The Research of Tripartite Game Between Managers and Executors in Logistics Security Under the Influence of Government

Abstract

Based on logistics security, this paper analysis that people as one of the most important roles affect logistics security, and the games among different hierarchies will lead to different results of logistics security. By constructing a tripartite game model of participating groups, including government, managers and executors, in logistics security, the income matrix of tripartite game can be listed, and then we can find the game equilibrium points through evolutionary game theory. Through using the game model simulation by placing the value which makes the characteristic roots of the Jacobian matrix less than zero, we can get expected game equilibrium point which is $\{$supervising, strengthening, executing$\}$. Meanwhile changing some of the initial values under the government’s macro-regulatory effect, such as increasing the cost of punishment and rewards for managers and executors or reducing the input cost and the opportunity cost of doing other inputs appropriately and so on, can promote the three participants to build a stable and safe logistics transportation environment.

This work was supported in part by the National Social Science Fund of China (Grant No. 18BJY066), Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant No. 106112016CDJXZ338825), Chongqing key industrial generic key technological innovation projects (Grant No. cstc2015zdcy-ztzx60009), Chongqing Science and Technology Research Program (Grant No. cstc2015yykfC60002).