Detecting Hardware Trojans by Reducing Rarity of Transitions in ICs

  • Tapobrata DharEmail author
  • Surajit Kumar Roy
  • Chandan Giri
Conference paper
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 892)


The fabless nature of the integrated circuits (ICs) manufacturing industry has made it prone to various kinds of attacks that can compromise the security of the IC. The inclusion of malicious circuitry in the original IC is one such attacks which has the potential to create a critical failure in the functioning of the ICs. Such kinds of clandestine circuitry is known as Hardware Trojan Horses (HTH) and they are often inserted in the circuit in such a way that they are very difficult to detect during the testing phase. The secretive nature of HT is attributed to the fact that they are often inserted in the parts of the IC where there is relatively less transitions. In this paper, a technique is suggested that aids in raising the number of transitions all over the IC which in turn helps in stimulating and/or activating the malicious HT circuit. The transition probability is increased in the IC by using 2-to-1 MUXs which are inserted in specific parts of the circuit. The 2-to-1 MUXs feed signals to the various parts of the IC with respect to weighted signal probability during the testing phase. The main goal of this paper is to increase the overall transition probability throughout the IC with an optimal number of 2-to-1 MUX insertions.


Design for testing Hardware trojan Transition probability 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tapobrata Dhar
    • 1
    Email author
  • Surajit Kumar Roy
    • 1
  • Chandan Giri
    • 1
  1. 1.Indian Institute of Engineering Science and Technology, ShibpurHowrahIndia

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