Abstract
Taipei’s mainland policies under Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT and Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP have both experienced some subtle changes. Despite Ma Ying-jeou’s statement of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” policy in his term, the opposition DPP was still very concern about Taiwan’s eventual incorporation by the mainland through peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. The failure of the Tsai Ing-wen administration in managing a stable relationship with the mainland has reminded the general public another way of doing business with the mainland. In fact, the fault line between the two parties has been redrawn as regards to (1) how important is the mainland factor as opposed to other external factors to Taiwan’s development and (2) to what degree Taipei should make policy adjustment to accommodate the increasing demand from the mainland.
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Notes
- 1.
Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China.
- 2.
In his inaugural address, Lee said, “China has suffered a lot in the 20th century,” and “For over 40 years, the two sides of the Straits have been two separate jurisdictions due to various historical factors, but it is also true that both sides pursue eventual national unification.” 20 May 1996, http://newcongress.yam.org.tw/taiwan_sino/leespeec.html, accessed 13 August 2018.
- 3.
After Lee’s “two-state argument,” one political appointee in the MAC frankly said, “We simply did not want to talk with mainland too soon.”
- 4.
In a meeting with a delegation of scholars from different countries, Chen clarified that the issue of one China in the future did not suggest the one China in the future is problematic. Author’s meeting record, 29 May 2000, Taipei.
- 5.
In the 20 June 2000 press conference, Chen denied that both sides had ever reached an agreement on the one-China principle. The so-called 1992 consensus could be interpreted as “one China with different interpretations” at the most, or “agree to disagree.” See China Times, 20 June 2000.
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This author intentionally uses the words “expression” and “interpretation,” respectively, to translate the Chinese word “biaoshu,” which is understood differently by the two sides in their word game.
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For Green supporters, the term of the Japanese rule carries the meaning of the Japanese colonial rule, which is not quite different from the term of the Japanese occupation.
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DPP Chairwomen Tsai Ing-wen meeting with Former Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe, DPP Headquarters’ News Release, 1 November 2011.
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Luo Chi-Cheng’s Remarks. See Xu Bodong and Guo Qingjin, eds., Jin shinian lai minjindang dalu zhengce dashiji (Important Things Related to the Democratic Progressive Party’s Mainland Policy over the Past Ten Years) (Beijing: Jiuzhou Press, 2013), p. 211.
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Tsai Ing-wen, “Taiwan Meeting the Challenges Crafting a Model of New Asian Value,” China Times, 4 June 2015, http://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20150604002450-260407, accessed 11 August 2018. The phrase of “the current constitutional order of the Republic of China” includes both the 1947 constitution and seven amendments since 1991. The fourth article in the original legal document defining territorial scope has never been redrawn. The 1991 amendment states that it is applicable to the “free area of the Republic of China,” that is, the islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Kimmen, and Matsu suggesting that the “free area” is part of the Chinese territory. The phrase, however, is different from the idea of “constitutional one China” for not directly defining the nature of cross-Strait relations. It may suggest the original idea of “two sides, one China” but can also be used to refer to the legal status of Taiwan after seven rounds of amendments. Hence, it is conceptually possible to describe cross-Strait relations as special state-to-state ones as Lee Teng-hui did earlier. It also includes the possibility of redefining the scope of territory through revision of the relevant legal article based on democratic procedure in the future.
- 31.
Emily Rauhala, “The Next President of Taiwan,” Time (Asian edition), 29 June 2015, p. 3.
- 32.
News Release, Department of Press and Information, the Democratic Progressive Party, 15 August 2015, available at www.dpp.org.tw. Emphases added by this author in italics.
- 33.
This author appreciates Ms. Tsai Meng-chung’s reminding of this subtle change. Tsai was in charge of the party’s mainland affairs then. Author’s personal interview, 2 September 2015.
- 34.
“Li Yufeng yu zhongping: Taiwan xuanhou liang’an dou xu rangchu kongjian” (Li Yufeng Told China Review That the Two Sides Should Make Compromise after Elections), China Review Net, 2 January 2016, http://www.zhgpl.com/crn-webapp/touch/detail.jsp?coluid=1&kindid=0&docid=104065991.
- 35.
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- 36.
See Lin Gang, “Minjindang shangtaihou dui dalu zhengce de yugu” (Predicting the DPP’s Mainland Policy after It Comes to Power), China Review Monthly, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2016), pp. 4–7.
- 37.
Liberty Times, 21 January 2016.
- 38.
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- 39.
