Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Territorial Disputes: China and Its Neighbors

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Issues Decisive for China’s Rise or Fall

  • 306 Accesses

Abstract

China has a land boundary of some 20,000 km, bordering 14 neighbouring countries. Across the sea, there are six island nations neighbour including Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. The current regime has inherited territorial disputes from its predecessors with all six of its island neighbours. Along with the global economic recession since 2008, territorial disputes between China and its neighbouring countries have escalated.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: China, <https://www.cia.gov/li-brary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>.

  2. 2.

    Ping Zheng, China Geography (2nd ed, China Intercontinental Press, Beijing, 2006), p. 2.

  3. 3.

    See generally the discussions in M Taylor Fravel’s book, Strong Border, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008).

  4. 4.

    Xiaoming Zhang, China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment 184 China Quarterly (2005) 853.

  5. 5.

    US Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Note, Ussr/China: Soviet And Chinese Forces Clash On The Ussuri River (4 March 1969) <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.1.pdf>; William Burr (ed.), The Sino–Soviet Border Conflict, 1969: U.S. Reactions and Diplomatic Maneuvers (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 49, George Washington University, Washington D C, 12 June 2001), <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/>.

  6. 6.

    See Editor, Sino-Vietnamese War, Wikipedia <http://www.amazon.com/wiki/Sino-Vietnamese_War>.

  7. 7.

    Martin Fackler, “Japan is Flexing its Military Muscles to Courter a Rising China”, New York Times (26 November 2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/world/asia/japan-expands-its-regional-military-role.html?pagewanted=all>; Michele Penna, “War Games: US and China Flex Military Muscle”, Asian Correspondent, (June 19, 2013) <http://asiancor-respondent.com/109390/analysis-us-pivot-to-asia-creates-some-unlikely-alliances/>.

  8. 8.

    Council on Foreign Relation (USA), China’s Maritime Disputes <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide>.

  9. 9.

    United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

  10. 10.

    Editor, “China Facts”, National Geographic <http://travel.nationalgeographic.com/travel/coun-tries/china-facts/>.

  11. 11.

    Ibid.

  12. 12.

    See William Alexander Parsons Martin , The Lore of Cathay: or The Intellect of China (F. H. Revell Company, New York, 1901), pp. 26–27 (noting China discovered Mariner’s Compass, using it in sea-faring “voyages as early as the fifth century A.D.”).

  13. 13.

    See Paul Rozario, Zheng He and the Treasure Fleet 1405–1433: A Modern Day Traveller’s Guide from Antiquity to the Present (SNP International, Singapore, 2005).

  14. 14.

    Yang Wei, “Admiral Zheng He’s Voyages to the West Oceans” 19 (2) Education about Asia (2014) 30, available at <https://www.asian-studies.org/EAA/EAA-Archives/19/2/1287.pdf>.

  15. 15.

    Ibid, at 29–30.

  16. 16.

    Seokwoo Lee, “Territorial Disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku Islands” 3 Boundary & Territory Briefing (2002) 16.

  17. 17.

    Joyman Lee, “Senkaku/Diaoyu : Islands of Conflict” 61 (5) History Today (2011), <http://www.historytoday.com/joyman-lee/senkakudiaoyu-islands-conflict>.

  18. 18.

    Ibid.

  19. 19.

    Reversion to Japan of the Ryukyu and Daito Islands, 1972, U.S.–Japan, June 17, 1971, 23.1 U.S.T. 447. See also John W Finney, “Senate Endores Okinawa Treaty”, New York Times (November 11, 1971), <http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F20714FB3D591A7493C3A8178AD95F458785F9&scp=44&sq=1972+okinawa&st=p>.

  20. 20.

    Charles Petee, “Reader’s Voice: An Important Fact about the Senkaku Island Dispute”, Japan Daily Press (October 30, 2012), <http://japandailypress.com/readers-voice-an-important-fact-about-the-senkaku-islands-dispute-3017510/>.

  21. 21.

    Reinhard Drifte, “Japanese-Chinese territorial disputes in the East China Sea –between military confrontation and economic cooperation”, LSE Research Online <http://www.docin.com/p-327439909.html>.

