaus (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (Edward Elgar, 1999) 136, 137–138. See also Leo XIII, ‘Rerum Novarum: Encyclical Letter on Capital and Labor’ (15 May 1891) in Claudia Carlen (ed) 2 The Papal Encyclicals 1878–1903 (1990) 241, 250–251, para 36; Pius XI, ‘Quadragesimo Anno: Encyclical Letter on Reconstruction of Social Order’ (15 May 1931) in Claudia Carlen (ed) 3 The Papal Encyclicals 1903–1939 (1990) 421, paras 79–80.

  24. 24.

    See Albert Breton, Alberto Cassone, and Angela Fraschini, ‘Decentralization and Subsidiary: Toward a Theoretical Reconciliation’ (1998) 19 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 21. See also Donald W Livingston, ‘Secession and the Modern State’ (1996) Stalking the Wild Taboo http://archive.li/yCvWU.

  25. 25.

    R Herzog, ‘Subsidiaritatsprinzip’ in Historiches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 10 (Schwabe, 1998) 482; cited in Stefan Gosepath, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity’ in Andreas Føllesdal and Thomas Pogge (eds), Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights, and Social Institutions (Springer, 2005) 157. See also Paolo G Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 97(38) The American Journal of International Law 38. For a critique of the principle of subsidiarity in the context of the European Union, see Christian Kirchner, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Treaty on European Union: A Critique from a Perspective of Constitutional Economics’ (1998) 6 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 291.

  26. 26.

    Other salient models leading to similar conclusions include Robert A Dahl and Edward R Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford University Press, 1974); Vincent Ostrom, Charles M Tiebout, and Robert Warren, ‘The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry’ (1961) 55 American Political Science Review 831; and Charles M Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure’ (1956) 64(5) Journal of Political Economy 416. For the closely connected principle of polycentricity, see Paul D Aligica and Vlad Tarko, ‘Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond’ (2012) 25(2) Governance 237.

  27. 27.

    Paolo G Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 97(38) The American Journal of International Law 38, 58.

  28. 28.

    John Hopkins, Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union (Cavendish Publishing, 2002) 29.

  29. 29.

    This explains why the US and Australian constitutions do not purvey local government.

  30. 30.

    See Chisholm vs. Georgia, 2 Dallas 435 (1792), and Charles Edward Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty Since Rousseau (Columbia University Press, 1900) 163 for other pronouncements by US Courts. See also Robert Jackson, ‘Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape’ in Neil Walker (ed), Relocating Sovereignty (Ashgate Dartmouth, Aldershot 2006) 3, 21; published earlier in Political Studies 1999 47(3) 431.

  31. 31.

    See Benjamen F Gussen, ‘On the problem of scale: Spinozistic Sovereignty as the Logical Foundation of Constitutional Economics’ (2013) 7 (1) The Journal of Philosophical Economics (online). Refer also to Baruch Spinoza, A Treatise on Politics (Holyoake, 1854), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (University of Michigan Press, 1962) 297–298.

  32. 32.

    James M Buchanan, Europe’s Constitutional Future (Institute of Economic Affairs London 1990) 2.

  33. 33.

    Ibid., 3–4.

  34. 34.

    See also Richard E Wagner, ‘Complexity, Governance and Constitutional Craftsmanship’ 2002 61(1) American Journal of Economics and Sociology 105, 115, and 120. On the mutual exclusivity between liberal and social democracies, refer to 116. See also Augustine, City of God (Image Books, 1958); Friedrich A Hayek, Law Legislation and Liberty: a New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy (The University of Chicago Press, 1983) 46; R E Wagner and J D Gwartney, ‘Public Choice and Constitutional Order’ in J D Gwartney and R E Wagner (eds), Public Choice and Constitutional Economics (JAI Press, 1988) 29, 32, and 35. Jane Jacobs suggests city-regions as the appropriate territorial footprint. See generally Jane Jacobs, Cities and the Wealth of Nations (Penguin Books Ringwood, 1984). See also Friedrich A Hayek Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).

