The Theoretical Basis for Expanding Environmental Human Rights

Abstract

The concept of a human right to an environment of a particular quality intuitively appeals to those who wish to secure greater protection for the natural world and to promote an enhanced understanding of humans’ relationship with it. Yet questions abound as to how such a right should be defined and how we can justify a good environment as something which ought to be characterised as a human right. This chapter considers a number of theories which explain what human rights are and why they warrant protection, and analyses whether any of them could support the notion of a right to a good environment. In seeking a theoretical rationale for the right to a good environment, the chapter identifies the need to exclude explanations which rely on the environmental dimensions of other rights, on the basis that human rights require some independent justification beyond merely providing instrumental benefit to the enjoyment of other rights. The chapter argues that it is extremely problematic to provide an account of the right to a good environment which demonstrates its essentiality for human dignity, autonomy or well-being without describing its value in terms of facilitating other rights. Consequently, it is difficult to find a home for the right within conventional human rights theories.