Bare Particulars

  • Bo R. MeinertsenEmail author
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 136)


States of affairs are complexes that are instantiations of properties or relations by particulars. The nature of these particulars in states of affairs qua constituents of states of affairs is the topic of this chapter.


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTongji UniversityShanghaiChina

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