  35. 35.

    Ludwig Van den Hauwe, ‘Constitutional Economics’ in Jürgen G. Backhaus (ed), The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (Edward Elgar, 1999) 112.

  36. 36.

    Charles M Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure’ (1956) 64(5) Journal of Political Economy 416.

  37. 37.

    See M A McKean, ‘Nesting Institutions for Complex Common-Pool Resource Systems’ in J Graham, I R Reeve, and D J Brunckhorst, Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Landscape Futures (Institute for Rural Futures and University of New England, 2002) 8, cited in Graham R Marshall, ‘Nesting, Subsidiarity, and Community-Based Environmental Governance Beyond the Local Level’ (2008) 2(1) International Journal of the Commons 75, 80. See also Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

  38. 38.

    Vincent Ostrom, Charles M Tiebout, and Robert Warren, ‘The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry’ (1961) 55 American Political Science Review 831. See also Richard E Wagner, ‘Self-Governance, Polycentrism, and Federalism: Recurring Themes in Vincent Ostrom’s Scholarly Oeuvre’ (2005) 57(2) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation 173.

  39. 39.

    John Gorham Palfrey, History of New England During the Stuart Dynasty (vols. 1–3) (Little, Brown, and Company, 1865) vol 1, 618.

  40. 40.

    John Quincy Adams, The New England Confederation of 1643 (Charles C Little and James Brown, 1843) 31.

  41. 41.

    See J Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806 (Clarendon Press, 1995) 276.

  42. 42.

    Omer Perue, The New England Confederation: Its Origins in Puritan Covenant Theology (PhD dissertation, Graduate College Union Institute and University, 2004).

  43. 43.

    Perry Miller, New England Mind in the 17th Century (Beacon Press, 1961) 478.

  44. 44.

    For a detailed account of the theological origins of subsidiarity, and for its counterpart in Calvinism, see Kent A Van Til, ‘Subsidiarity and Sphere-Sovereignty: A Match Made in …?’ (2008) 69(3) Theological Studies 610.

  45. 45.

    See Carl Joachim Friedrich, Politica Methodica Digesta of Johannes Althusius (Harvard University Press, 1932). See also the subsidiarity taxonomy provided by Andreas Føllesdal, ‘Subsidiarity’ (1998) 6(2) The Journal of Political Philosophy 118. See also Ken Endo, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to Jacques Delors’ (1994) 44(6) Hokkaido Law Review 553.

  46. 46.

    Francis Newton Thorpe (ed), The Federal and State Constitutions Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America (Government Printing Office, 1909).

  47. 47.

    Herbert Osgood, ‘England and the American Colonies in the 17th Century’ (1902) 17 Political Science Quarterly 206.

  48. 48.

    For a detailed account of the Confederation, see Henry William, History of the United States of America (The Macmillan Company, 1904).

  49. 49.

    Harry Ward, The United Colonies of New England 1643–90 (Vantage Press, 1961) 60.

  50. 50.

    See in particular the analysis by Paul Moon, Te Ara Ki Te Tiriti: The Path to the Treaty of Waitangi (David Ling Publishing Ltd, 2002).

  51. 51.

    See generally Joseph A Conforti, Imagining New England: Explorations of Regional Identity from the Pilgrims to the Mid-20th Century (The University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

  52. 52.

    The nature of the relationship between the Treaty and the Declaration is currently under review by the Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal, under the Te Paparahi o te Raki inquiry (Wai 1040), filed by Nga Puhi iwi of Northland in 2010. As of 2019, The Te Paparahi o Te Raki (Northland) inquiry (Wai 1040) is presided over by Judge Craig Coxhead and is currently inquiring into claims brought by hapū from Ngāpuhi, Ngāti Wai, Ngāti Hine, Patuharakeke, Ngāti Rehua, Ngāti Whātua, and Ngāti Manuhiri.