  22. 22.

    The Ministry of the Interior (Taiwan), “The Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the Territory of the Republic of China” <http://maritimeinfo.moi.gov.tw/marineweb/LayFromE0.aspx?icase=T02&pid=0000000516>.

  23. 23.

    See Zalmay Khalil et al., The United States and Asia: Toward a New U. S. Strategy and Force Posture (Rand, Santa Monica, CA, 2001), pp. 1–3, 43–56.

  24. 24.

    See David Scott, “US Strategy in the Pacific—Geopolitical Positioning for the Twenty-First Century” 17 (3) Geopolitics (2012) 607.

  25. 25.

    Ashley J. Tellis, Balancing without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China (2014) 61–62 <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf>.

  26. 26.

    Ibid, at 60–62.

  27. 27.

    See PTI, “Chinese Navy sails through island chain in Pacific”, Zee News (2 August 2013) <http://zeenews.india.com/news/world/chinese-navy-sails-through-island-chain-in-pacific_866199.html>.

  28. 28.

    The first island chain refers to the first chain of major archipelagos out from the East Asian continental mainland coast. Principally composed of the Kuril Islands, Japanese Archipelago, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and Borneo; from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Malay Peninsula. The second island chain refers to the next chain of archipelagos out from the East Asian continental mainland coast, beyond the first island chain. Principally composed of the Bonin Islands, Marianas Islands, Caroline Islands, from Honshu to New Guinea. See Editor, “First Island Chain”, Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_island_chain>; see also Editor, “Second Island Chain”, Wiktionary, <http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/second_island_chain>.

  29. 29.

    Supra note 25, at 58–59.

  30. 30.

    Editor, “How Uninhabited Islands Sourced China-Japan Ties”, BBC News (9 November 2014), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139>.

  31. 31.

    United States Energy Information Administration, “East China Sea ” <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=ecs>.

  32. 32.

    United States Energy Information Administration, “China” <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ch>.

  33. 33.

    Supra note 31.

  34. 34.

    Kristin Walker, “China Set to Surpass U.S. as Largest Oil Importer”, Morning Ledger (August 12 2013), <http://www.morningledger.com/china-set-to-surpass-u-s-as-largest-oil-importer/132885/>.

  35. 35.

    Supra note 32.

  36. 36.

    Supra note 31.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    Ibid.

  39. 39.

    Murray Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen, Gregory B Poling, “Perspectives On the South China Sea : Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute” (A Report of Center for Strategic & International Study Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies, 2014) 83, electronic version is available at <https://www.amazon.com.au/Perspectives-South-China-Sea-Diplomatic-ebook/dp/B00OLG9VN6>.

  40. 40.

    Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, The South China Sea Dispute: Rising Tensions, Increasing Stakes (The Jamestown Foundation, Report, 2009), p. 8.

  41. 41.

    Ying Du and Qinglin Peng, “The Establishment of the South China Sea Research Institution”, China Social Science Net Foundation (April 4, 2014) <http://www.cssn.cn/st/st_whdgy/201404/t20140404_1058089.shtml>.

  42. 42.

    Chengjun Feng, The History of Maritime Transportation in South China Sea (1st ed, The Commercial Press, Beijing, 1937); reprinted by Shanghai: Shanghai Rarebooks Publishing House, 2012), pp. 78–90, electronic version available at <http://books.google.ca/books?id=mdHVt6uz1yUC&pg=PT14&hl=zh-CN&source=gbs_selected_pages&cad=3#v=onepage&q&f=false>.

  43. 43.

    Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications” 107 American Journal of International Law (2013) 111–112.

  44. 44.

    Ibid, at 100–102.

  45. 45.

    Ibid. See also Jingxiang Su, “The History of China’s Sovereignty in the South China Sea ”, Dong Fang Daily (May 15, 2012) <http://www.dfdaily.com/html/51/2012/5/15/791777.shtml>.

  46. 46.

    Ibid, at 102.

  47. 47.

    The Cairo Declaration, 9 Department of State Bulletin (US), December 4, 1943, at 393 (The Declaration was jointly made by the US, the UK and China. It states: “The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent. With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.” Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration 1945 (jointly made by the US, the UK, the USSR and Chia) states: “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”).

