A Partial Look at Trope Theory

  • Bo R. Meinertsen
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 136)


Trope theory (‘moderate nominalism’, ‘trope nominalism’) is usually introduced as the view that properties are not universal (repeatable) but particular (or ‘particularized’). The particular size, shape, weight, colour, etc. of this mug standing on my desk are examples of such particular properties.


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bo R. Meinertsen
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTongji UniversityShanghaiChina

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