Abstract
The hard problem of consciousness arises in most incarnations of present-day physicalism. Why should certain physical processes necessarily be accompanied by experience? We begin with the assumption that experience cannot exist without being accompanied by a subject of experience (SoE). Strawson has elaborately defended the notion of a thin subject—an SoE which exhibits a phenomenal unity with different types of content (sensations, thoughts, etc.) occurring during its temporal existence. Next, following Stoljar, we invoke our ignorance of the true physical as the reason for the explanatory gap between present-day physical processes (events, properties) and experience. We are therefore permitted to conceive of thin subjects as related to the physical via a new, yet to be elaborated, relation. While this is difficult to conceive under most varieties of classical physics, we argue that this may not be the case under certain quantum field theory ontologies. We suggest that the relation binding an SoE to the physical is akin to the relation between a particle and (quantum) field. In quantum field theory, a particle is conceived as a coherent excitation of a field. Under the right set of circumstances, a particle coalesces out of a field and dissipates. We suggest that an SoE can be conceived as akin to a particle which coalesces out of physical fields, persists for a brief period of time, and then dissipates in a manner similar to the phenomenology of a thin subject. While it is odd at first glance to conceive of subjects of experience as akin to particles, the spatial and temporal unity exhibited by the particle as opposed to fields and the expectation that selfons are new kinds of particles paves the way for cementing this notion.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Atmanspacher H. Dual-aspect monism à la Pauli and Jung. J Conscious Stud. 2012;19(9–10):96–120.
Banks EC. The realistic empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell: neutral monism reconceived. reprint edn. Cambridge University Press; 2016.
Cleary T. Entry into the inconceivable: an introduction to Hua-Yen Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press; 1983.
Cross S. Schopenhauer’s encounter with Indian thought: representation and will and their Indian Parallels. Monographs of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy. University of Hawaii Press; 2013.
Chalmers DJ. The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Philosophy of mind. rev edn. Oxford University Press; 1997.
Deikman A. ‘I’=awareness. J Conscious Stud. 1996;3(4):350–6.
Dennett DC. Consciousness explained. 1st ed. New York: Back Bay Books; 1992.
Deutsch E. Advaita Vedanta: a philosophical reconstruction. Studies in the Buddhist traditions. University of Hawaii Press; 1980.
Freeman A (ed). The emergence of consciousness. J Conscious Stud. 2001;8. Imprint Academic, Exeter
Georgiev DD. Falsification of Hameroff-Penrose Orch OR model of consciousness and novel avenues for development of quantum mind theory. NeuroQuantology. 2007;5(1):145–74.
Griffin DR, Smith H. Primordial truth and postmodern theology. Suny series in constructive postmodern thought. Albany: New York University Press; 1990.
Hameroff SR. Quantum computation in microtubules? The Penrose-Hameroff “Orch OR” model of consciousness. Phil Trans R Soc A. 1998;356:1869–96.
Hargens S. Intersubjective musings: a response to Christian de Quincey’s ‘the promise of integralism’. J Conscious Stud. 2001;8(12):35–78.
Hoffman D. Conscious realism and the mind-body problem. Mind & Matter. 2008;6(1):87–121.
Jinpa T. Self, reality and reason in Tibetan philosophy: Tsongkhapa’s quest for the middle-way. Routledge critical studies in Buddhism. 1st ed. London: Routledge; 2002.
Koslicki K. The structure of objects. reprint edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2010.
Kuhlmann M. The ultimate constituents of the material world: in search of an ontology for fundamental physics. Philosophische analyse/philosophical analysis (Book 37). Berlin: De Gruyter; 2010.
Kuhlmann M, Lyre H, Wayne A, editors. Ontological aspects of quantum field theory. River Edge: World Scientific; 2002.
Ladyman J, Ross D. Everything must go: metaphysics naturalized. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press; 2009.
LaPorte J. Natural kinds and conceptual change. Cambridge studies in philosophy and biology. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2009.
Lloyd S. Programming the universe: a quantum computer scientist takes on the cosmos. reprint edn. London: Vintage; 2007.
Lowe EJ. Subjects of experience. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2006.
Malament D. In defense of dogma: why there cannot be a relativistic quantum mechanics of (localizable) particles. In Clifton R, editor. Perspectives on quantum reality: non-relativistic, relativistic, and field-theoretic, volume 57 of Western Ontario series in philosophy of sci-ence, chapter 1, pages 1–10. Springer Science and Business Media; 1996.
Nāgārjuna. The fundamental wisdom of the middle way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhya-makakārikā. Oxford University Press; 1995. Translated and Commentary by J. L. Garfield.
Rangarajan A. Panpsychism and compositionality: a solution to the hard problem. In: The Science of consciousness. University of Helsinki; 2016.
Rosenberg G. A place for consciousness: probing the deep structure of the natural world. Philosophy of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2004.
Schrödinger E. Quantisierung als eigenwertproblem. Ann Phys. 1926;384(4):361–76.
Schwartz MD. Quantum field theory and the standard model. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2013.
Skrbina D. Panpsychism in the west. Cambridge: MIT Press; 2007.
Sprigge TLS. The vindication of absolute idealism. 1st ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; 1984.
Stoljar D. Ignorance and imagination: the epistemic origin of the problem of consciousness. Philosophy of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2009.
Stoljar D. Physicalism, volume 2 of new problems of philosophy. London/New York: Routledge; 2010.
Strawson G. Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism? Imprint Academic, 2006.
Strawson G. Selves: an essay in revisionary metaphysics. rev edn. Oxford University Press; 2011.
Tigunait PR. Seven systems of Indian philosophy. Honesdale: Himalayan Institute Press; 1983.
van Inwagen P. Material beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1995.
Varela F, Thompson E, Rosch E. The embodied mind: cognitive science and human experience. rev edn. The MIT Press; 1992.
Wheeler JA, Zurek WH, editors. Quantum theory and measurement. Princeton Legacy Library. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1983.
Wilber K. Sex, ecology, spirituality: the spirit of evolution. 1st ed. Boston: Shambhala; 1995. (page 708, note for page 497, chapter 14)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Rangarajan, A. (2019). Can A Quantum Field Theory Ontology Help Resolve the Problem of Consciousness?. In: Bhatt, S.R. (eds) Quantum Reality and Theory of Śūnya. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1957-0_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1957-0_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-13-1956-3
Online ISBN: 978-981-13-1957-0
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)