  48. 48.

    Article 8 of the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, 13 Department of State Bulletin (US), July 26, 1945, at 137 [hereinafter Potsdam Declaration] (“The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we deter-mine.”).

  49. 49.

    Supra note 43, at 102–103.

  50. 50.

    Ibid, at 103.

  51. 51.

    For instance, Indonesia declared independence in 17 August 1945; The Philippines was granted independence by the United States in 1946; Britain granted independence to Malaya and Singapore in 1957 and 1963 respectively. See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Independence <http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2088.html> (listing all countries in world, dates they gained independence, and from which country).

  52. 52.

    See, e.g., Wendy N. Duong, “Following the Path of Oil: The Law of the Sea or Real-politik—What Good Does Law do in the South China Sea Territorial Conflicts?” 30 Fordham International Law Journal (2007) 1098; Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “The building of China’s Great Wall at Sea” 17 OCEAN & COASTAL Law Journal (2012) 255–263.

  53. 53.

    United States Energy Information Administration, “South China Sea” <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS>.

  54. 54.

    Beina Xu, “South China Sea Tensions”, Council on Foreign Relation <http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-tensions/p29790>.

  55. 55.

    Editor, “South China Sea Oil Shipping Lanes”, Global Security <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-ship.htm>.

  56. 56.

    See generally Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Can China Defend a Core Interest in the South China Sea ”, 34 (2) The Washington Quarterly 45–59 (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), available at <http://twq.com/11spring/docs/11spring_yoshihara_holmes.pdf>.

  57. 57.

    Bruce Blair, Chen Yali, and Eric Hagt, “The Oil Weapon: Myth of China’s Vulnerability” 3 China Security (2006) 37–38.

  58. 58.

    Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Beijing’s Energy Security Strategy: The Significance of a Chinese State-Owned Tanker Fleet” 51O rbis (2007) 677–680. See also Yuwa Wei, “When China Meets IEA : A Dilemma between Joining the Club and Being a Lonely Tiger” 7 International Energy Law Review (2012) 325.

  59. 59.

    Supra note 54.

  60. 60.

    Richard Weitz, “Superpower Symbiosis: The Russia–China Axis”, World Affairs (November/December 2012), <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/superpower-symbiosis-russia-china-axis>; See also Kathrin Hille and Amy Kazmin, “Border dispute exposes faultline in China-India relations”, Asia-Pacific (May 9, 2013), <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/08a2905a-b7b0-11e2-9f1a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2xtxFybz9>.

  61. 61.

    Ibid.

  62. 62.

    Supra note 1; Also Editor, “China-Russia Borders”, Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93Russia_borders>.

  63. 63.

    Frank Jacobs, “Why China Will Reclaim Siberia”, New York Times (January 13, 2015), <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/07/03/where-do-borders-need-to-be-redrawn/why-china-will-reclaim-siberia>.

  64. 64.

    Asya Pereltsvaig, “Border Disputes over Damansky Island and the Troubled Rela-tions between Russia and China”, Languages World (October 25, 2014), <http://languagesoftheworld.info/russia-ukraine-and-the-caucasus/border-disputes-damansky-island-troubled-relations-russia-china.html>.

  65. 65.

    Thomas W Robinson, “The Sino–Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes” 66 American Political Science Review (1972) 1183–1184.

  66. 66.

    William Burr (ed.), The Sino–Soviet Border Conflict, 1969: U.S. Reactions and Diplomatic Maneuvers (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 49, George Washington University, Washington, June 12, 2001), <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/>.

  67. 67.

    Supra note 60.

  68. 68.

    Supplementary Agreement on the Eastern Section of China–Russia Boundary Line, China–Russia, October 14, 2004, available at < http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2005-07/28/content_341693.htm>.

  69. 69.

    Ibid, at Art. 1.

  70. 70.

    Gang Zhang, “The Foreign Ministry’s Comments on the Ratification of the Sino–Russian Supplementary Agreement by Russian Duma”, China Daily Net (May 24, 2005) <http://news.nen.com.cn/72340194296070144/20050524/1686437.shtml>.