  53. 53.

    This analysis takes a wide interpretation of Māori as representing all local communities in New Zealand. See Benjamen F Gussen, ‘The Marginalisation of Localism in Current Responses to the Ecological Crisis’ (2012) 16 New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 167.

  54. 54.

    For an authoritative background on the principle of subsidiarity, see Chantal Millon-Delsol, L’État Subsidiaire: Ingérence et Non-ingérence de l’État, Le Principe de Subsidiarité aux Fondements de l’Histoire Européenne (Presses Universitaires de France, 1992).

  55. 55.

    Subsidiarity is also evident in Treaty of Waitangi jurisprudence. The principles that emanated from New Zealand Māori Council v. Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 all emerge from the principle of subsidiarity. I do not pursue this point in detail in this chapter, preferring instead to leave this to future enquiry. For the subprinciples of subsidiarity, see, for example, Stefan Gosepath, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity’ in Andreas Føllesdal and Thomas Pogge (eds), Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights, and Social Institutions (Springer, 2005) 157, 162; Peter J Floriani, Subsidiarity (Penn Street Productions, 2012) 82–83.

  56. 56.

    Refer to Chap. 7 for a delineation of these subprinciples.

  57. 57.

    Viola Florence Barnes, The Dominion of New England: A Study in British Colonial Policy (Frederick Ungar, 1960 [1923]) 59–61.

  58. 58.

    Terry L Anderson, ‘Wealth Estimates for the New England Colonies, 1650–1709’ (1975) 12 Explorations in Economic History 151, 171. See also Terry L Anderson, ‘Growth in Colonial New England: Statistical Renaissance’ (1979) 39(1) The Journal of Economic History 243 and the references therein.

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    See Joseph A Conforti, Imagining New England: Explorations of Regional Identity from the Pilgrims to the Mid-20th Century (The University of North Carolina Press, 2001) 57–59.

  61. 61.

    Guy Howard Miller, ‘Rebellion in Zion: The Overthrow of the Dominion of New England’ (1968) 30(3) Historian 439, 459.

  62. 62.

    W P Morrell, The Provincial System in New Zealand, 1852–76 (Longmans, Green and Co, 1932) 22. See also the views of Sir Robert Peel and Lord John Russell (19 June 1845) 81 GBPD HC 934 and 950, and Sir John Pakington (2nd Baronet) (4 June 1852) 122 GBPD HC 18.

  63. 63.

    Morrell, The Provincial System in New Zealand, 1852–76, 15.

  64. 64.

    Ibid., 2; David Gordon Herron, The Structure and Course of New Zealand Politics, 1853–1858 (Thesis (PhD), University of Otago, 1959) 1; Ron Watts, ‘Federalism Today’ (Paper presented at the International Conference on Federalism, Saint Gallen, 27–30 August 2002). According to Watts, quasi-federalism is where ‘the overall structure is predominantly that of a federation but the federal or central government is constitutionally allocated some overriding unilateral powers akin to those in unitary systems that may be exercise in certain specified circumstances’ (at xx).

  65. 65.

    Morrell, The Provincial System in New Zealand, 1852–76, 55–57.

  66. 66.

    See, for example, J R Mallory, ‘The BNA Act: Constitutional Adaptation and Social Change’ (1967) 2 La Revue juridique Thémis de l’Université de Montréal 127.

  67. 67.

    (30 July 1845) 82 GBPD HC 1236.

  68. 68.

    James McIndoe, ‘A Sketch of Otago from the Initiation of the Settlement to the Abolition of the Province’ in The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout, vol 32 (Victoria University of Wellington Library, Wellington) 86 http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz.

  69. 69.

    Statistics New Zealand figures.

  70. 70.

    Similar arguments can be made in relation to the Australian Constitution and the role of concurrent powers under s51 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp).

  71. 71.

    G A Wood, The Political Structure of New Zealand, 1858 to 1861 (Thesis (PhD), University of Otago, 1965) 1, 64–65.

