Abstract
States of affairs are complexes that are instantiations of properties or relations by particulars. The nature of these particulars in states of affairs qua constituents of states of affairs is the topic of this chapter.
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Notes
- 1.
Note that philosophers who are not state of affairs ontologists might put essentially the same view in different terms. For instance, Loux (1998, Chap. 3) states that the traditional answer of ‘substratum theory’ is that the relation in case is the external relation of ‘exemplification’.
- 2.
A natural implication of this is that the U-relation unifies the thick particular. This contrasts with the view of e.g. Macdonald (1998, p. 331) and, in particular, LaBossiere (1994, pp. 363–365), on which it is the bare particular that unifies it. However, it seems plain to me that a bare particular can unify the thick particular only in the derivative sense that it instantiates the properties included in it. Thus, I am sympathetic to the fact that the listing of roles for bare particulars in Perovic (2017) does not include unification.
- 3.
Perhaps this dismissal of them is too crass. Perovic (2017) discusses them (she calls them ‘genuinely bare particulars’) in some detail. However, she argues that although the standard objections to them can be met, they are still unable to solve important ontological problems. Given this, they can fortunately still be rejected.
- 4.
An early article by Alston (1954) proposed a similar conception with ‘underlying’ and ‘inclusion’ corresponding to ‘rooted in’ and ‘linked to it’, respectively.
- 5.
It may be noted as a terminological point that Mertz’s jargon differs considerably from these nominalizations, but recall that for all systematic purposes I use the method of naming states of affairs which I find preferable.
- 6.
In addition, Davis (2003, pp. 538–542) provides further criticism of Mertz’s objection from instantiation’s being ‘completely external’. Despite this, however, Davis rejects (Moreland’s version) of the account of bareness I have defended here. For a clear response to Davis’ arguments for this rejection, see Pickavance (2009).
- 7.
For an instructive presentation and discussion of the main arguments, see Loux (1998, pp. 106–113).
- 8.
O’Leary-Hawthorne (1995) thinks Black’s argument fails in contexts, like ours (Chap. 8), where universals are concrete (immanent). For since such universals are multiply located, the bundle of them that is identical to a thick particular can, he claims, be wholly present in more than one place simultaneously, such that a Black-world merely is a world where one and the same thick particular is wholly present in two places. This objection is flawed. Firstly, by definition, a thick particular, at least the ‘ordinary objects’ of concern to the bundle theory and Black’s argument, cannot be wholly present in more than one place, so it is at best a reductio of the bundle theory of concrete universals. Secondly, as pointed out by Vallicella (1997a), it is clearly the fallacy of composition to believe that what holds for the universals in a bundle also holds for the bundle itself.
- 9.
Some readers might prefer the modal counterpart of this thesis: the particulars in states of affairs are necessarily bare. But I shall remain neutral on whether or not the view can be modally strengthened in this way.
- 10.
He has both a strong and a weak version of it, but the difference between them does not matter to our purposes.
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Meinertsen, B.R. (2018). Bare Particulars. In: Metaphysics of States of Affairs. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 136. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-3068-1_5
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