  71. 71.

    John D. Ciorciari, “India’s Approach to Great-Power Status” 35 The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (2011) 70; see also Tsering Topgyal, “Charting the Tibet Issue in the Sino–Indian Border Dispute” 47 (2) China Report (2011) 121, electronic version is available at: <http://www.academia.edu/1269178/Charting_the_Tibet_Issue_in_the_Sino-Indian_Border_Dispute>.

  72. 72.

    Aldo D Abitbol, “Causes of the 1962 Sino–Indian War: A Systems Level Approach” 1 Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Study (2009) 75.

  73. 73.

    Ministry Foreign Affairs of China, “China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence” <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18053.shtml>.

  74. 74.

    Topgyal, supra note 71, at 117–118.

  75. 75.

    Atul Singh, “China and India: Relations between the Two Asian Giants”, Fair Observer (February 15, 2013), <http://www.fairobserver.com/360theme/china-and-india-relations-between-two-asian-gian>.

  76. 76.

    Ibid. See also generally Abitbol, supra note 72 (noting McMahon Line was one cause of Sino–Indian War).

  77. 77.

    A G Noorani, “India & China: Strategic Differences”, Frontline (India, 20 December 2008–2 January 2009), <http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2526/stories/20090102252608400.htm>.

  78. 78.

    Ibid.

  79. 79.

    Ibid.

  80. 80.

    Ibid.

  81. 81.

    Ibid.

  82. 82.

    Ibid.

  83. 83.

    Editor, “Conference was Never Valid, Legal”, China Daily <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2008-04/08/content_6597672.html>.

  84. 84.

    Ibid.

  85. 85.

    Supra note 75.

  86. 86.

    Supra note 12, at 428–429.

  87. 87.

    Ibid, at 429–430.

  88. 88.

    Jacques deLisle, “China’s Approach to International Law: A Historical Perspective” 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (2000) 267–275.

  89. 89.

    Editor, “Chinese History–Qi (Zhou Period Feudal State)”, China knowledge <http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Zhou/rulers-qi.html>; See also Daren Liu, The History of the Development of International Law (China Fangzheng Press, Beijing, 2007), p. 25.

  90. 90.

    Ibid.

  91. 91.

    Ibid. According to the usages practiced by the States in the age of the “Warring States”, only the emperor had the privilege of being escorted by a Duke beyond the border of his state upon the visit of the emperor. When Duke Huan of Qi visited Yan State in 663 BC, the two heads of State had a friendly dialogue and then Duke Zhuang of Yan escorted Duke Huan to the border. Due to being deep in conversation, they went beyond the border of Yan State and entered Qi State unintentionally. For easing Duke Zhuang of Yan out of the awkward and humiliating situation, Qi transferred the territory trespassed by Duke Zhuang to Yan State.

  92. 92.

    See Robert L Worden, Andrea Matles Savada, Ronald E Dolan, Library of Congress China: A Country Study (Federal Research Division, Washington, DC, 1987) 22–23.

  93. 93.

    Ibid, at 22–39.

  94. 94.

    M Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008), p. 1–3.

  95. 95.

    Ibid, at 21–22.

  96. 96.

    Ibid, at 2.

  97. 97.

    Ibid.

  98. 98.

    Ibid.

  99. 99.

    Ibid, at 173–219. See also Editor, “Shelving differences and seeking joint development ”, Database of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (November 7, 2000) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/wjs_611318/t8958.shtml>.

  100. 100.

    China Preparatory Committee for United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development , The People’s Republic of China National Report on Sustainable Development (2012) 7.

  101. 101.

    Deng Xiao Ping, “Seize the Opportunity to Develop the Economy” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Vol. 3, People’s Press, Beijing, 1993), pp. 378 & 382.

  102. 102.

    Permanent Mission China to the United Nations, China’s Peaceful Development Road (December 12, 2005), <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zywjyjh/t227733.htm>.

  103. 103.

    See e.g., Zhiwu Chen, “China’s Economy would Plunge into A Lost Decade in the Scenario of War Breaking out Between China and Japan”, China.com (February 25, 2013), <http://club.china.com/data/thread/1011/2756/88/28/0_1.html>.