Tsai Ing-wen’s Inaugural Address, 20 May 2016.
- 40.
While Tsai claims that she respects to the “constitutional order of the Republic of China,” she told DPP members on her 28 September 2016 letter to them that she was “constrained (jiban) by the constitution and cannot take free action.”
- 41.
Tsai Ing-wen’s Inaugural Address, Taipei Times, 21 May 2016, p. 1, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/05/21/2003646753, accessed 28 August 2018.
- 42.
Ten-Year Platform of the DPP.
- 43.
Press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 20 May 2016.
- 44.
“Tsai Ing-wen:Minjindang hui xunqiu liang’an zhengyi huajie zhidao” (Tsai Ing-wen Said that the DPP would Seek the Way to Resolve the Dispute Between the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait), China Review Net, 12 August 2014.
- 45.
For Catharine Chang, cross-Strait agreement is not an international treaty. For David Lee, cross-Strait relationship is not a “diplomatic relationship.” Meanwhile, the executive branch spokesman Hsu Kuo-yung indicated openly China is not a foreign country to Taiwan (zhongguo bingfei waiguo). According to Lee Yuh-feng, all these remarks have pointed out a fact that cross-Strait relationship is not a state-to-state one.
- 46.
“Yichang buchenggong de liang’an gekong duihua” (An Unsuccessful Dialogue between the Two Sides), China Times, 23 July 2018, http://www.chinatimes.com/cn/newspapers/20180723000589-260109, accessed 11 August 2018.
- 47.
When Beijing first used words “incomplete exam paper” to evaluate Tsai’s May 20th speech, some people criticized Beijing was so arrogant to treat Taiwan as a student, unaware of the fact that the Chinese leaders like to use the exam paper to refer to people’s expectation. It is interesting to know that Tsai used the term as well now, a product from the learning process.
- 48.
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- 49.
“Tsai Ing-wen’s Grand Escape,” China Times (Taiwan), 7 August 2017, p. 1.
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- 52.
Tsai Ing-wen’s Inaugural Address (20 May 2016).
- 53.
In Ma’s inaugural address in May 2008, he just mentioned about the United States, not Japan and other foreign countries.
- 54.
“Meiguo weihe po wo zizhu guofang lengshui” (Why Does the United States Discourage Taiwan to Develop Its Defense Independently?), United Daily, 23 October 2016.
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According to the mainland’s statistics, Taiwan’s import from the mainland is next to that from Japan. According to Taiwan’s statistics, however, the mainland has overtaken Japan as the most important source for import.
- 56.
Tsai Zheng-jia, “Dapo duiri waijiao kejiu” (Breaking Through the Diplomatic Bottleneck Between Taiwan and Japan), China Daily, 22 July 2008.
- 57.
The only exception was Japan said it hoped that Taiwan authorities would not unilaterally change the status quo in December 2003 under the pressure of the United States.
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According to the statistical data of Investment Commission at Ministry of Economic Affairs in Taiwan.
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- 64.
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- 65.
Author’s interview, 17 November 2010, Taipei.
- 66.
Author’s interview, 15 November 2010, Taipei.
- 67.
One DPP county councilor said that the party’s position is closer to that of Japan than the mainland. What Taiwan wants is fishing rights, not the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands. Japan’s sovereignty over the islands can present a check against the mainland. Author’s interview, 27 September 2010, Kaohsiung.
- 68.
Author’s interview, 9 December 2010, Taipei.
- 69.
Author’s interview, 15 November 2010, Taipei; 17 November 2010, Taipei.
- 70.
“Fenghuo waijiao guanjian yinsu” (Key to the “Fighting Diplomacy”), Central Daily, 28 December 2016.
- 71.
This is not the precise description, though. Japan is still the biggest trade source for Taiwan’s import, and the mainland’s position on territorial disputes with Japan also helps Taiwan to protect its own interest in dealing with Japan.
- 72.
Kao Yishen, “Luke diao qicheng” (Mainland Tourists Reducing 70 Percent), China Review Net, 10 June 2016.
- 73.
Chen Ming-tung, “Taiwan miandui zhongguo de zhanlue sikao” (Strategic Thinking of Taiwan Facing China), Symposiums of Social Dialogue on Taiwan’s Unavoidable Challenge, Hosted by DPP’s Policy Committee, 2 May 2010, Taipei.
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Lin, G. (2019). Taipei’s Policy Toward the Mainland. In: Taiwan’s Party Politics and Cross-Strait Relations in Evolution (2008–2018). Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-5814-2_4
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