Abstract
In Chaps. 2, 3, and 4, we examined the mechanism of the three decade-long difficulties of the Japanese economy, basically in a time-sequential manner. In this and the next chapters, we will look at the issues that are more directly relevant to the current Japanese economy, that is, the long economic stagnation after the collapse of the bubble and deflation.
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- 1.
The GDP deflator is a deflator that covers the entire economic activities, including investment and exports, while CPI covers only private consumption. Two points should be noted. First, prices of investment goods such as machinery tend to reflect price-reducing technological progress. Second, price movements of imports are excluded from the calculation of the GDP deflator (i.e., if import prices rise at a higher pace than domestically produced goods, then the GDP deflator tends to be lowered more than otherwise), while rise in import prices are reflected in CPI (household sector consumes imported goods, too). Therefore, the GDP deflator tends to record a lower rate of increase than that of CPI, if prices of domestically produced goods, including those for exports, rise less than import prices.
- 2.
Translated by the author of this book into English from the original text.
- 3.
Noguchi (2002) criticized the supply-side structural interpretation of deflation by contending that positive shocks on the supply side, such as technological progress and availability of less expensive materials from abroad, will shift the (upward sloping) short-term aggregate supply curve to the right, bringing about a reduction of price level, and that this shift is expected to produce an expansion of production, which does not seem to be in line with Japan’s case in which the growth rate continued to decline from the 1990s. So, under this argument, even if we admit the effects of price decline due to these (favorable) factors on the general price level, it is clear that this mechanism was not dominant in the functioning of the Japanese economy during the stagnant decades. We need to find out what was a dominant mechanism that operated through the Japanese economy, which produced both stagnation and deflation.
- 4.
There are some arguments that refer to the quantity theory of money in their understanding of deflation. However, the quantity theory of money, which advocates that the quantity of money supplied in the economy determines the general price level, may be relevant in the very long-term or under the extreme circumstances such as hyperinflation, but for other, more realistic cases, the theory does not seem to be of practical use.
- 5.
The timing of fiscal policy management may be questioned . Yoshikawa (1999) criticized the timing of fiscal consolidation efforts in 1997, on the grounds that they were undertaken, despite economic indicators showing that the economy might have entered a contraction phase by mid-1997, and argued that it is impossible to achieve fiscal consolidation under a recession.
- 6.
Translated by the author.
- 7.
Refers to the worsening real profitability, in particular.
- 8.
Hayami, Yu (1998) “Azia Keizai to Nihon no Yakuwari” (The Asian Economy and the Role of Japan), keynote speech by Governor Hayami of Bank of Japan, October 29. (BOJ Home Page, https://www.boj.or.jp/en/index.htm/).
- 9.
Simulation using the FRB/Global model.
- 10.
Why could the removal of unprofitable assets from the balance sheets of corporate sector not be conducted more speedily? There is an argument that funding from financial institutions had an element of introducing capital rather than pure borrowing. Under this argument, when an investment project financed by financial institutions failed, financial institutions acted as if they were a provider of capital and shared responsibility of failure, through alleviation of repayment conditions and/or providing additional funds. Such behaviors helped delay the necessary adjustments and made it possible for companies to continue to hold the unprofitable project. Probably, the best solution was to remove unprofitable assets together with relevant debt from the rest of the borrower, that is, splitting a borrower into a “good company” and a “bad company,” with the latter proceeding to a bankruptcy procedure. See Harashima (2005) for an interpretation of bank loans as provision of capital.
- 11.
Manuscript of the press conference by Governor Hayami on July 21, 1998 (BOJ 1998a). The same statements were found in the manuscript of the press conference by Governor Hayami on August 13, 1998. Such statements are also found in press releases by the Monetary Policy Committee. For example, see Bank of Japan (1998c) “Kinnyu Shijo Chosetsu Hosin no Henko ni tuite” (On the Changes of Monetary Adjustment Policies, September 9, 1998).
- 12.