  104. 104.

    Editor, “US: Chinese Political Reforms Have Lagged behind Economic Advances”, Voice America (July 25, 2012), <http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2012/07/25/us-chinese-political-reforms-have-lagged-behind-economic-advances/>.

  105. 105.

    Richard Wike, “China Inequality Causes Unease–Pew Survey”, BBC News (October 16, 2012), <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19953634>.

  106. 106.

    Congressional Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2004 <http://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2004-annual-report>.

  107. 107.

    Editor, “Why is There Tension Between China and the Uighurs?”, BBC News (September 26, 2014) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014>.

  108. 108.

    Andrew Browne, The Great Chinese Exodus, The Wall Street Journal (online, August 15, 2014), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-great-chinese-exodus-1408120906>. Jeremy Page, Plan B for China’s Wealthy: Moving to the U.S., Europe, The Wall Street Journal (online, February 22, 2012), <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203806504577181461401318988>.

  109. 109.

    See Rui Faro Saraiva, “Japan’s Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations in Southern Africa. The Quest for Peace or Prestige?” 2 (1) Southern African Peace and Security Studies (2013) 61, electronic version is available at < http://www.saccps.org/pdf/2-1/Faro%20Saraiva%20(article).pdf> (Japan was allowed to engage in international peacekeeping operations since 1992).

  110. 110.

    Matteo Dian, Japan and the US Pivot to the Asia Pacific (The London School of Economics and Political Science, IDEAS Reports—Strategic Update 13.1, January 2013) 6. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SU13-1-Japan-USPivot-LoRes.pdf>.

  111. 111.

    See e.g., supra note 31 and supra note 53.

  112. 112.

    James Beldon, The Chinese Threat to US Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region and Implications for US Defence Arrangements with South Asia and Japan (May 25, 2012, unpublished MPhil in International Relations Candidate, Analytical Research Paper Submission) 1 < http://www.academia.edu/1852274/The_Chinese_threat_to_US_interests_in_the_Asia-Pacific_Region_and_implications_for_US_defence_arrangements_with_Southeast_Asia_and_Japan>.

  113. 113.

    See Zoher Abdoolcarim, “Why Asia’s Maritime Disputes Are Not Just About China”, Time (August 19, 2012), <http://world.time.com/2012/08/19/why-asias-maritime-disputes-are-not-just-about-china/>.

  114. 114.

    See Ellen Tordesillas, “Will China Withdraw from UNCLOS if UN Court Decides in Favor of PH?”, Yahoo News (December 10, 2013), <https://ph.news.yahoo.com/blogs/the-inbox/china-withdraw-unclos-un-court-decides-favor-ph-153936547.html>.

  115. 115.

    Ibid.

  116. 116.

    Ibid.

  117. 117.

    Ibid.

  118. 118.

    Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3/[1994] ATS 31/21 ILM 1261 (1982).

  119. 119.

    Jianjun Gao, “The Okinawa Trough Issue in the Continental Shelf Delimitation Disputes within the East China Sea ” 9(1) Chinese Journal of International law (2010) 145 & 149.

  120. 120.

    Ibid, at 145–146.

  121. 121.

    Ibid.

  122. 122.

    See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den., Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 50 (Feb. 20).

  123. 123.

    Ibid. See also S P Jagota, Maritime Boundary (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1985), p. 208.

  124. 124.

    Mark W Janis, An Introduction to International Law (4th ed, Aspen, New York, 2003), p. 70.

  125. 125.

    See e.g., Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 271 (Ct. Arb. 1978); Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya),1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24); Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3); Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14).

  126. 126.

    Supra note 124, at 67–83. Taking the two elements of actual practice and opinio juris of States (necessary for forming international customary law), the principle has the characteristic of being established gradually in international practice and become one part of international practices. Although decisions of international courts do not constitute state practice, what States claim before international courts, however, is clearly a form of State practice.

  127. 127.

