Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Reforming WTO Rules on State-Owned Enterprises pp 69–123Cite as

The Extent, Nature, and Effect of Advantages Granted to Chinese SOEs

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

Abstract

This Chapter examines the problem of SOEs in the context of China. In particular, it considers the extent to which Chinese SOEs receive various advantages from the Chinese Government. Section 1 begins with a general overview of the presence of SOEs in China and then looks at the extent to which SOEs are present in several industries that are considered as key industries. In each industry, examples are given regarding major SOEs; their dominance or significant presence; their monopoly/oligopoly status, which is also related to advantages of monopolies and exclusive rights SOEs enjoy by law or in fact; the financial advantages they receive; and the regulatory advantages they enjoy.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    A command economy is one that has centrally planning economy and state-led resource allocation. See Paul R. Gregory, “The Stalinist Command Economy,” The Annual of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 507, Privatizing and Marketizing Socialism, 18–25 (Jan., 1990): 18; Valery Lazarev and Paul R. Gregory, “The Wheels of A Command Economy: Allocating Soviet Vehicles,” (A Research Funded by Grants from the Hoover Institution and from the National Science Foundation, Oct. 2001): introduction. http://www.uh.edu/~vlazarev/ehr.pdf

  2. 2.

    “Melding the power of the state with the power of capitalism, state-owned and state-controlled enterprises continue to control the commanding heights of the Chinese economy.” See Michael M. Du (Ming Du), “China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law” 63 (2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly (Jan. 11, 2014), 409–448. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377797; Ronald J. Gilson and Curtis J. Milhaupt, “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism” Stanford University Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 355, and Columbia University Law and Economics Working Paper No. 328 (2008): 2. http://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/258673/doc/slspublic/Gilson%20Sovereign%20Wealth.pdf; Xi Li, Xuewen Liu and Yong Wang, “A Model of China’s State Capitalism,” HKUST IEMS Working Paper N. 2015–12 (Feb. 2015), 2. http://iems.ust.hk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/IEMSWP2015-12.pdf

  3. 3.

    The SASACs were created by the State Council in March, 2003 based on “The Plan for Restructuring the State Council”, which was adopted at the first session of the tenth National People’s Congress in 2003. See Decision of the First Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on the Plan for Restructuring the State Council, March 03, 2003, English version http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6695&CGid=

  4. 4.

    There are 112 central SOEs, last update/accessed on Sept. 7, 2016, see a list of central SOEs on the website of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html

  5. 5.

    For a list of central SOEs on the website of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html

  6. 6.

    “Operation Report of SOEs Subject to the National SASAC in 2013,” SASAC’s Statistical and Assessment agency, August 8, 2014. http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n86302/n326735/n326745/c1327899/content.html

  7. 7.

    Julia Ya Qin, “WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)- A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol,” 7(4) Journal of International Economic Law: 863–919; Shang-Jin Wei and Tao Wang, “The Siamese Twins: Do State-Owned Banks Favor State-Owned Enterprises in China?” 8(1) China Economic Review Volume (1997): 19–29; Hejing Chen & John Whalley, “The State-owned Enterprises Issue in China’s Prospective Trade Negotiations,” Centre for International Governance Innovation (2014).

  8. 8.

    In China, there is a perceived phenomenon described as ‘the state advances, the private (sector) retreats’ (guo jin min tui) in recent years. FAN Gang and Nicholas C. Hope, “Chapter 16: The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy,” China US Focus, 4. http://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part+02-Chapter+16.pdf

  9. 9.

    If the output of urban collective enterprises and the government-run proportion of township-village enterprises (TVEs refer to the location of the enterprises) are considered, the broadly defined state sector likely surpasses 50%. See id., at 6.

  10. 10.

    Yajie Wang, “Experts: Tax contributed by SOEs Accounts More than Half of the Total Tax in China”, NBD, Jan. 05, 2015. http://money.163.com/15/0105/00/AF5I5HND00253B0H.html

  11. 11.

    “World Bank Reported that Chinese SOEs account for 45% of China’s economy, and the Presence of Chinese SOEs Should be Reduced,” Sina, Feb. 24, 2012. http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20120224/151211448532.shtml

  12. 12.

    International Monetary Fund, The People’s Republic of China: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 16/271 (Washington D.C.: IMF, Aug. 2016), 38.

  13. 13.

    A review of the D&B® Family Tree for the China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC).

  14. 14.

    Also See top ten enterprise by market capitalization on the Shanghai Exchanges in 2002, 2007, 2015 by assets.

  15. 15.

    A-Shares refer to shares in mainland China-based companies that trade on Chinese stock exchanges such as the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, based on the RMB currency. A-shares are generally only available for purchase by mainland citizens. See A-Shares, INVESTOPEDIA, available at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/a-shares.asp

  16. 16.

    Qing Ze, “How are subsidies granted to SOEs?” JING55, Nov.20, 2014. http://www.jing55.com/toutiao/20141120/210e8b75dae30d5e72189.html

  17. 17.

    Adrian Wooldridge, “The Visible Hand”, The Economist (Jan 21, 2012). http://www.economist.com/node/21542931; See Also U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011 Report to Congress (Nov. 2011) 40.

  18. 18.

    Jie Wu, “Scrutinizing China’s Fortune Global 500 Companies’”, Guo Qi, August 14, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-08/14/c_125166671.htm

  19. 19.

    Top 500 Chinese enterprises, POEs account for 15%.

  20. 20.

    Yh Deng et al., “Monetary and Fiscal Stimuli, Ownership Structure, and China’s Housing Market” NBER Working Paper 16,871, (2011), 21 http://www.nber.org/papers/w16871

  21. 21.

    There are various standards for categorizing industries into the strategic sector, and the standards are adjusted over the time. On December 5, 2006, the SASAC chairman designated 7 industries (defense, electric power and grid, petroleum and petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and shipping) to be strategic.

  22. 22.

    Individual provinces also have their own SASACs and may designate their own pillar industries for provincial development apart from the central list. George Haley, “State-owned enterprises: Vehicles of industrial policy implementation”, Expert testimony to U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission’s Hearing “China’s Industrial Policy and Its Impact on U.S. Companies, Workers and the American Economy,” Washington, DC, March 24, 2009.

  23. 23.

    Elizabeth J. Drake, “Chinese State-Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises: Policy Options for Addressing Chinese State-Owned Enterprises,” Testimony before the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission (Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, 15 Feb. 2012), 1; Julia Ya Qin, “WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)- A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol,” 7(4) Journal of International Economic Law: 863–919; Strong control reflects an ownership share of 30–50%. See “China’s Industrial Policy and Its Impact on U.S. Companies, Workers, and the American Economy: Testimony of Terrence P. Stewart, (2009); The State Council’s General Office Circular on the Guidance Opinions about Promoting the Adjustment of State-owned Assets and the Restructuring of State owned Enterprise (Guo Ban Fa 2006/97); Section 2.2 of the State Council Circular on Deepening the Reform of Economic Regime in 2010.

  24. 24.

    Andrew Szamosszegi & Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 44–48.

  25. 25.

    Ibid.

  26. 26.

    The author only looked at “subsidies, government grants”, and occasionally use the column of “other income/revenue/gains” to serve as a substitute. For instance, China Mobile said that its subsidies from the government were included in the “other income”, which didn’t specify the detailed information.

  27. 27.

    The author excluded defense industry and power industry, which usually have no international trade effects.

  28. 28.

    It is because that a parent SOE may have numerous subsidiary companies, one or a couple of which may be listed publicly on Stock Exchanges. However, the information regarding unlisted parent SOE and its unlisted subsidiaries is largely unavailable, and hence, they are not included in my findings. That’s the reason why my findings are only a piece of the big picture.

  29. 29.

    Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang (China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008), 319. [Lv Zheng, Huang Sujian Zhubian, Zhongguo Guoyou Qiye Gaige Sanshinian Yanjiu, Jingji Guanli Chuganshe].

  30. 30.

    FAN Gang and Nicholas C. Hope, “Chapter 16: The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy,” China US Focus, 4. http://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part+02-Chapter+16.pdf

  31. 31.

    China Statistical Yearbook 1999 and 2012. In the mining and washing of coal, SOEs presence: Number of firms decreased from 49.5% to 11.5%, Gross industrial output decreased from 81.9% to 53.6%, total assets from 92.7% in 1998 to 94.7% in 2011.

  32. 32.

    National Bureau of Statistics data; Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 44–48.

  33. 33.

    China Shenhua Energy Company Limited’s annual financial report to Shanghai Stock Exchange.

  34. 34.

    China National Coal Group Corp. (ChinaCoal) China Coal Technology & Engineering Group Corp. (CCTEG).

  35. 35.

    Other businesses include auto-motors, logistics transportation, production of electric motors and housing management. (I looked at the specific information regarding coal business for the operation income). See Sundiro Holding’s financial report of 2008 from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange main board.

  36. 36.

    Sundiro Holding’s financial reports from 2007 to 2014 from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange main board.

  37. 37.

    It said that it had no subsidies in its 2009 financial report while it said that in the previous period (2009) it received subsidies in its 2010 financial report. Hence, I used the 2010 financial report and didn’t find the reason for government’s granting subsidies. See Id.

  38. 38.

    Usually purchasing state bonds would be an obligation imposed on SOEs.

  39. 39.

    From a legal perspective, it is specific, while regarding whether the tax refund is a form of reward (I am not sure what rewards here refer to), and whether it is specific or not, it is not clear.

  40. 40.

    There were several mines forced to shut down by the government in 2011, in Inter Mongolia. http://www.coalchina.org.cn/page/info.jsp?id=58638

  41. 41.

    PingDing Shan Tian An Coal Co. Ltd. is an SOE with state shares of 56.12% in 2014 shown in its financial report of 2014 from Shanghai Security Exchange Board.

  42. 42.

    Subsidies were granted for updating Chaochuang Mine and updating Tianzhuang Mine, both of which belong to Pinding Shan Tian An Coal Ltd. From a legal perspective, subsidies were specific for this company since subsidies were specifically for this project.

  43. 43.

    The gross subsidies of Pinding Shan were RMB 75.44 million from 2008–2014.

  44. 44.

    The steel industry needs significant coal used to produce energy for production and processing steel. The coal industry provides coal at lower prices pursuant to the national policy of encouraging/supporting the steel industry, then the state compensates/subsidizes coal companies.

  45. 45.

    Due to the state ownership of natural resources, the state would usually grant enterprises the right to explore natural resources and impose taxes on them as the resource tax. From a legal perspective, it was specific for this company since the title of legal document in question explicitly refers to Pingding Shan Tian An Coal Ltd.

  46. 46.

    China National Coal Group owned China Coal Energy Company Limited, which is trade on the Shanghai and the Hongkong Security Exchange. But the financial information released to the Shanghai Stock Exchange is different from the information released to the HK Stock Exchange regarding subsidies (government grants), I looked at the assets and other items, and assume it is the same company with same assets. The difference may be due to different accounting standards. Other subsidies are given with no available information.

  47. 47.

    Id.

  48. 48.

    “SOEs in the Coal Industry and SOEs in the Electricity Industry are the major source of selling coal, and PingCoal (an SOE) makes profits at the amount of trillions RMB per year”, blog, the Chinese Times, March 6, 2010. http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5efc3eed0100hkmq.html

  49. 49.

    Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang (China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008).

  50. 50.

    “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), 122–210.

  51. 51.

    In 2013, there were 46 airlines for air transportation, among which 36 were SOEs and 10 were POEs.

  52. 52.

    Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 44–48. Table V-3: Top SOE share of revenues in China’s air transportation sector, 2009.

  53. 53.

    During the first three quarters of 2009, China Southern had a market share of 30%, compared to 19% for China Eastern and 17% for Air China. Shanghai Air, owned by China Eastern, held 5% of the market.

  54. 54.

    Relaxing entry into the civilian airlines in terms of domestic flights routes, the legal document “Regulations on Permitting of Domestic Flight Routes in China’s Civilian Aviation” [中国民用航空国内航线经营许可规定] March 20, 2006. for a Chinese version available at http://www.chinalawindex.cn/lawdb/detail/ef329fe49d5946bcb85ddf07ff10ef93; “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), 122–210.

  55. 55.

    2007–2014 Financial reports of Hainan Airlines, Eastern Airlines, Southern Airlines, Eastern Airlines: operation income: 8974 in 2014, gross subsidies 11,616 from 2007–2014; Southern Airlines: operation income 8158 in 2014, gross subsidies 8642 from 2007–2014; Hainan Airlines: operation income 3604 in 2014, gross subsidies 2542 from 2007–2014. Subsidies are not corresponding to the size of the company.

  56. 56.

    Agricultural Bank of China. ABC Signed the Bank-Enterprise Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Agreement with China Southern Airlines. Beijing, June 11, 2011.

  57. 57.

    A review of the SEC filings of the five firms (Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (Chalco), China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec Corp.), China Southern Airlines Company Limited, China Telecom Corp. Limited, CNOOC Limited) indicates that they continued to benefit from tax preferences in 2010, though the benefit is being phased out. Nargiza Salidjanova, “Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” US- China Economic & Security Review Commission, USCC Staff Research Report (Washington: March 30, 2011), 19–24.

  58. 58.

    It is based on data from the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association.

  59. 59.

    Table V-5: Top SOE share of revenues in China’s petroleum and petrochemical industry, 2010 in Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013).

  60. 60.

    Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang (China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008).

  61. 61.

    CNOOC: HKES is a Hong Kong-listed firm 70% owned by an unlisted parent company, whose shares are owned by the central governmental agency, SASAC.

  62. 62.

    “Opinions Regarding Regulating Small Refineries and the Distribution of Crude Oil and Processed Oil” (the so called Doc. No. 38) [Guangyu Qingli Zhengdun Xiaolianyouchang he Guifang Yuanyou Chengpingyou Liutong Zhixu de Yijian], issued by the State Economic and Trade Commission of the P.R.C. in 1998.

  63. 63.

    “Notifications Regarding Regulating the Distribution of Oil”, The Ministry of Railway, 2003/150, 2003 [关于加强石油运输管理的通知]

  64. 64.

    “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), 122–210.

  65. 65.

    “Regulation of the PRC on the Administration of the Import and Export of Goods,” Issued by the State Council Jan 1st, 2002, [Huowu Jinchukou Guanli Tiaoli] http://oilsyggs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/gjzcfg/shangwubu/201310/72621_1.html

  66. 66.

    “Opinions Regarding Regulating Small Refineries and the Distribution of Crude Oil and Processed Oil” (the so-called Doc. No. 38), issued by the State Economic and Trade Commission of the P.R.C. in 1998.

  67. 67.

    “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), 83–101.

  68. 68.

    “Interfax. 2008a”, China Energy Report Weekly, March 20–26.

  69. 69.

    Annual report of 2008 and 2007 of Sinopec.

  70. 70.

    Sinopec’s Annul Financial Report 2011.

  71. 71.

    Sinopec’s Annul Financial Report 2013.

  72. 72.

    Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 4. Citing FN 75.

  73. 73.

    Id., 78–84.

  74. 74.

    Qing Ze, “How are subsidies granted to SOEs?” JING55, Nov.20, 2014. http://www.jing55.com/toutiao/20141120/210e8b75dae30d5e72189.html; “Ranking of SOEs Receiving Subsidies: each SOE received 50 million RMB and Sinopec ranked as the top one,” Vision Times, April 27, 2016. http://m.secretchina.com/node/606307

  75. 75.