Around the beginning of the 2000s, an argument that distinguishes between “good deflation” and “bad deflation” attracted some attention. Under this argument, deflation caused by such factors as technological progress or structural reform is said to be beneficial to the economy. Then BOJ Governor Hayami contended in a press conference on March 10, 2000, that price declines arising from reductions in production and distribution costs due to technological progress and a distribution revolution were beneficial to consumers. This contention can be classified as a “good deflation” argument. The Annual Economic and Fiscal Report FY 2001, pp. 43–49, of the Cabinet Office argued that the good deflation arguments have problems: First, the arguments do not properly distinguish between changes of prices of specific items (relative price change) and deflation (decline in general price level). Second, decline in general price level does do harm to the economy. Under deflation, the burden of debt in real terms increases, depressing investment. If the nominal interest rates or nominal wages do not fall to the same extent as the general price level falls, the real interest rates or the real wages rise, depressing investment and employment. Deflation may be beneficial to the lenders for whom the real value of interest and principal repayments increase and those employees whose employment and wages are protected; it is disadvantageous to borrowers and new entrants to labor markets who may be squeezed out. In total, deflation discourages investment and is detrimental to employment, bringing about significant damage to the economy. Some media favored the “good deflation” argument. For example, Mainichi Newspaper on March 17, 2001, in an article entitled “Deflation, Do Not Stop Prices from Falling,” argued that price drops in recent years were due to import penetration or deregulation, and therefore desirable. The article criticized the government’s interpretation of the price developments at that time as deflation, as stated in the government monthly economic report on March 16, 2001. The government report wrote that, if deflation is defined to mean continuous decline in prices, then the Japanese economy is under a mild deflation.
- 13.
The manuscript of the press conference by the Governor on May 20, 1999 (BOJ 1999a). Governor Hayami also stated in another press conference that the BOJ had been providing sufficient funds to the financial markets under the zero interest policy, and even if additional finance was provided, further monetary easing effects would not be expected. See the manuscript of the press conference, September 21, 1999 (BOJ 1999c).
- 14.
In a press conference on August 17, 1999, Governor Hayami stated that there were four by-products in relation to the zero interest policy: a distributional problem of reducing interest income of the household, a concern that structural reforms may be delayed, moral hazard of the market participants, and decline in market function. See manuscript of press conference by Governor Hayami on August 17, 1999 (BOJ 1999b). For similar comments, see manuscripts of press conference by the Governor on February 15, 2000 (BOJ 2000a).
- 15.
Manuscript of press conference by the Governor on March 10, 2000 (BOJ 2000b).
- 16.
Manuscript of a press conference on April 12, 2000 (BOJ 2000c). In a press conference on June 14, 2000, Governor Hayami said “(it) is an emergency measure adopted under an emergency situation. Interest rate is something that goes up and down under the demand/supply conditions like price; clearly, zero interest rate should not be continued limitlessly. We have always a desire to recover space of maneuvering of monetary policy. See manuscript of press conference by the Governor on June 14, 2000 (BOJ 2000d). In a press conference on July 19, 2000, Governor Hayami stated that as the interest rates adjust monetary conditions, the situation where interest rate is zero is a very distorted situation, while it may not be appropriate to refer to the degree of freedom of monetary policy. See manuscript of press conference by Governor, July 19, 2000 (BOJ 2000e)
- 17.
The thought that monetary policy tools had been exhausted was later denied by the policy actions of the BOJ itself, which included quantitative easing and its move to inflation targeting. However, whether these policy actions contributed to the removal of the fundamental cause of the long economic stagnation is a different matter.
- 18.
The classification in the text basically followed Tanaka Takayuki, “Zero Kinri Seiyakuka niokeru Rifureshon Seisaku Rongi-Nichign ha Nani wo Okonai Nani wo Okonawa Nakattaka-”(Reflation Policy Debate under the Zero Lower Bound Constraint on Interest Rate—What Did the BOJ Do and Not Do?), downloaded on January 19, 2015, http://ir.acc.senshu-u.ac.jp/index.php?active_action=repository_view_main_item_detail&page_id=13&block_id=52&item_id=1426&it em_no=1
- 19.
The aggressive outright purchase of long-term government bonds.
- 20.
The base money is composed of deposits with the BOJ and cash (notes and coins in circulation). As of February 2001, the amount of base money was 68.4 trillion yen, with notes amounting to 56.4 trillion yen (87%), coins 4.2 trillion yen (6.4%), and deposits with the BOJ 4.2 trillion yen (6.5%).
- 21.
These factors must have been at work, albeit to a different degree, in other advanced economies.
- 22.
The situation changed with the outbreak of the financial crisis in the late 1990s, and the lending attitude of the financial institutions was suddenly tightened. This fact implies that we need to look at effects of the financial crisis on the behaviors of financial institutions and companies.
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Aramaki, K. (2018). Deflation and Monetary Policy. In: Japan’s Long Stagnation, Deflation, and Abenomics. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2176-4_5
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