    Kun Liu, “Chinese Scholars Challenged Japan’s Territorial Claims in the East China Sea at Four Aspects”, Huanqiu.com (September 20, 2012), <http://mil.huanqiu.com/paper/2012-09/3132628.html>.

  128. 128.

    William A Joseph (ed), Politics In China: An Introduction (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014), p. 7.

  129. 129.

    North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den., Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 54 (Feb. 20).

  130. 130.

    See e.g., Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bah-rain, 2001 I.C.J. 40, 219 (Mar. 16).

  131. 131.

    Half effect means that the island does not have continental shelf and economic zone, but only territorial sea; zero effect means that the island even does not have territorial sea of its own.

  132. 132.

    See e.g., Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya),1982 I.C.J. 18, 129 (Feb. 24); Mari-time Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, 2001 I.C.J. 40, 219 (Mar. 16).

  133. 133.

    See e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den., Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 271 (Ct. Arb. 1978); Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya),1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).

  134. 134.

    See Chris Carleton, “Maritime Delimitation in Complex Island Situations” 53 Maritime Delimitation (2006) 159–165.

  135. 135.

    Greg Austin, “Peaceful Moments in the East China Sea 1979–1998”, Policy Innovation (July 20, 2013) <http://ewipolicy.tumblr.com/post/55953929148/peaceful-moments-in-the-east-china-sea-1979-1998>.

  136. 136.

    Ibid.

  137. 137.

    Ibid.

  138. 138.

    The Cairo Declaration states: “Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China”. Article 8 of the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender states: “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine”.

  139. 139.

    Editor, “POSTWAR ERA: No Protest Lodged when Senkakus Were Placed Under U.S. Administration”, The Asahi Shimbun (December 26, 2012), <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/special/senkaku_history/AJ201212260101>.

  140. 140.

    Ibid.

  141. 141.

    Ibid.

  142. 142.

    See Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3); Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya),1982 I.C.J. 18 (February 24); Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 271 (Ct. Arb. 1978); and Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bah-rain, 2001 I.C.J. 40, 219 (March 16).

  143. 143.

    Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. 2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the ex-clusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accord-ance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory. 3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclu-sive economic zone or continental shelf.”); See also Ibid, at 154–155.

  144. 144.

    Supra note 22.

  145. 145.

    Martin Lohmeyer, The Diaoyu /Senkaku Islands Dispute: Questions of Sovereignty and Suggestions for Resolving the Dispute, (unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Canterbury, 2008) 19–20, available at < http://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/bitstream/10092/4085/1/thesis_fulltext.pdf>.

  146. 146.

    Keith Highet, “Whatever Became of Natural Prolongation” in Dorinda G Dallmeyer and Louis DeVorsey (eds) Rights to Oceanic Resources: Deciding and Drawing Maritime Boundaries (Norwell: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), p. 97.

  147. 147.

    Supra note 119, at 146.

  148. 148.

    Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45.

  149. 149.

    Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 6(1), Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.

  150. 150.

    Jianming Shen, “China’s Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands: A Historical Perspective” 1 Chinese Journal of International Law (2002) 117–122.

  151. 151.

    Ibid, at 126–130.

  152. 152.

    Ibid, at 102–103.

  153. 153.

    See generally Bin Yang, “Horses, Silver, and Cowries: Yunnan in Global Perspective” 15 Journal of World history (2004) 281 (discussing existence, relations, and distinctions be-tween overland Silk Road, maritime Silk Road , and Southwest Silk Road).

  154. 154.

    Michel Jacq-Hergoualc’h, The Malay Peninsula: Crossroads of the Maritime Silk Road (100 BC-1300 AD) (Brill, Leiden, 2002), p. 59.

  155. 155.

    Supra note 153, at 316–317. Gang Deng, Chinese Maritime Activities and Socioeconomic Development, C. 2100 BC - 1900 AD. (Greenwood, Westport, 1997), p. 85–86.

  156. 156.

    Ibid, at 295–297.

  157. 157.

    Guoqiang Li, “Investigations Carried out by Chinese Governments into the History of China’s Administration over the South China Sea Islands”, Shenzhen News (July 26, 2011) <http://sztqb.sznew s.com/html/2011-07/26/content_1676306.htm>.

  158. 158.

