Abstract
States of affairs are instantiations of universals by particulars. We have examined these particulars and universals. The task we now face is to account for how states of affairs are unified, to account for the unity of states of affairs. That is, we face the problem of unity.
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Notes
- 1.
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A very similar view can be found in Olson (1987, p. 61); and Tegtmeier (1992, p. 173; 2009). It bears close resemblance to the thesis, to be encountered later in passing in Sect. 9.3, that the U-relation unifies a state of affairs as a matter of brute ontological fact, cf. fn. 8 below. Another closely related and more crass view simply construes unification to be a matter of brute ontological fact per se. For discussion (even if not endorsement) of this kind of view, see Vallicella (2002a, b); and Orilia (2007, 2016), which attribute the view to Bergmann and Armstrong, respectively. I am inclined to hold that these views fail as long as there is any viable non-primitivist alternative, and it is in any case beyond the scope of this book to consider them.
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Compare how e.g. being a plane figure is essential to both being a quadrilateral and its species being a rectangle (since a quadrilateral is a plane figure bounded by four straight sides and a rectangle in turn is a quadrilateral with four right angles).
- 5.
I appeal to an intuitive sense of ‘material’, as opposed to ‘formal’ here, though it is not easy to come up with a definition of its exact meaning (cf. Mulligan 1998).
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It should be noted that there is an element of interpretation in the claim that Grossmann maintains explicitly that relations are not related to their relata, for the following reason. He is actually asserting only the weaker, non-equivalent thesis that relations need not be related to their relata (1983, p. 169). However, I think one can conjecture in the context that he intends to assert the stronger thesis that no relation is related to its relata.
- 7.
Like Grossmann in the monadic case, Bergmann identifies U with the relation of instantiation—for both the monadic and polyadic cases. If I understand him correctly, Bergmann himself would not quite accept this way of characterizing his position, however, as he thinks instantiation is not a relation, but a ‘nexus’, i.e. a sui generis kind of entity that ‘does not need a further entity to tie it to what it ties’ (ibid., p. 9), cf. Tegtmeier (2013). Bergmann apparently later postulated a new kind of entity, a ‘circumstance’, as constituent of the state of affairs in order to secure that this ‘nexus’ in fact ties its relata, but as Hochberg argues (1978, pp. 336–37), this obviously fails, since ‘circumstance’ is just another name for the state of affairs, thus making the state of affairs a (proper) part of itself.
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I do nonetheless consider it a serious candidate for a version of relational internalism which faces having to answer (ER). Of course, a harsher version of ‘classic internalism’ may reject being considered a candidate in this way—perhaps by suggesting that the U-relation unify the fact as a matter of brute ontological fact, that we have reached ontological bedrock, and that nothing more is to be said. However, although consideration of such a view might be interesting, space limitations do not permit it here.
- 9.
Alternatively, rather than identifying the U*-relation with instantiation, the latter might be construed as an ontological role that the U*-relations plays. However, this will make no difference to our purposes here.
- 10.
This is the second option, as it were; the first option, the U-relation being related to its relata by another U-relation, leads to the regress, as we have seen. Strictly speaking, there is also a third option: the U-relation being related to its relata ‘by nothing’ (i.e. it being a brute fact that it is so related). By the Principle of Sufficient Reason, among other things, this option is a non-starter—but that is a topic for another occasion.
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Meinertsen, B.R. (2018). The Problem of Unity and Relational Internalism. In: Metaphysics of States of Affairs. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 136. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-3068-1_9
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