Concrete Universals

  • Bo R. Meinertsen
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 136)


As mentioned in Chap.  1, I am inclined to believe that naturalism is true. This metaphysical view requires that every existent be concrete (or non-abstract), i.e. spatially and/or temporally located.


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bo R. Meinertsen
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTongji UniversityShanghaiChina

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