    Ibid.

  159. 159.

    Ibid.

  160. 160.

    Supra note 53.

  161. 161.

    Ibid.

  162. 162.

    Supra note, at 102–103.

  163. 163.

    Ibid, at 116.

  164. 164.

    Daniel J Dzurek, “The Spratly Islands dispute: who’s on first?” 2 (1) Maritime Briefing (1996) 11–12.

  165. 165.

    Ibid, at 116.

  166. 166.

    Supra note 43, at 110.

  167. 167.

    Carlyle A Thayer, “South China Sea disputes: ASEAN and China”, East Asian Forum (July 14, 2011), <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/14/south-china-sea-disputes-asean-and-china/>.

  168. 168.

    Supra note 164, at 14.

  169. 169.

    Ibid, at 48–49.

  170. 170.

    Ibid, at 50.

  171. 171.

    The term “Proximity” is taken out from the 1951 Peace Treaty between the Republic of China and Japan, which states: “Considering their mutual desire for good neighbourliness in view of their historical and cultural ties and geographical proximity; Realizing the importance of their close cooperation to the promotion of their common welfare and to the maintenance of international peace and security; … Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace”. See Treaty of Peace Between the Republic of China and Japan, China–Japan, Apr. 28, 1952, 1952 U.N.T.S. 38.

  172. 172.

    Wu Zhong, “China Aims to Diversify Oil Sources”, Asia Times Online (Hong Kong, February 28, 2007), <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/IB28Cb02.html>.

  173. 173.

    Erica Downs, Energy Security Series: China (The Brookings Institution, 2006) 31, the electronic version is available at:<http://www.brookings.edu/fp/research/energy/2006china.pdf>. See also Celeste Wallander, “China’s Energy Policy in the Geopolitical Context” <http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/China%5C’s%20Energy%20Policy.pdf>.

  174. 174.

    Gary Feuerberg, “Growing Foreign Government Investments May Threaten U.S. National Security”, The Epoch Times (Washington D C, February 14, 2008), <http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/8-2-14/65934.html>.

  175. 175.

    Gerry Mullany and David Barboza, “Vietnam Squares off with China in Disputed Seas”, New York Times (May 7, 2014), <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/world/asia/philippines-detains-crew-of-chinese-fishing-vessel.html?_r=0>.

  176. 176.

    Whether or not a foreign acquisition poses a threat much depends on the criticalness of the goods or services provided by the target of the proposed acquisition and if the competition among rival suppliers is high and switching costs are low (“When competition among rival suppliers is high and switching costs are low, there is no genuine national security rationale for blocking a proposed acquisition no matter how crucial the goods and services the target company provides.”). See Theodore H Moran, “When Does a Foreign Acquisition Pose a National Security Threat, and When not?”, VOX (September 11, 2009) <http://www.voxeu.org/article/when-does-foreign-acquisition-pose-national-security-threat>.

  177. 177.

    See Erica Downs, Inside China, Inc: China Development Bank’s Cross-Border Energy Deals (The John L Tornton China Center at Brookings, 2011), p. 3; See also Zhongxiang Zhang, “The Overseas Acquisition and Equity Oil Shares of Chinese National Oil Companies: A threat to the West but a boost to China’s energy security ?” 48 (12) Energy Policy (2012) 698–701.

  178. 178.

    Ibid; See also Julie Jiang and Jonathan Sinton, Overseas Investments by Chinese National Oil Companies: Assessing the Drivers and Impacts (Information Paper Prepared for the Standing Group for Global Energy Dialogue of the International Energy Agency, International Energy Agency, 2011) 22 & 37.

  179. 179.

    Xiudong, Jia, “South China Sea Cooperation Benefits All”, China.org.cn (9 August 2013) <http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2013-08/09/content_29665352.htm>.

References

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Freelance writer, Melbourne, Australia

    Yuwa Wei

Authors
  1. Yuwa Wei
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Wei, Y. (2019). Territorial Disputes: China and Its Neighbors. In: Issues Decisive for China’s Rise or Fall. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-3699-7_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-3699-7_4

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-13-3698-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-13-3699-7

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation