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Issues Decisive for China’s Rise or Fall pp 161–180Cite as

The Relationship Between Human Rights and Anti-corruption

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Abstract

In China, corruption has rampaged for several decades to a degree that the legitimacy of the ruling party and its governance has been under question in the eyes of ordinary people. Bring corruption down to a controllable level has thus become an ambitious task challenging the government's authority and strength. Since 2012, the central government has launched a crusade aiming at eradicating corruption. However, the ultimate outcome of the campaign remains to be seen.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Kofi Annan, the Forward to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC ), See UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 31 October 2003, A/58/422.

  2. 2.

    In the initial stage of the economic reforms, for ensuring the smoothness of the reforms, the Chinese policy makers adopted a gradual reform strategy rather than a “big bang” strategy. A dual-track price system , in which the socialist central planning and the emerging market coexisted for resource allocation, was introduced to fulfil the purpose. Under this double-track price system, a commodity could have a state-controlled price and a market price at the same time. It allowed state-owned enterprises which had met their planned production quotas to sell their surplus output at market prices which were undoubtedly higher than the stated-controlled price. The adoption of this system was helpful in terms of preventing the emergence of a substantial amount of immediate losers in the economic transition and reducing social and political costs of the economic reforms. However, the system was open to abuses by those who were in a position to procure and allocate commodities in the state-controlled system. A wave of official diversion took place and soon, in turn, took the form of corruption . Although a full market economy have come into existence and the dual-track price system has becoming a history in today’s China, corruption as an inherent and incompetently addressed element has followed the country’s economic progress all the way along.

  3. 3.

    See Amnesty International UK, “1989 Tiananmen Square Protest”, at <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/china-1989-tiananmen-square-protests-demonstration-massacre>.

  4. 4.

    China signed the Convention on 10 December 2003 and ratified on 13 January 2006. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention against Corruption , at <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html>. Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 December 2015.

  5. 5.

    See Octavian Aron, “Corruption and Anti-corruption Strategies: An assessment Framework”, 1 Romanian Journal for Multidimensional Education (2009) 15.

  6. 6.

    See Lorena Alcazar, Raul Andrade (2001), Diagnosis Corruption, ISBN 978-1-931003-11-7, pp. 135–136.

  7. 7.

    See Delmar Thomas C Stewart (ed.), Corruption in the People’s Republic of China (Dicho, United States, 2012), pp. 135–136.

  8. 8.

    See Xingkun Yang, “The Current Status and Governance of Corruptions of Officials at the Ministerial or Provincial Government Level in China”, Oriental Morning Post (September 9, 2014), Available at <https://wenku.baidu.com/view/55b5bbadf90f76c661371abb.html>.

  9. 9.

    See Guangqing Xiong, “Institutionalized Corruption and Institutionalized Anti-Corruption in China”, 21ccom.net (October 11, 2013), <http://www.21ccom.net/articles/dlpl/szpl/2013/1011/article_93369.html>.

  10. 10.

    These four strong social ties include: the ties among fellow students, among army friends, among those who partook of corruptions , and among those who visited prostitutes together.

  11. 11.

    See Yang, supra note 8.

  12. 12.

    For detailed explanation of the phrase, see Yuwa Wei, Comparative Corporate Governance: A Chinese Perspective (2003), at 10.

  13. 13.

    See Gregory C Chow, Corruption and China’s Economic Reform in the Early 21st Century, (CEPS Working Paper No. 116, Princeton University, October 2005), at 3.

  14. 14.

    See Johann Graf Lambsdorff, “Corruption and Rent-Seeking”, 113 (1–2) Public Choice (2002) 97.

  15. 15.

    See Yuqiong Lei and Cheng Zhang, “A Study of the Current Situation and Trend of Educational Corruption in China”, 9 Chinese Public Administration (2014) 63–68; and Juhua Wang, “An Analysis on the Forms and Causes of Medical Corruption” 21 (9) Medicine and Society (2008) 31–32.

  16. 16.

    See Zhimin Peng, Present Situation of Corruption and Solutions in Contemporary China, (unpublished LLM Thesis) 2–3, available at <http://www.docin.com/p-1437654963.html>; See also Nanyu Jiang, “New Trend of Power Corruption in China: Power Capital Combines with China” Economic Times (July 22, 2004), available at <http://www.ce.cn/hgjj/gnbd/200407/22/t20040722_1298064.shtml>.

  17. 17.

    One of the four municipalities, which are directly under the administration of the central government in China. The other three municipalities are: Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin.

  18. 18.

    See Peng, supra note 16.

  19. 19.

    See Minxin Pei, “Corruption threatens China’s Future”, 55 Policy Brief of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (October 2007), <http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/10/09/corruption -threatens-china-s-future-pub-19628>.

  20. 20.

    See Editor, “Naked Officials ”, Wikipedia, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naked_official>.

  21. 21.

