• Bo R. Meinertsen
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 136)


States of affairs are unified complexes that are instantiations of properties or relations by particulars.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bo R. Meinertsen
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTongji UniversityShanghaiChina

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