  72. 72.

    W P Morrell, The Provincial System in New Zealand, 1852–76 (Longmans, Green and Co, 1932) 263.

  73. 73.

    (23 July 1875) 17 NZPD HC 50.

  74. 74.

    G A Wood, The Political Structure of New Zealand, 1858 to 1861 (Thesis (PhD), University of Otago, 1965) 29 and 367.

  75. 75.

    G A Wood, The Political Structure of New Zealand, 1858 to 1861 (Thesis (PhD), University of Otago, 1965) 37; David Gordon Herron, The Structure and Course of New Zealand Politics, 1853–1858 (Thesis (PhD), University of Otago, 1959) 389.

  76. 76.

    Bernard Attard, ‘Making the Colonial State: development, debt, and warfare in New Zealand, 1853–76’ (2012) 52(2) Australian Economic History Review 101, 101.

  77. 77.

    J B Condliffe, New Zealand in the Making: A Study of Economic and Social Development (George Allen & Unwin, 1959) 33.

  78. 78.

    W P Morrell, The Provincial System in New Zealand, 1852–76 (Longmans, Green and Co, 1932) 263, 252.

  79. 79.

    See Pt 2 of the Local Government Act 2002 (NZ).

  80. 80.

    Curtis P Nettels, The Roots of American Civilization; A History of American Colonial Life (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963) 297. See also Viola Florence Barnes, The Dominion of New England: A Study in British Colonial Policy (Frederick Ungar, 1960) 29.

  81. 81.

    W P Morrell, The Provincial System in New Zealand, 1852–76 (Longmans, Green and Co, 1932) 13.

  82. 82.

    J B Condliffe, New Zealand in the Making: A Study of Economic and Social Development (George Allen & Unwin, 1959) 16.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., 516.

  84. 84.

    Hidalgo Hausmann et al., The Atlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping Paths to Prosperity (Centre for International Development, 2011) 259.

  85. 85.

    US Department of Commerce, ‘Background on the New England Economy (Archived)’ (2002) US Commercial Service. http://web.archive.org/web/20020919185248; http://www.buyusa.gov/newengland/background.html. Archived from the original on 2002-09-19.

  86. 86.

    See E Wayne Nafziger, Economic Development (Cambridge University Press, 2012). For a classic monograph on economic development, see John Kenneth Galbraith, Economic Development (Harvard University Press, 1964). For economic development at the local scale, see John P Blair and Michael C Carroll, Local Economic Development: Analysis, Practices, and Globalization (Sage Publications, 2009).

  87. 87.

    Hidalgo Hausmann and others, The Atlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping Paths to Prosperity (Centre for International Development, 2011).

  88. 88.

    Ibid.

  89. 89.

    Steven Lee, ‘A Puzzle of Sovereignty’ in Neil Walker (ed), Relocating Sovereignty (Ashgate, 2006) 29, 29. See also John Andrew, Globalization and Sovereignty (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), and Jean L Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press, 2012). Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law: From Political to Economic Constitutionalism?’ in Neil Walker (ed) Relocating Sovereignty (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006) 361, 367, and 372. See also Giovanni Arrighi, ‘Globalization, State Sovereignty, and the “Endless” Accumulation of Capital’ in David A Smith, Dorothy J Solinger, and Steven C Topik (eds), States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (Routledge, 1999) 53.

  90. 90.

    See Saskia Sassen, The Global City (Princeton University Press, 1991). See also A T Kearney, 2012 Global Cities Index http://www.atkearney.com.

  91. 91.

    Stephen D Krasner, ‘Globalization and Sovereignty’ in David A Smith, Dorothy J Solinger, and Steven C Topik (eds), States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (Routledge, 1999) 34, 34.

  92. 92.

    Krasner, ‘Globalization and Sovereignty’ in David A Smith, Dorothy J Solinger, and Steven C Topik (eds), States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (Routledge, 1999) 34, 43. However, see also Eric Helleiner, ‘Sovereignty, Territoriality and the Globalization of Finance’ in David A Smith, Dorothy J Solinger, and Steven C Topik (eds), States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (Routledge, 1999) 138, 149.

    Helleiner, Eric, ‘Sovereignty, Territoriality and the Globalization of Finance’ in David A Smith, Dorothy J Solinger, and Steven C Topik (eds), States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (Routledge, 1999) 138, 151–152.

  93. 93.

    Martin Loughlin, ‘Ten Tenets of Sovereignty’ in Neil Walker (ed), Relocating Sovereignty (Ashgate, 2006) 79, 107–108. Citing Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 87. See also James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (University of Michigan Press, 1962) 301, Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, ‘Opting-Out: The Constitutional Economics of Exit’ (2002) 61(1) Journal of Economics and Sociology 123, 146, citing B Smith ‘The Cognitive Geometry of War’ in P Koller and K Puhl (eds), Current Issues in Political Philosophy (Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1997); Stephen Tierney, ‘Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary Challenges to the Nation-State’ in Neil Walker (ed), Relocating Sovereignty (Ashgate, 2006) 239, 245; Robert Jackson, ‘Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape’ in Neil Walker (ed), Relocating Sovereignty (Ashgate, 2006) 3, 15, and 21.

  94. 94.

    Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of the Regional Economics (HarperCollins, 1995). See also Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The End of The Nation-State (University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Daniel Chernilo, A Social Theory of The Nation-State (Routledge, 2007); and David A Smith, Dorothy J Solinger, and Steven C Topik (eds), States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (Routledge, 1999).

  95. 95.

    See, for example, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (University of Michigan Press, 1962). But also see Friedrich A Hayek, Law Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy (The University of Chicago Press, 1983) vol II. See also Tom W Bell, ‘Polycentric Law’ 1991 7(1) Institute of Humane Studies Review (online). R E Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law (Clarendon Press, 1998).

  96. 96.

    See J Agnew and S Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory, and International Political Economy (Routledge, 1995) 89. Cited in Andrew Herod, Scale (Routledge, 2011) 200. Also see J Allen and A Cochrane, ‘Beyond the Territorial Fix: Regional Assemblages, Politics and Power’ (2007) 41(9) Regional Studies 1161. Cited in Herod, 201–202. John Hopkins, Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the European Union (Cavendish Publishing, 2002); K Morgan ‘The Polycentric State: New Spaces of Empowerment and Engagement?’ 2007 41(9) Regional Studies 1237, 1238.

  97. 97.

    See, for example, Bruno S Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, The New Democratic Federalism for Europe: Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions (Edward Elgar, 1999).

  98. 98.

    Raia Prokhovnik, ‘Spinoza’s Conception of Sovereignty’ (2001) 27(3) History of European Ideas 289, 300–301. Refer to Benedict de Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise/A Political Treatise (Dover, 1951) 347–348, 356–357, 370, 383, and 384. Also see Raia Prokhovnik, ‘From Democracy to Aristocracy: Spinoza, Reason and Politics’ (1997) 23(2–4) History of European Ideas 105, 107.

  99. 99.

    James M Buchanan, Europe’s Constitutional Future (Institute of Economic Affairs, 1990) 3–4.

  100. 100.

    Ibid., 6 and 17.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., 18.

  102. 102.

    Yishai Blank, ‘Localism in the New Global Legal Order’ (2006) 47(1) Harvard International Law Journal 264, 264.

  103. 103.

    See Ltee v Hudson (Ville) [2001] 2 SCR 241, where the Supreme Court of Canada inferred jurisdiction of the municipality to act on environmental protection based on international environmental law.

  104. 104.

    Yishai Blank, (2006) 47(1) Harvard International Law Journal 264, 269.

  105. 105.

    Ibid., 272–273.

  106. 106.

    Ibid., 278.

  107. 107.

    On continentalization, see Chaps. 1 and 9.

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