    See Pei, supra note 19, at 5.

  22. 22.

    Ibid.

  23. 23.

    See UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, articles 22–28; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966.

  24. 24.

    See International Council on Human Rights Policy, Corruption and Human Rights: Making the Connection (2009), at 7–9.

  25. 25.

    The right to health includes healthcare, but also the underlying determinants of health, such as safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, adequate supply of safe food, nutrition, housing, occupational health, environmental health and access to health-related information. Furthermore, the following rights must be guaranteed by a state under all circumstances: access to maternal and child healthcare, including family planning, immunization against the major infectious diseases, appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries, essential drugs, adequate supply of safe water and basic sanitation, and freedom from serious environmental health threats. See ibid, at 50–51. The previous chapter thoroughly depicts the relationships between environment and human rights , between medical securities and human rights , and between food safety and human rights.

  26. 26.

    Yury Fedotov (Chief of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), speech at the opening of the Fifth Session of the Conference of States Parties to the UN Convention against Corruption in Panama City—COSP5 (12–14 September 2012).

  27. 27.

    Discrimination is defined as: “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.” See the UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, para. 7.

  28. 28.

    In judicial systems, corruption usually takes the form of “acts or omissions that constitute the use of public authority for the private benefit of court personnel, and result in the improper and unfair delivery of judicial decisions. Such acts and omissions include bribery, extortion, intimidation, influence peddling and the abuse of court procedures for personal gain”.

  29. 29.

    See Transparency International , “What is Transparency International?” <https://www.transparency.org/about/>.

  30. 30.

    Ibid.

  31. 31.

    See Transparency International, “Our Impact”, <https://www.transparency.org/impact/>.

  32. 32.

    See José Ugaz (the Chair of Transparency International), “Corruption Is Threatening Economic Growth for All”, <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results>.

  33. 33.

    See Transparency International , Corruption Perceptions Index , at <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview>.

  34. 34.

    See Melanie Manion, “Taking China’s anticorruption campaign seriously”, 4 (1) Economic and Political Studies (2016) 6, at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20954816.2016.1152094>.

  35. 35.

    Peng Hu, “Adhering to Six Normalizations and Maintaining Anti-Corruption New Normal ”, 2 Communist Party of China Construction (2016) 44, available at <http://www.360doc.com/content/16/0226/15/363711_537563978.shtml>.

  36. 36.

    “New Normal is a term in business and economics that refers to financial conditions following the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the aftermath of the 2008–2012 global recession. The term has since been used in a variety of other contexts to imply that something which was previously abnormal has become commonplace”. See Editor, “New Normal (business)”, Wikipedia, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Normal_(business)>.

  37. 37.

    See Fan Zhang, “The New Features of the Anti-Corruption Campaign since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China”, Shangdu Net (July 3, 2014), at <http://view.shangdu.com/249/20140703/249_5919187.shtml>.

  38. 38.

    See Xudong Niu, “133 Officials at and above the Vice-Ministerial Level Investigated and Punished”, Procuratorate Daily (December 8, 2015), available at <http://www.china.com.cn/legal/2015-12/08/content_37264061.htm>.

  39. 39.

    Lu Wang, “More than 180,000 officials were disciplined, Concentrated on the Sectors such as Real Properties etc.”, Economic Information Daily (October 22, 2014), available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2014-10/22/c_127124920.htm>.

  40. 40.

    See Manion, supra note 34, at 8.

  41. 41.

    See the 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, available at <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview>.

  42. 42.

    See Huangke Xu and Jiaobao Duan, “Economy and Corruption: Critiques on Views that Corruption Benefits the Economic Development”, 36 (5) Journal of Guangxi Teachers Education University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition, 2015) 21–22; See also Shuguang Zhang and Zuoshi Xie, “What China has Done Right?”, Eastday (July 8, 2016), <http://mini.eastday.com/a/160708141952463-3.html>.

  43. 43.

    See Ian Armstrong, “Forecasting China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (for Global Risk Insights)”, International Policy Digest (August 30, 2015), <http://intpolicydigest.org/2015/08/30/forecasting-china-s-anti-corruption-campaign/>.

  44. 44.

    See generally Loren Cobb and Mike Gonzalez, “Corruption as a System of Interlocking Vicious Cycles: Lessons from NationLab”, The NationLab Concept of Corruption, available at <http://www.aetheling.com/NL/docs/NL-Concept-of-Corruption.pdf>.

  45. 45.

    See Duncan Hewitt, “How China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Is Putting Pressure on A Slowing Economy”, IVT Special Report (March 22, 2016), <http://www.ibtimes.com/how-chinas-anti-corruption-campaign-putting-pressure-slowing-economy-2308834>.

  46. 46.

    See Rob McCusker, Review of anti-corruption strategies (Austrian Institution of Criminology, Technical and Background Paper, No. 23, 2006) 34.

  47. 47.

    See Valerie Wright, Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment (The Sentencing Project, November 2010) 2, available at <http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Deterrence-in-Criminal-Justice.pdf>.

  48. 48.

    See ibid., at 4. See also Lana Friesen, Certainty of Punishment versus Severity of Punishment: An Experimental Investigation (School of Economics Discussion Paper, No. 400, October 2009, Queensland University) 9, available at <http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/400.pdf>.

  49. 49.

    See Xin Haiguang, “China’s Great Swindle: How Public Officials Stole $120 Billion and Fled the County”, Time Magazine (Worldcrunch, June 26, 2011), available at <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/08599207975600.html>.

  50. 50.

    See Mitsue Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law (Intersentia, Oxford, 2005), at 224.

  51. 51.

    See Hengjun Yang, ‘Fox Hunt 2014’: China’s Overseas Campaign against Corrupt Officials, The Diplomat (October 22, 2014), <http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/fox-hunt-2014-chinas-overseas-campaign-against-corrupt-officials/>.

  52. 52.

    See Inazumi, supra note 50, at 86.

  53. 53.

    See Inazumi, ibid., at 225; See generally also Ved P. Nanda, “Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests—Capital Punishment and Torture”, 23 (5) Fordham International Law Review (1999) 1369–1396, available at <http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1700&context=ilj>.

  54. 54.

    See Nanda, ibid, at 1369.

  55. 55.

    See Zhang Yan and Zhang Yunbi, “Anti-corruption campaign ‘good for China, US”, China Daily (August 18, 2015), <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2015-08/18/content_21635090.htm>; See also Angus Grigg and Lisa Murry, “Untold Story: China’s Operation Fox Hunt and the Capture of Zhang Jianping”, Financial Review (June 18, 2016), <http://www.afr.com/news/politics/world/untold-story-chinas-operation-fox-hunt-and-the-capture-of-zhang-jianping-20160615-gpk1i9>.

  56. 56.

    See Yang, supra note 51.

  57. 57.

    See Lei Zhang, “Examine Persuasion Work through Hu Xin Case”, 18 (2) Journal of National Prosecutors College (2010) 105–110.

  58. 58.

    See Editor, “Foxhunt 2014”, Baike, at <http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=HZx8ZMwXDlzgZQp58tYbCXvS75xv6btQePn0N3QPF5YntW4aeO9KpwHRvq4lD92qIBJScdeqFYsPozsNGgR1PUgRTmacJk1ndkwgtUl1bR3>; See also Huilin Wang, “Foxhunt Siezed 857 Fugitives in 2015—the Longest Hiding Time Is 21 Years”, Xinhua Net (Jan. 28, 2016), <http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2016-01/28/c_128677422.htm>; See also Min Rui, “Campaign Sees 857 Fugitives Returned to China”, News of CRIenglish (January 28, 2016), <http://english.cri.cn/12394/2016/01/28/3561s914910.htm>.

  59. 59.

    United Nations, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC ) 2005; United Nations, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC ) 2000; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Handbook on Practical Anti-corruption Measures for Prosecutors and Investigators 2004; OECD , the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Bearer of Transactions (the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention) 1997.

  60. 60.

    See UNCAC, art. 15—art. 20.

  61. 61.

    See Shaohong Li, “The United Nations Convention against Corruption will Boost China’s Anti-corruption Campaign”, Xinhua Net, <http://review.jcrb.com/zyw/n51/ca152532.htm>.

  62. 62.

    See Huhua Cao and Jeremy Paltiel (eds.), Facing China as a New Global Superpower: Domestic and International Dynamics: Domestic and International Dynamics from A Multidisciplinary Angle (2016), at 115.

  63. 63.

    See art. 44 of the UNCAC and art. 16 of the UNTOC .

  64. 64.

    See Zunyou Zhou, “China’s Global Hunt for Fugitives: What Beijing Needs to Get Right”, The Wall Street Journal (May 27, 2015), <http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/05/27/chinas-global-hunt-for-fugitives-what-beijing-needs-to-get-right/>.

  65. 65.

    Once a corruption investigation against a Chinese party official is carried out, the official is usually first subjected to shuanggui according to party regulations before he/she is handed over to prosecutors. The suspect is usually seized, held incommunicado for a period before entering the court room. According to Western media that in this process, these officials are denied some of the basic rights to which ordinary criminal suspects are entitled.

  66. 66.

    See Editor, “Shuanggui”, Wikipedia, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shuanggui>.

  67. 67.

    See Zhou, supra note 64; see also Grigg and Murry, supra note 55.

  68. 68.

    See Editor, “Anti-corruption : Challenging China, Policies and Government” (October 24, 2014), <http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/anti_corruption_changing_china>.

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    Yuwa Wei

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Wei, Y. (2019). The Relationship Between Human Rights and Anti-corruption. In: Issues Decisive for China’s Rise or Fall. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-3699-7_9

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