A Survey of Approaches for Promoting Honest Recommendations in Reputation Systems

  • Junsheng ChangEmail author
  • Liquan Xiao
  • Weixia Xu
Conference paper
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 994)


The efficiency of the reputation mechanism fully depends on the number of received recommendations and the quality of each of them, but a peer may not be willing to provide honest recommendations actively in order to pursue its own interest. To address this problem, a number of schemes have been proposed. It is therefore necessary to give an overview of the representative schemes. In this paper, we present a comprehensive discussion on approaches for promoting honest recommendations in reputation systems. We first classify the existing schemes into two categories: protecting the privacy of recommenders and providing incentive to recommenders. The latter can then be sub-divided into two categories: market-based incentive schemes and policy-based incentive schemes. We then survey some representative schemes in the literature belonging to each category, and summarize their unique characteristics and working principles. Moreover, some open problems in each category are also discussed.


Incentive mechanism Privacy Reputation system Reputation 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of ComputerNational University of Defense TechnologyChangshaChina

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