• Bo R. Meinertsen
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 136)


No investigation of relations should start without the following ontological distinction between what I consider the three basic kinds of (material) relation (Meinertsen 2011). The issue of how these kinds are related to one another is rather complicated, but here I need give only a sketch of it in order to show that only one of the kinds of relation is TM-irreducible, i.e. constituent of states of affairs.


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bo R. Meinertsen
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTongji UniversityShanghaiChina

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