    “Interfax. 2008b”, China Energy Report Weekly, August 28–September 3.

  76. 76.

    Annul Financial Report 2008 of PetroChina, released to Shanghai Stock Exchange.

  77. 77.

    Annual report of CNOOC.

  78. 78.

    “Ranking of SOEs Receiving Subsidies: each SOE received 50 million RMB and Sinopec ranked as the top one,” Vision Times, April 27, 2016. http://m.secretchina.com/node/606307

  79. 79.

    Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013), 32.

  80. 80.

    “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), 39–63.

  81. 81.

    Data is obtained from the firm Datamonitor.

  82. 82.

    Table V-6: Top SOE share of revenues in China’s shipping industry, 2010 in Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013).

  83. 83.

    See the association of the Shipping Industry, http://www.cansi.org.cn/index.php/Information/detail?id=363

  84. 84.

    “China State Shipbuilding Corp.”, Global Security Org., http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/cssc.htm

  85. 85.

    Xiaofeng Zhang & Xiaoyu Ren, “Realization of Ten Experiments in SOE Reform, and the Steel and Other Six Industries will Face New Opportunities”, Finance China, Feb 27, 2016. http://finance.china.com.cn/stock/zqyw/20160227/3603626.shtml

  86. 86.

    Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang (China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008), 319.

  87. 87.

    Annual Report of China Mobile Limited, 20-F Form (2014). http://www.chinamobileltd.com/sc/ir/reports.php

  88. 88.

    Article 7, 8, and 10 of “Regulation on Telecommunications of the People’s Republic of China,” Decree of the State Council of the P.R.C (No. 291), adopted at the 31st regular meeting of the State Council on September 20, 2000. a Chinese version http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1146557/n1146619/c4860613/content.html for an English version, http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1667

  89. 89.

    Although there is a little bit relaxation recently in the telecommunication sector in that POEs can contract with SOEs to retail sell some packages of services products through outsourcing, both China Telecom and China Unicom are full-service telecommunications services providers exclusively. See China Mobile’s Form 20 F (2014) filed to the U.S. Security Exchange Commission.

  90. 90.

    Form 20 F of China mobile limited filed to the U.S. Security Exchange Commission. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1117795/000119312514158810/d711555d20f.htm

  91. 91.

    Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 78–84.

  92. 92.

    SAIC is China’s largest automaker by sales. A Fortune Global 100 company (60th largest in the world) http://500q.jigouba.cn/i/i/c.html

  93. 93.

    FAW has three publicly traded subsidiaries: FAW Car Company, Tianjin FAW Xiali Automobile Co Ltd., and Changchun FAWAY Automobile Components Co Ltd.

  94. 94.

    Data is from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers; it is about 52% in 2014, see China-Britain Business Council, “Report: The Automotive Market in China,” 2015 EU SME Centre, (2015), 13. http://www.ccilc.pt/sites/default/files/eu_sme_centre_sector_report_-_the_automotive_market_in_china_update_-_may_2015.pdf

  95. 95.

    For instance, Anhui provincial government owns Chery, the Liaoning provincial government owns Brilliance Automotive, Xiaoshan municipal government partially owns the Wanxiang Group. Shanghai car companies and Nanjing car companies are municipally owned. Independent Auto-parts companies: Wanxiang, Chery and Geely,

  96. 96.

    Auto parts include those used by original equipment manufacturers and aftermarket parts. Original equipment parts go into the assembly of new motor vehicles.

  97. 97.

    Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang (China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008), 65.

  98. 98.

    The examples I found was SOEs, like SAIC, Dongfeng, and POEs, like Geely, Liaoning SG Automotive Group.

  99. 99.

    Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Fact Sheet: WTO Case Challenging Chinese Subsidies,” 2012. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2012/september/wto-case-challenging-chinese-subsidies

  100. 100.

    From a legal perspective, these subsidies are SOEs specific. See J. Yang, “Why Cities’ Subsidies Will Hurt Domestic Automakers in the Long Run?” Automotive News China, August 24, 2012.

  101. 101.

    George Haley, “Overview of China’s pillar and strategic industries,” Expert testimony to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s hearing, “the Extent of the Government’s Control of China’s Economy, and Its Impact on the United States,” May 25, 2007.

  102. 102.

    Alan H. Brice, Timothy C. Brightbill, Christohper B. Weld, and D. Scott Nance, “Money for Metal: A Detailed Examination of Chinese Government Subsidies to Its Steel Industry,” Prepared for the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), the Steel Manufacturers Association (SMA), the Committee for Pipe and Tube Imports (CPTI), and the Specialty Steel Industry of North America (SSINA), (July 2007), 10. http://www.wileyrein.com/resources/documents/fm14037.pdf

  103. 103.

    WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012.

  104. 104.

    Annual Financial Report of Jiangsu Shagang Group Co., Ltd.

  105. 105.

    Alan H. Brice, Timothy C. Brightbill, Christohper B. Weld, and D. Scott Nance, “Money for Metal: A Detailed Examination of Chinese Government Subsidies to Its Steel Industry,” Prepared for the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), the Steel Manufacturers Association (SMA), the Committee for Pipe and Tube Imports (CPTI), and the Specialty Steel Industry of North America (SSINA), (July 2007), 25. http://www.wileyrein.com/resources/documents/fm14037.pdf

  106. 106.

    WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012, summary.

  107. 107.

    Directorate for Science Technology and Industry Steel Committee 2006.

  108. 108.

    Trade Policy Review: China, Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Executive Summary, WT/TPR/S/264.

  109. 109.

    Joint Announcement by MIIT and NEA (MIIT Announcement 2011/36) on 29 October 2011. http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293877/n13138101/n13138118/14323368.html

  110. 110.

    For details see MIIT Circular on the Implementation Plan for Elimination of Backward Production Capacity (2011/46, 26 Jan. 2011). Joint Announcement by MIIT and NEA (MIIT Announcement 2011/36) on 29 October 2011. http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293877/n13138101/n13138118/14323368.html

  111. 111.

    “The Reform of the Steel and Coal industry focuses on becoming stronger and larger”, July 21, 2016, http://www.cnwnews.com/html/biz/cn_sypl/20160721/816015.html

  112. 112.

    “Railway authority in Ha’er bing Province adopted policy to secure that coal is transported to markets in order to reduce pressure from high demand for electricity nationwide,” June 11, 2016. http://nlhw.bgzxv.com/gjzj/9262.html; “The Ministry of Railways stated that railways will undertake the task of transportation for coal as long as there are markets demanding for coal,” China News, July 2, 2016. http://alt.823veyo.com/fctkzc/3236.html; “SOEs in the Coal Industry and SOEs in the Electricity Industry are the major source of selling coal, and PingCoal (an SOE) makes profits at the amount of trillions RMB per year”, blog, the Chinese Times, March 6, 2010. http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5efc3eed0100hkmq.html “The Railway Department Guarantees the Transportation of Coal,” Guangming Newspaper, Nov. 19, 2011. http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2011-11/10/nw.D110000gmrb_20111110_6-10.htm

  113. 113.

    Data is from the China Statistical Yearbook, 2009.

  114. 114.

    There are three groups of SOEs in non-ferrous metals sector. One is Guangshen Group, one is Wukuang Group and another is SOEs doing research and are subject to SASAC.

  115. 115.

    Su Aik Lim, “Fitch Affirms Chalco at ‘BBB+’” Outlook Stable, Hong Kong, June 1, 2011.

  116. 116.

    Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 44–48.

  117. 117.

    From the list of companies who are eligible to enter this industry of rare earths, they are mainly SOEs.

  118. 118.

    The above data are from annual reports of the enterprise which is publicly traded on stock exchanges.

  119. 119.

    Here is several example of companies that received subsidies for imported goods: Sichuan Hongda, Zhejiang Hailiang Co., Ltd., Aluminum Corporation of China Limited, China Nonferrous Metal Industry’s Foreign Engineering And Construction Co., Ltd.

  120. 120.

    Based on the China Statistical Yearbook, there is some overlap between the machinery and equipment sector, on the one hand, and the information technology sector, on the other hand.

  121. 121.

    WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012, summary.

  122. 122.

    Data is from the China Statistical Yearbook, 2009.

  123. 123.

    WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012, summary.

  124. 124.

    MIIT Announcement 2011/26, On 17 August 2011.

  125. 125.

    WTO documents G/SCM/N/155/CHN and G/SCM/N/186/CHN, 21 October 2011.

  126. 126.

    Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 44–48.

  127. 127.

    The information technology sector includes the electronics industry, which covers communication equipment, computers and other electronic equipment.

  128. 128.

    Hehui XIn, “Which IT segment will benefit from the undergoing reform of SOEs,” Jan 23, 2016, https://www.xinhehui.com/zt-gptzjq/view-43187.html

  129. 129.

    State Council Circular 2011/1.

  130. 130.

    WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012, summary. For detailed information on tax preference for the manufacture of integrated circuits, see WTO documents G/SCM/N/155/CHN and G/SCM/N/186/CHN, 21 October 2011.

  131. 131.

    Bank lending is biased in favor of SOEs. For instance, if the SOEs’ share in City A is higher than City B by 1%, then the growth in loan/output ratio in City A will be higher by 0.34%. See Shang-Jin Wei and Tao Wang, “The Siamese Twins: Do State-Owned Banks Favor State-Owned Enterprises in China?” China Economic Review Volume 8(1) 1997, 19–29.

  132. 132.

    OECD, “Economic Survey of China 2005”, (Sept. 16, 2005), 86; OECD, “China in the Global Economy: Governance in China” (2005), 140.

  133. 133.

    Paul Saulski, “Panel II: The Competitive Challenges Posed by China’s State Owned Enterprises,” Hearing on “Chinese Stat-Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises”, Testimony before the U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission (Feb. 15, 2012), 2–3. http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2.15.12saulski_testimony.pdf; Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 55.

  134. 134.

    Terence P. Stewart, et al., “China’s Support Programs for Automobiles and Auto Parts under the 12th Five-Year Plan”, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, Jan. 2012, at 60; Elizabeth J. Drake, “Chinese State-Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises: Policy Options for Addressing Chinese State-Owned Enterprises,” Testimony before the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission (Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, 15 Feb. 2012), 2.

  135. 135.

    Report to the U.S. Congress on Export Credit Competition and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (June 2011), 113; Yang Wanli, “Sinohydro: Top Hydropower Engineering firm,” China Daily, Oct. 20, 2009.

  136. 136.

    Sebastian Claro, “Supporting inefficient firms with capital subsidies: China and Germany in the 1990s,” Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (2006) 377–401, 378.

  137. 137.

    According to the China Information Center, the average of monthly prime lending rates in China from December 2009 to December 2010 was 5.36%. See Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 4. Citing FN82.

  138. 138.

    Agricultural Bank of China. ABC Signed the Bank-Enterprise Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Agreement with China Southern Airlines. Beijing, June 11, 2011.

  139. 139.

    Annual Financial Report of China Telecom Corporation Limited, F-23 (2011).

  140. 140.

    Annual Financial Report of CNOOC Limited, F-54 (2011).

  141. 141.

    2012 Annual report of China Coal Energy Company, submitted to the Shanghai Stock Exchange.

  142. 142.

    Julia Ya Qin, “WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)- A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol,” Journal of International Economic Law 7(4), 863–919. citing FN 54.

  143. 143.

    There are arm length transactions and transactions among related parties. SOEs frequently transact with related parties. In the energy sector and in vertically integrated operations, 12% of Sinopec Corp.’s sales and 7% of its purchases in 2010 involved related parties. Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 4; Elizabeth J. Drake, “Chinese State-Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises: Policy Options for Addressing Chinese State-Owned Enterprises,” Testimony before the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission (Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, 15 Feb. 2012), 2.

  144. 144.

    “The Ministry of Railways stated that railways will undertake the task of transportation for coal as long as there are markets demanding coal,” China News, July 2, 2016. http://alt.823veyo.com/fctkzc/3236.html

  145. 145.

    “The Railway Department Guarantees the Transportation of Coal,” Guangming Newspaper, Nov. 19, 2011. http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2011-11/10/nw.D110000gmrb_20111110_6-10.htm; “SOEs in the Coal Industry and SOEs in the Electricity Industry are the major source of selling coal, and PingCoal (an SOE) makes profits at the amount of trillions RMB per year”, blog, the Chinese Times, March 6, 2010. http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5efc3eed0100hkmq.html Datong Coal Industry Company Limited, and Shenhua Group (Energy company), and electricity SOEs, take advantage of their better access to transportations, especially railways, and better retail ability in markets, purchased coal from small coal miners at lower prices, and resell them at higher prices. POEs and small-and-medium sized enterprises have to spend a lot money in order to get their coal transported to markets by rails. What’s more, they cannot get sufficient access to railways through money sometimes. (There are some administrative interventions in the allocation of railways services.) Therefore, they prefer selling their coal to the large SOEs who have better access to railways. Electricity SOEs also benefit in such a way as five giant SOEs in the electricity sector, including China Huaneng, and China Huadian Corp., all sell coal for profit, and such a business has been their focus. It is also because they take advantage of their better access to rails.

  146. 146.

    “The Steel Industry: the Influence of Increased Price of Electricity on the Steel Industry”, Guotai Junan Securities, June 23, 2008. http://money.163.com/08/0623/11/4F4C0QQG00251M00.html#

  147. 147.

    For instance, the cost of transporting electricity is more than 25% of the total if the distance is longer than 1500 kilometers.

  148. 148.

    Direct power purchase is a transaction directly between the seller of electricity and buyer of electricity without an intermediary, with agreed prices which probably are lower than the prices of on-grid electricity purchases.

  149. 149.

    Shuwei Zhang, “The Reform in Electricity Prices is More About the Pricing Mechanism, Rather Than Whether the Prices are Higher or Lower,” Energy, June 11, 2014, http://energy.people.com.cn/n/2014/0611/c71661-25135482.html

  150. 150.

    Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang (China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008), 319; Eight SOEs account for approximately 70% of revenue in the power sector. See the National Bureau of Statistics; State-owned and controlled firms account for more than 90% of output in 2009, see Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 44–48, (Table V-4: Top SOE share of revenues in China’s power sector, 2010).

  151. 151.

    Annual Financial Report of Aluminum Corporation of China Limited 2011, 37.

  152. 152.

    Michael Wines, “China Fortifies State Businesses to Fuel Growth”, New York Times, 29 August 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/world/asia/30china.html

  153. 153.

    “The most profitable SOEs received financial subsidies from the government and the government is becoming corporatization”, Blog, JieFang News Magazine, Nov. 22, 2014. http://blog.people.com.cn/article/1416621257770.html

  154. 154.

    Shukun Wang, “SOEs Received 60% of all Subsidies from the Government, and PetroChina Ranked as the First One,” New Beijing Magazine, Oct. 10, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2014-10/10/c_127079629.htm

  155. 155.

    Shukun Wang, “SOEs Received 60% of all Subsidies from the Government, and PetroChina Ranked as the First One,” New Beijing Magazine, Oct. 10, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2014-10/10/c_127079629.htm

  156. 156.

    “Ranking of SOEs Receiving Subsidies: Each SOE received 50 million RMB and Sinopec ranked as the Top One,” Vision Times, April 27, 2016. http://m.secretchina.com/node/606307

  157. 157.

    Shukun Wang, “SOEs Received 60% of all Subsidies from the Government, and PetroChina Ranked as the First One,” New Beijing Magazine, Oct. 10, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2014-10/10/c_127079629.htm

  158. 158.

    “Ranking of SOEs Receiving Subsidies: Each SOE received 50 million RMB and Sinopec ranked as the Top One,” Vision Times, April 27, 2016. http://m.secretchina.com/node/606307

  159. 159.

    WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012, p. 35, 58, 61, 63, 72, 73, 114, 121.

  160. 160.

    Data is from the HongKong Institute for Monetary Research in 2009.

  161. 161.

    He said that he did an survey on the costs of financing of enterprises in Zhejiang Province in China in 2012. See the Chairman of the Association of Industrial and Commercial of P.R.C.: SOEs’ interest rate is 5.3% while a 10% for POEs can make POEs happy”, Goldsen Engtone, (assessed Sept. 14, 2016) http://www.jinxinyintong.com/industry/2013/01/1156.html

  162. 162.

    From 2002–2008, the dividend rates of 172 Chinese SOEs on the HongKong Stock Exchange was 23.2%. The dividend rates of Chinese SOEs on the U.S. stock exchanges was 35.4% in 2005. World Bank, “SOE Dividends: How Much and to Whom?”, World Bank Report (Oct. 17, 2005).

  163. 163.

    Decision on Certain Major Issues Concerning the Comprehensive Deeping of Reform (15 November 2013).; Lingling Wei, “China Looks to Consolidate State Companies to Avoid Layoffs,” The Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-looks-to-consolidate-state-companies-to-avoid-layoffs-1457775420

  164. 164.

    World Bank, “SOE Dividends: How Much and to Whom?”, World Bank Report (Oct. 17, 2005), 5.

  165. 165.

    Article 3 of “Temporal Regulations regarding the right to use land in the reform of SOEs”, [Guoyou Qiye Gaigezhong Huabo Tudi Shiyongquan Guanli Zanxing Guiding], The Ministry of Land and Resources of P.R.C., Feb. 17, 1998. It provides that Parent SOEs can rent or equitize the right to use the land to their subsidiaries.

  166. 166.

    “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), 39–63.

  167. 167.

    Qing Ze, “How are subsidies granted to SOEs?” JING55, Nov.20, 2014. http://www.jing55.com/toutiao/20141120/210e8b75dae30d5e72189.html

  168. 168.

    “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), 39–63.

  169. 169.

    The tax reform unified the tax rate as 25% for enterprises after 2008, see art. 2, 3, 4. of Tax Law of P.R.C., (approved on March 16, 2007), effective on Jan 1, 2008. http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-03/19/content_554243.htm

  170. 170.

    Qing Ze, “How are subsidies granted to SOEs?” JING55, Nov.20, 2014. http://www.jing55.com/toutiao/20141120/210e8b75dae30d5e72189.html

  171. 171.

    Article 8 and Chapter 5 of the Anti-Monopoly Law. SAIC’s Provisions on the Suppression of Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate and Restrict Competitive Conduct (entered into effect on 1 Feb. 2011, SAIC Decree 2011/55), arts. 3 & 4. NDRC Provisions on Prohibition of Price Monopoly with a focus on price-related violations. http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=0&CGid=96789#menu4

  172. 172.

    Article 7 of Anti-Monopoly Law 2008; WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012, p. 35, 58, 61, 63, 72, 73, 114, 121, para. 253.

  173. 173.

    The U.S. Trade Representative, “2016 U.S.T.R. National Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” (2016), 95.

  174. 174.

    Such as in the areas of local and long distance fixed-line telephone services, and data service providers whose telecommunications services cover two or more provinces.

  175. 175.

    Annual Financial Report China Mobile Limited, 20-F Form (2014). http://www.chinamobileltd.com/sc/ir/reports.php

  176. 176.

    Annual Financial Report of Sinopec, 20-F Form; Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 4.

  177. 177.

    Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013), 5.

  178. 178.

    Considering the cutthroat price competition, the Ministry of Public Security, the General Administration of Customs, and the Ministries of Land Resources (MLR) and Environmental Protection, ordered 126 rare-earth production firms to suspend production and revoked another 161 firms’ production licenses in August 2013. “China Focus: China must tackle rare earth industry chaos,” Shanghai Daily, Aug 9, 2014. http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=234479

  179. 179.

    Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China (MIIT), The Fifth List of Firms That Have Complied with the Regulation on Conditions for Entry into the REEs Industry, MIIT Doc. No. 2014 (41), June 23, 2014, available at http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146352/n3054355/n3057569/n3057572/c3569588/content.html (in Chinese); MIIT, The Fourth List of Firms That Have Complied With the Regulation on Conditions for Entry Into the REEs Industry, MIIT Doc. No. 2013(31), July 4, 2013. http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1653100/n3670459/c3680202/content.html (in Chinese); MIIT, The Third List of Firms that Have Complied with the Regulation on Conditions for Entry Into the REEs Industry, MIIT Doc. No. 2012(65), Dec. 26, 2012. http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1653100/n3670459/c3680411/content.html (in Chinese); MIIT, The Second List of Firms that Have Complied with the Regulation on Conditions for Entry Into the REEs Industry, MIIT Doc. No. 2012(61), Dec. 11, 2012. http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1653100/n3670459/c3680427/content.html (in Chinese); MIIT, The First List of Firms that Have Complied with the Regulation on Conditions for Entry Into the REEs Industry, MIIT Doc. No. 2012(59), Nov. 21, 2012. http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146352/n3054355/n3057569/n3057579/c3566732/content.html (in Chinese).

  180. 180.

    “It is still not enough to increase production quotas by 112,00 ton,” Xinhua News, June 20, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/energy/2014-06/20/c_1111232486.htm

  181. 181.

    “Report on the Economic Performance of the Industry of REEs in 2013,” MIIT, Feb. 21, 2014. http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n11294132/n12858402/n12858507/15890977.html

  182. 182.

    For instance, China MinMetals Corp. (SOE) produced rare earths without permits and was forced to suspend production in June 2013. Nevertheless, in September 2013, China MinMetals Corp. said that MIIT agreed to increase the second assignment of production quotas of originally 1435 tons, which was announced in middle of 2013, to 2135 tons. It is unknown why MITT decided to increase the production quota for China MinMetals Corp. The underlying reason might be that production capacity of MinMetals Corp is not fully used. As an SOE, it has negotiation leverage over the government due to its connections to the government. “Subsidiary of China MinMetals has its second assignment of producing REEs increased,” STCN, Sep. 11, 2013. http://kuaixun.stcn.com/2013/0911/10749049.shtml

  183. 183.

    Working Party on State Trading Enterprises-State Trading-Updating Notification Pursuant to Article XVII:4(a) of the GATT 1994 and Paragraph 1 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII, China, Addendum, G/STR/N/9/CHN/Add.1, 14 July 2003, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=@Symbol=%20g/str/n/*%20and%20%20@Symbol=%20chn&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true#

  184. 184.

    My calculation was based on data found in the website of the Ministry of the Commerce.

  185. 185.

    Article 17, 18.2, 18.4 of Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China. Adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on August 30, 2007, effective as of August 1, 2008.

  186. 186.

    In March 2003, NDRC, the former State Economic and Trade Commission, and the former Foreign Trade Department issued “Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment” [Waishang Touzi Chanye Zhidao Mulu], which opened the urban network of gas and pipe to foreign investment. In May 2004, the Ministry of Construction issued “Measures for the Administration on the Franchise of Municipal Public Utilities” [Shizheng Gongyong Shiye Texu Jingying Guanli Banfa], article 4 authorized municipal governments to franchise in terms of the supply of gas through pipelines in urbans. It changed local monopolies into regional competitors in the market of supplying gas through pipelines. http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=3491&CGid=

  187. 187.

    It transports imported foreign natural gas as well as natural gas from the Western China to the Eastern China.

  188. 188.

    “Why Did the Merger of Subsidiaries of CNPC Paused: the Natural Gas Market Refuses Monopolistic Power,” Energy, SINA, Jan 12, 2016. http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/sdbd/2016-01-12/doc-ifxnkkuy7943686.shtml

  189. 189.

    Jinbiao Xia and Xiantang Zhang, “CNPC: Being Questioned About its Strategy of Exchanging its Resources for Downstream Markets to the Exclusion of other Enterprises in Downstream Markets,” China Economic Times, August 1, 2008. http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/67723/7597579.html

  190. 190.

    David E.M. Sappington and Sidak, J. Gregory, “Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises,” 71(2) Antitrust Law Journal (2003): 479, 484.

  191. 191.

    Fifth Plenary Session of the 14th Communist Party of China, Sept. 28, 1995; Robert E. White, Robert E. Hoskisson, Daphne W. Yiu & Garry D. Bruton, “Employment and Market Innovation in Chinese business Group Affiliated Firms: The Role of Group Control Systems” 4(2) Management and Organization Review (2008): 225–56.

  192. 192.

    Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013), 5.

  193. 193.

    “Guiding the merger and reorganization of enterprises”, in Part three, chapter nine, section four of 12th Five Year Plan, http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838_4.htm in Chinese http://www.cbichina.org.cn/cbichina/upload/fckeditor/Full%20Translation%20of%20the%2012th%20Five-Year%20Plan.pdf in English; One purpose of consolidation strategy currently is to deal with the overcapacity problem. See “Opinions of the State Council Regarding Over Production of the Steel Industry and Poverty Reduction”, the State of Council of P.R.C., Feb. 04, 2016, Doc. NO. [2016] 6. [Guowuyuan Guanyu Gangtie Hangye Huajie Guosheng Channeng Shixian Tuokun Fazhan de Yijian] http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-02/04/content_5039353.htm;

  194. 194.

    George Haley, “Overview of China’s pillar and strategic industries,” Expert testimony to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s hearing, “the Extent of the Government’s Control of China’s Economy, and Its Impact on the United States,” May 25, 2007.

  195. 195.

    “The Closing Deal of Consolidation of three SOEs in the Steel industry”, Price of Steel, Jan 25, 2010. http://ggjgw.com/new_view.asp?id=8251&ad=16

  196. 196.

    Xiaoqin Ruan and Feng Qin, “Six rare earths blocs are ready, and MIIT will discuss proposals,” Finance Sina, Oct. 28, 2014. http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20141028/071620660117.shtml

  197. 197.

    For instance, Ganzhou Rare Earth Group was established by the city and eight counties in 2004 to exclusively exploit, process and sell REEs in Gangzhou city.

  198. 198.

    Economic Information, “Geography and market division by six giant REEs group,” People.cn, Aug 12, 2014. http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0812/c70731-25446075.html

  199. 199.

    China Security, “Baogang Group and Xiamen Tungsten has got approval from MIIT of consolidation proposal, and the plan will be implemented by the end of the year,” Xinhua Net, Aug 5, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2014-08/05/c_126833588.htm

  200. 200.

    The Notification Regarding Further Reform of the Telecommunications System [Guanyu Shenhua Dianxin Tizhi Gaige de Tonggao], issued by MIIT, NDRC, Ministry of Finance of PRC, May 24, 2008.

  201. 201.

    Article 21 of Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, it provides that most restructuring of central and local SOEs needs authorization from the government.

  202. 202.

    For more examples, see Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 57 (May 13, 2016): 55–6.

  203. 203.

    Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the 29th Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress and effective as of August 1, 2008); Article 1, 4, 7 of the Anti-Monopoly Law 2008. See Legislative Affairs Commission, “Interpretation of the Anti-Monopoly of the People’s Republic of China,” Law Press China (2008) at 4 translated and quoted in U.S. Chamber of Commerce, China’s Application of its Anti-Monopoly Law, at 24.

  204. 204.

    Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 57 (May 13, 2016): 55–6; The U.S. Trade Representative, “2016 U.S.T.R. National Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” (2016), 95.

  205. 205.

    “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), 83–101.

  206. 206.

    China uses the AML to coerce multinational companies (MNCs) to transfer assets to SOEs. See Daniel C.K. Chow and Anna Han, Doing Business in China: Problems, Cases, and Materials (West 2012), 168; Daniel Chow, “How China Promotes its State-Owned Enterprises at the Expense of Multinational Companies Doing Business in China and Other Countries,” Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, No. 307, October 5, 2015, North Caroline 41(3) Journal of Int’l Law (Spring 2016): 455; “China Media: Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Call,” BBC News, Nov. 20, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20405106; PRC Criminal Law, art. 164 (Crime of offering bribes to persons other than state officials), (amended in 2011 based on the United Nations Convention Against Bribery), other relevant provisions are art. 163, 385, 387 (crime of offering bribes to state officials); Samuel R. Gintel, Fighting Transnational Bribery: China’s Gradual Approach, 31 (1) Wisc. Int’l L.J. (2013): 7–9. However, China has never brought a prosecution under the new Criminal Law since its enactment in 2011.

  207. 207.

    My calculation is based on “China Imports: 1983–2016,” Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/imports; Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 4.

  208. 208.

    My calculation is based on “China Exports: 1983–2016,” Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/exports; The “going-global strategy” (zouchuqu) was proposed in 2000 at the 5th plenary session of the 15th Central Committee. See Junyeop Lee, “State Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing the Evidence,” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD Occasional Paper (2009), 9. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/30/42095493.pdf

  209. 209.

    Nargiza Salidjanova, “Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” US- China Economic & Security Review Commission, USCC Staff Research Report (March 30, 2011), 5–6.

  210. 210.

    My calculation is based on the following sources: “A glimpse of Chinese Economy,” Research HKTDC, http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/中國經貿資料/中國經貿概況/ff/tc/1/1X000000/1X09PHBA.htm; “Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP),” World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts Data Files, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS; Richard S. Eckaus, “China’s Exports, Subsidies to State Owned Enterprises and The WTO,” China Economic Review 17 (2006):1–13.

  211. 211.

    Steven Mufson, “China Surpasses Germany as World’s Top Exporter”, Washington Post, Jan. 11, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/10/AR2010011002647.html

  212. 212.

    Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013), 2.

  213. 213.

    Alan H. Brice, Timothy C. Brightbill, Christohper B. Weld, and D. Scott Nance, “Money for Metal: A Detailed Examination of Chinese Government Subsidies to Its Steel Industry,” Prepared for the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), the Steel Manufacturers Association (SMA), the Committee for Pipe and Tube Imports (CPTI), and the Specialty Steel Industry of North America (SSINA) (July 2007), 1.

  214. 214.

    Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Fact Sheet: WTO Case Challenging Chinese Subsidies,” 2012. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2012/september/wto-case-challenging-chinese-subsidies

  215. 215.

    They may ask for concessions on economic, political, or military affairs as well. Robert Loring Allen, “State Trading and Economic Warfare,” 24 Law and Contemporary Problems (Spring 1959): 256–275, 263.

  216. 216.

    Adrian Wooldridge, “The Visible Hand”, The Economist (Jan 21, 2012). http://www.economist.com/node/21542931; Ministry of the Commerce of P.R.C. (MOFCOM), 2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (Beijing: 2010), 12.

  217. 217.

    Ministry of the Commerce of P.R.C. (MOFCOM), 2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (Beijing: 2010), 12.

  218. 218.

    Richard S. Eckaus, “China’s Exports, Subsidies to State Owned Enterprises and The WTO,” 17 China Economic Review (2006):1–13.

  219. 219.

    For instance, CMCC (China Mobile Limited) has its settlement arrangements with respect to international interconnection and roaming with the relevant telecommunications services providers in foreign countries and regions, and collected the relevant usage fees and other fees. See “Overviews”, the website of China’s Mobile Limited, and its annual financial reports. http://www.chinamobileltd.com/en/about/chairman.php

  220. 220.

    Hejing Chen and John Whalley, “The State-owned Enterprises Issue in China’s Prospective Trade Negotiations,” Centre for International Governance Innovation (2014); The Behavior of Bureaucrats and State Banks in Allocating Credit to Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, Journal of Development Economics 71 (2003) 533–559, citing FN 1.

  221. 221.

    Julia Ya Qin, “WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)- A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol,” 7(4) Journal of International Economic Law: 863–919.

  222. 222.

    The U.S. Trade Representative, “2016 U.S.T.R. National Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” (2016), 86. Also, more and more complaints and questions were raised at the Trade Policy Review of China at the WTO towards SOEs and their advantages in 2016 as compared to 2010. See WTO Trade Policy Review: China, Concluding remarks by the Chairperson, 20 and 22 July 2016, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp442_crc_e.htm; WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, China, WT/TPR/S/342, 15 June 2016; WTO Trade Policy Review: China, Conlcuding remarks by the Chairperson, 31 May and 2 June 2010, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp330_crc_e.htm; WTO Trade Policy review: China, Concluding remarks by the Chairperson, 19 and 21 April 2006, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp262_crc_e.htm

  223. 223.

    Use the figure 3.1 with specific numbers, Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013), 57.

  224. 224.

    Sourafel Girma, Yundan Gong, Holger Gorg, and Zhihong Yu., “Can Production Subsidies Foster Export Activity? Evidence from Chinese firm-level data,” Working Paper Series No. 6052, Centre for Economic Policy Research, (London: Jan. 2007).

  225. 225.

    It explores the relation of loss-making SOE subsidies to SOE exports to estimate regressions on exports of SOEs using data from a set of 30 Chinese provinces. Citing FN 6 from Richard S. Eckaus, “China’s Exports, Subsidies to State Owned Enterprises and The WTO,” 17 China Economic Review (2006): 1–13.

  226. 226.

    Richard S. Eckaus, “China’s Exports, Subsidies to State Owned Enterprises and The WTO,” China Economic Review 17 (2006): 1–13.

  227. 227.

    The U.S. Trade Representative, “2016 U.S.T.R. National Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” (2016), 86.

  228. 228.

    Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 4.

  229. 229.

    For instance, trade barriers can be done through mark-up, custom specification, etc. Mark-up means the ratio between the cost and selling prices. In the context of import monopolies, mark-up prices mean the selling prices to domestic markets after importing the goods. Custom specification means an official document stating details and rules for importing or exporting goods into or from a country. See Dictionary Cambridge, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/customs-specification (last visited June 28, 2017.); One example can be found between Japan and Australia concerning importing STEs of wheat, barley and sugar from Australia to Japan. See WTO Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, Questions Posed by Australia Concerning the New and Full Article XVII Notification of Japan, State Trading, G/STR/Q1/JPN/6, 9 Oct. 2007; WTO Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, Questions Posed by Australia Concerning the New and Full Article XVII Notification of Japan, State Trading, G/STR/Q1/JPN/7, 7 Oct. 2009; WTO Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, Questions Posed by Australia Concerning the New and Full Article XVII Notification of Japan, State Trading, G/STR/Q1/JPN/9, 20 Oct. 2009.

  230. 230.

    1.4 million vehicles were imported to China in 2014, while 23.7 million vehicles were sold in China in 2014. See China-Britain Business Council, “Report: The Automotive Market in China,” 2015 EU SME Centre, (2015), 5, 8. http://www.ccilc.pt/sites/default/files/eu_sme_centre_sector_report_-_the_automotive_market_in_china_update_-_may_2015.pdf; China Association of Automobile Manufacturers, A summary on the automobile market in 2014 and an estimate on the automobile market in 2015, http://www.caam.org.cn/xiehuidongtai/20150112/1805144356.html

  231. 231.

    See a list of central SOEs on the website of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html

  232. 232.

    For instance, COMAC’s jet in the next plan is the C919, a narrow-body jet that China hopes will be able to compete directly the Airbus 320 and the Boeing 737. “G.E. to Share Technology with China in New Joint Venture,” New York Times, Jan. 17, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/business/global/18plane.html?_r=0. “Ryan Air May Spend Billions on Cheap Chinese Jets,” Independent.ie. Feb. 6, 2011.

  233. 233.

    See the website of the corporate, Company Profile, Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, Ltd. http://english.comac.cc/aboutus/introduction/. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comac

  234. 234.

    Dali L. Yang, Remarking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China (Stanford University Press, 2004); See Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978–1993 (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1–25 and 309–26.

  235. 235.

    The need for maintaining monopolistic profit also accounts for governmental price control. Government may also set high floor prices for SOEs so that they can get profit.

  236. 236.

    See Xuejin Zuo and Hangsheng Cheng, State-owned Enterprise Governance in China: An International Comparative Perspective (China: Social Science Academic Press, 2006), 15–33. China Examiner, “SOE Reform Encountered Difficulties and Obstacles: Xi Jinping Cannot Tolerate with it and Li Keqiang Was Angry,” 29 May 2016.

  237. 237.

    Jinbiao Xia and Xiantang Zhang, “CNPC: Being Questioned About its Strategy of Exchanging its Resources for Downstream Markets to the Exclusion of Other Enterprises in Downstream Markets,” China Economic Times, Aug. 1, 2008. http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/67723/7597579.html

  238. 238.

    Paul Krugman, “Is Free Trade Passe?” 1 Economic Perspective (1987): 131–144, 142.

  239. 239.

    Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013), 37.

  240. 240.

    These are essentially zero-sum games in that one group receive advantages at the expense of another group.

  241. 241.

    Ling Liao and Liulong Cao, “The Reform on the Supply Side: the Steel industry turns left and the coal industry turns right,” notes from the first day of survey done by the GF Securities regarding the reform on the supply side facing the reform of SOEs, GF Securities Research, 23 July 2016. http://www.weidu8.net/wx/146138

  242. 242.

    The anti-trust dispute between China Unicom and China Mobile shows that there is interest conflict among SOEs. In the fall of 2011, reports indicated the National Development and Reform Commission was investigating anti-competitive behavior by two major telecom SOEs, China Unicom and China Mobile allegedly charging prices for access to their broadband backbone networks that were higher for competitors than for internet operators. See Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 4; Elizabeth J. Drake, “Chinese State-Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises: Policy Options for Addressing Chinese State-Owned Enterprises,” Testimony before the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission (Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, 15 Feb. 2012), 8.

  243. 243.

    Joost Pauwelyn, “New Trade Politics After the Doha Round,” Les Conférences de HEI avec le parrainage du quotidien Le Temps, Geneva, 5 December 2007.

  244. 244.

    WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, China: Record of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/264, July 17, 2012, para. 126.

  245. 245.

    For instance, high profile managers or CEOs in PetroChina, Sinopec, CNOOC, China Mobile, Telecom, China Unicom have stepped down after Xi Jinping took power. See China Examiner, “SOE Reform Encountered Difficulties and Obstacles: Xi Jinping Cannot Tolerate With it and Li Keqiang Was Angry,” 29 May 2016.

  246. 246.

    Dali L. Yang, Remarking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China (Stanford University Press, 2004), 5. The roster can be evidenced by one survey of the resumes of officials in ministries and commissions in the State Council, it shows that 56 out of 183 officials have working experiences in SOEs, accounting for 30.6%. A survey of resumes of senior executives of 123 central SOEs shows that 115 senior managers of 47 SOEs have the background of working in governmental offices. See “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), Abstract.

  247. 247.

    Daniel Chow, “How China Promotes its State-Owned Enterprises at the Expense of Multinational Companies Doing Business in China and Other Countries,” Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, No. 307, October 5, 2015, 41(3) North Caroline Journal of Int’l Law (Spring 2016): 455.

  248. 248.

    Daniel Chow, The Legal System of the People’s Republic of China in a Nutshell, 3rd edition (West Academic Publishing, 2015), 21.

  249. 249.

    WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, China: Record of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/264, July 17, 2012, para. 61.

  250. 250.

    It is evidenced by the fact that both exports and imports are declining, shown from the data about trade balancing during the period of 2010–2015. See “China Balance of Trade, 1983–2016, Data/Chart/Calendar/Forecast,” Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/balance-of-trade National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2015, (2015). http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2015/indexeh.htm; “Fresh Data Confirms Chinese Economic Slowdown,” BBC News Business, 1 March 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35693794

  251. 251.

    For more about the historical reform of Chinese SOEs and grant of various advantages to SOEs, see Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978–1993 (Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang (China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008); Xuejin Zuo and Hangsheng Cheng, State-owned Enterprise Governance in China: An International Comparative Perspective (China: Social Science Academic Press, 2006).

  252. 252.

    As for some SOEs that are publicly-traded on stock exchanges, the profit from non-main operation has exceeded the profit from main operation. See “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), 101–111.

  253. 253.

    SASAC, NDRC and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced “Ten experiments for SOE reform” on Feb. 25, 2016, including the power of the board of directors, salaries, state assets operation companies, mergers and restructuring of central SOEs, ownership reform in some key industries, shares held by workers, information transparency of SOEs, separating social obligation of SOEs for their workers and easing historical burden. “Report of the Development of the Steel Industry 2016”, Association of the China Steel Industry, May 25, 2016, http://www.chinamission.be/chn/zgggfz/zghgjj/t1366468.htm; Ye Yang, “SASAC announced the timeline for the Reform on the Supply Side, and the production of Coal SOEs are to be reduced,” Xinhua Net, July 22, 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-07/22/c_129168257.htm

  254. 254.

    “China’s Foreign Trade Flourishes,” China Daily, 08 Dec. 2011, p. 8. http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-12/08/content_14230448.htm

  255. 255.

    In May 2010, China’s State Council issued Certain Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding the Sound Development of Private Investment towards sectors that have been dominated by SOEs. The policies set out in the Opinions are not applied to foreign investment. See WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012, summary, para. 14.

  256. 256.

    For instance, in May 2013, China introduced a pilot program to allow non-SOEs to do the business of the resale of mobile services to customers through entering leasing contracts with China Unicom, China Telecom or China Mobile. However, this pilot program ended in 2015 See Annual Financial Report of China Mobile Limited, 2014 20-F Form, (2014). http://www.chinamobileltd.com/sc/ir/reports.php; Foreign firms are excluded from the pilot program. See The U.S. Trade Representative, “2016 U.S.T.R. National Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” (2016), 91; WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012, summary.

  257. 257.

    For example, China attempted to supervise the electricity monopoly by establishing an independent agency in 2012. This effort, however, failed due to “administrative capture” by the electricity industry. To take an another example, local governments may lower the standard of regulations on giant SOEs in the oil industry regarding their transportation and retail out of fear the giant SOEs in the oil industry may threaten to withdraw or reduce the supply of oil to that city. See Jinbiao Xia and Xiantang Zhang, “CNPC: Being Questioned About its Strategy of Exchanging its Resources for Downstream Markets to the Exclusion of Other Enterprises in Downstream Markets,” China Economic Times, August 1, 2008. http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/67723/7597579.html

  258. 258.

    “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), 17–34; Michael M. Du (Ming Du), “China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law” 63 (2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 409–448 (Jan. 11, 2014): 417–419; Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises (Adopted at the 5th session of the Standing Committee of the 11th National People’s Congress on October 28, 2008), arts. 11–15. http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7195&CGid=

  259. 259.

    From a path dependence viewpoint, historical process and institutional conditions matter to some degree. For the basic concept of path dependence, see S. J. Liebowitz, “Path Dependence, Locke-In, and History,” https://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/paths.html

  260. 260.

    Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 277.

  261. 261.

    For more about the historical reform of Chinese SOEs and grant of various advantages to SOEs, see Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978–1993 (Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang (China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008), 319; Xuejin Zuo and Hangsheng Cheng, State-owned Enterprise Governance in China: An International Comparative Perspective (China: Social Science Academic Press, 2006).

  262. 262.

    For instance, the SASAC of Shangxi Province requires that the percentage of state shares shall be more than 50% in publicly traded SOEs in the energy sector. It is the same with the steel industry where the cooperation between SOEs and POEs regarding mixed ownership is not encouraged by the government. See Ling Liao and Liulong Cao, “The Reform on the Supply Side: the Steel industry turns left and the coal industry turns right,” notes from the first day of survey done by the GF Securities regarding the reform on the supply side facing the reform of SOEs, GF Securities Research, 23 July 2016. http://www.weidu8.net/wx/146138

Bibliography

Treaties, GATT/WTO Legal Texts and Other Documents

  • Hejing Chen and John Whalley, “The State-Owned Enterprises Issue in China’s Prospective Trade Negotiations,” Centre for International Governance Innovation (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  • Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China. Adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on August 30, 2007, effective as of August 1, 2008

    Google Scholar 

Books

  • Chen J (2008) In: Zheng LV, and Huang S (eds) Research on the 30 years of China’s state-owned enterprise reform. Economy & Management Publishing House, China, “Zhongguo Guoyou Qiye Gaige 30 Nian Yanjiu”

    Google Scholar 

  • Chow DCK, Han A (2012) Doing business in China: problems, cases, and materials. West, St. Paul

    Google Scholar 

  • Haley UCV, Haley GT (2013) Subsidies to Chinese industry, state capitalism, business strategy, and trade policy. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Salvatore D (1995) International economics, 5th edn. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs

    Google Scholar 

  • Yang DL (2004) Remarking the Chinese leviathan: market transition and the politics of governance in China. Stanford University Press, Stanford

    Google Scholar 

  • Zuo X, Cheng H (2006) State-owned enterprise Governance in China: an international comparative perspective. Social Science Academic Press, China, “Zhongguo Guoyou Qiye Gaige Zhili: Guoji Bijiao de Shijiao”

    Google Scholar 

Journals and Working Papers

  • Allen RL (1959) State trading and economic warfare. Law Contemp Probl 24:256

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chow D (2016) How China promotes its state-owned enterprises at the expense of multinational companies doing business in China and other countries. North Caroline J Int Law 41(3):455

    Google Scholar 

  • Eckaus RS (2006) China’s exports, subsidies to state owned enterprises and the WTO. China Econ Rev 17:1

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krugman P (1987) Is free trade passe? Econ Perspect 1:131

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wei S-J, Wang T (1997) The Siamese twins: do state – owned banks favor state-owned enterprises in China? China Econ Rev 8(1):19–29

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • White RE, Hoskisson RE, Yiu DW, Bruton GD (2008) Employment and market innovation in Chinese business group affiliated firms: the role of group control systems. Manag Organ Rev 4(2):225

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of International Law, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing, China

    Yingying Wu

Authors
  1. Yingying Wu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Wu, Y. (2019). The Extent, Nature, and Effect of Advantages Granted to Chinese SOEs. In: Reforming WTO Rules on State-Owned Enterprises. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-3561-7_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-3561-7_2

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-13-3560-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-13-3561-7

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation