China’s Long March to Market Economy Status: An Analysis of China’s WTO Protocol of Accession and Member Practices

Nedumpara, James J.; Subramanian, Archana

doi:10.1007/978-981-13-1331-8_2

James J. Nedumpara³ &
Archana Subramanian³

538 Accesses
2 Citations

Abstract

The debate on the market economy status of China is possibly one of the most critical issues in the field of international trade law. While the use of non-Chinese costs and prices in anti-dumping proceedings hinges on the interpretation of Section 15 of China’s Protocol of Accession, individual WTO Members have undertaken peculiar and ingenious methods to address State intervention in the Chinese market. This chapter discusses the legal nuances of the debate on Section 15 and argues that despite the expiry of Section 15 (a)(ii), the use of surrogate prices can be justified through reliance on the surviving parts of Section 15. The chapter also analyses country specific practices of key anti-dumping users to determine the different practices adopted by these Members to continue rejection of Chinese costs and prices, even after December 11, 2016.

The authors are grateful to Weihuan Zhou, Jorge Cerdio, Unnati Ashish Ghia, Anton Cooray, D. P. Mohapatra, Sanjay Notani, Amrita Bahri, Shruti Ramakrishnan and Bradly Condon for their comments and suggestions on the previous draft versions of this chapter. The authors are solely responsible for any mistakes. The views expressed in this chapter represent the views of the authors and cannot be attributed to their institutions.

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Notes

1.
Electric Golf Carts from Poland, Inv. No. AA1921-147, USITC Pub. 740 (September, 1975) (Final) [hereinafter Electric Golf Carts Case]. See James J. Nedumpara and Archana Subramanian, China and the Non-Market Economy Treatment in the Anti-Dumping Cases: Can the Surrogate Price Methodology Continue Post – 2016, 4(2) J. Int’l & Comp. L. 253,278 (2017).
2.
Outboard Marine Corporation v. Pezetel & Ors., 535 F. Supp. 248 (D. Del. 1982).
3.
Electric Golf Carts Case, supra note 1.
4.
Id.
5.
Ronald A. Cass and Stephen J. Narkin, Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Law: The United States and the GATT in Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws 215 (Richard Botluck eds., 1991).
6.
David A. Andelman, The Polish Golf Carts are No Toke, n.y.Times (Jan 28, 1979).
7.
Note, Dumping from ‘Controlled Economy’ Countries: The Polish Golf Cart Case, 11 L. & pol’y Int’l. Bus 771 (1979).
8.
Dwight H. Perkins, Economic Transformation of China (World Scientific Publishing Co., 2015); Letter from Sen. Sherrod Brown to President Donald Trump (May 16, 2017), available at www.brown.senate.gov.
9.
Bicycles from Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. Reg. 9,782 (Dep’t Treas., 1960) (final deter.).
10.
Other NME countries included Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, and Vietnam.
11.
Vera Thorstensen, Daniel Ramos Carolina Muller, Fernanda Bertolaccini, WTO – Market and Non-Market Economies: a hybrid case of China, 1(2) Latin Am. J. Int’l L., 765, 772 (2013).
12.
See U.S. Dep’t Com., Department of Commerce announces Market Economy Status for the Russian Federation (Jun. 6, 2002), https://www.trade.gov/media/PressReleases/may2002/russianMESannounce_060602.html; EU Commission, EU announces formal recognition of Russia as "Market Economy" in major milestone on road to WTO membership (May 29, 2002), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-02-775_en.htm.
13.
Request for Consultations by China, European Union — Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, WTO Doc. WT/DS516/1 (Dec. 12, 2016) [hereinafter China — EU Consultations]; Request for Consultations by China, United States — Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, WTO Doc. WT/DS515/1 (Dec. 12, 2016) [hereinafter China — US Consultations].
14.
China — EU Consultations, ¶ 4; China — US Consultations, ¶ 3.
15.
The WTO panel was established on April 3, 2017, see World Trade Organization, European Union — Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, DS516, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm.
16.
As of April 30, 2018.
17.
Appellate Body Report, European Union — Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS473/AB/R (adopted Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter EU — Biodiesel (AB Report)].
18.
The policy reasons underlying dumping include curtailing price discrimination and protection of domestic industries from unfair competition, by discouraging excessively low pricing of imported goods. Anti-dumping is a trade remedy to deal with ‘dumping’ which is said to have occurred when an exporter introduces goods in the markets of the importing country at a price less than that of the like product in the domestic market of the exporter. The price of the product in the domestic market of the exporter, in the ordinary course of trade, is often referred to as the ‘normal value’.
19.
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 201 (1994), art. 2.2.1 [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Agreement].
20.
GATT Secretariat, Proposal by the Czechoslovakian Delegation Relating to Article VI, WTO Doc. W9/86/Rev.1 (Dec. 21, 1954).
21.
The purpose of the Ad Note is to further explain the GATT provisions.
22.
Jorge Miranda, Interpreting Paragraph 15 of China’s Protocol of Accession, 9(3) Global Trade & Customs J. 94, 95 (2014).
23.
The “Ad” Articles are interpretative notes relating to specific articles of the GATT; See Carol J. Beyers, The U.S./Mexico Tuna Embargo Dispute: a Case Study of the GATT and Environmental Progress, 16 Md. J. Int’l L. 229, 237 (1992).
24.
Anti-dumping Agreement, supra note 19, Note 2, Paragraph 1, Interpretative Note Ad Article VI from Annex I. It states,

It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability for the purposes of paragraph 1, and in such cases importing contracting parties may find it necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not always be appropriate.
25.
Mark Wu, The WTO and China’s Unique Economic Structure in Regulating the Visible Hand?: The Institutional Implications of Chinese Capitalism 319 (Benjamin L. Leibman eds., 2016).
26.
Miranda, supra note 22, at 95.
27.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Glossary of Custom Terms, http://www.asycuda.org/cuglossa.asp?term=market+economy.
28.
The United States typically applies six statutory criteria which are: (i) free currency convertibility; (ii) wages determined by labour market; (iii) openness to foreign investments; (iv) Government ownership or control over means of production, (v) allocation of resources and price; and (vi) output decisions of enterprises. See Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C, § 1677b(c)(4) (1930), § 771 (18)(b) [hereinafter Tariff Act].
29.
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, The Outlook for Market Economy Status for China, Peterson Institute For International Economics (Apr. 11, 2017) https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/outlook-market-economy-status-china.
30.
Government of India, Customs Notification No. 28/2001 - Cus (NT) (May 31, 2001)(Annexure III) and substituted vide Customs Notification No. 1/2002 (NT) (Jan. 1, 2002). European Commission, Council Regulation 1225/2009 of November 30, 2009, Protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community 2009 O.J. (L 343/5) 1.
31.
supra note 22.
32.
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Natural Menthol from the People’s Republic of China 46 Fed. Reg. 24614 (U.S. Dep’t Com., 1981)(final determ.); See William P Alford, When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the “Non-Market Economies, 61 Southern Cal. L. Rev., 79 (1987).
33.
Michelle Zang, ‘The WTO Contingent Trade Instruments against China: What Does Accession Bring?, 58(2) The Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 321, 329 (2009); see also Richard Lockridge, Doubling Down on Market Economies: The Inequitable Application of Trade Remedies Against China and the Case for a New WTO Institution, Southern Cali. Interdisc. L. J. 249, 258 (2014).
34.
Folkert Graafsma & Elena Kumashova, ‘In re China’s Protocol of Accession and the Anti-Dumping Agreement: Temporary Derogation or Permanent Modification’, 9(4) Global Trade & Customs J. 154 (2014); Judhith H. Bello et al., Searching for Bubbles of Capitalism: Application of U.S. Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Laws to Reforming Nonmarket Economies, 25 George Washington J. Int’l Eco. L 665, 692–705 (1992).
35.
Zang, supra note 33, at 329.
36.
Aaron Ansel, ‘Market Orientalism: Reassessing an Outdated Anti-Dumping Policy Towards the People’s Republic of China’ 35(3) Brook. J. Int’l L., 883, 889 (2010).
37.
Zang, supra note 33, at 330.
38.
Michael Flynn, China: A Market Economy, 48 Geo. J. Int’l L. 297, 320 (2016).
39.
Working Party on the Accession of China, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001) at 46 [hereinafter China’s Working Party Report].
40.
Miranda, supra note 22, at 97; see also Mark Wu, The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenges to Global Trade Governance, 57 Harv. J. of Int’l L. 261, 306 (2006).
41.
China — US Consultations, supra note 13; China — EU Consultations, supra note 13.
42.
See Jorge Miranda, More on Why Granting China Market Economy Status after December 2016 Is Contingent upon Whether China Has in Fact Transitioned into a Market Economy 11(5) Global Trade & Customs J. (2016); Bernard O’Connor, ‘Much Ado About Nothing’: 2016, China and Market Economy Status 10 (5) Global Trade & Customs J. (2015); Matthew Nicely, Time to Eliminate Outdated Non-market Economy Methodologies 9(4) Global Trade & Customs J. (2014); Brian Gatta, Between ‘Automatic Market Economy Status’ and ‘Status Quo’: A Commentary on ‘Interpreting Paragraph 15 of China’s Protocol of Accession’ 9(4) Global Trade & Customs J. (2014), Rao Weijia, China’s Market Economy Status under WTO Anti-dumping Law After 2016, 5 Tsinghua China L. Rev. 151, 162 (2013); Li Zhenghao, Interpreting Paragraph 15 of China’s Accession Protocol in Light of the Working Party Report, 11(5) Global Trade & Customs J. (2016), Theodore R. Posner, A Comment on Interpreting Paragraph 15 of China’s Protocol of Accession 9(3) Global Trade & Customs J. (2014); James J. Nedumpara and Archana Subramanian, China and the Non-Market Economy Treatment in the Anti-Dumping Cases: Can the Surrogate Price Methodology Continue Post – 2016, 4(2) J. Int’l & Comp. L., 253, 278 (2017).
43.
Rao Weijia, id., at 162.
44.
China — EU Consultations, supra note 13, ¶ 4.
45.
Bernard O’Connor, The Myth of China and Market Economy Status in 2016, World Trade Law, 3, http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/files/oconnorresponse.pdf.
46.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, ¶ 286, WTO Doc. WT/DS397/AB/R (adopted Jul. 28, 2011).
47.
The so-called a contrario argument is fairly well accepted in the context of WTO jurisprudence. For example, in the examination of prohibited subsidies in the Illustrative List of the Subsidies and Countervailing Agreement, a contrario based arguments was used. In the Panel Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 4.52, WTO Doc. WT/DS46/R (adopted Aug. 20, 1999), Brazil contended that under first paragraph of Item (k) of the Illustrative List, the payment by governments “of all or part of the costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits” constitutes and export subsidy “in so far as they are used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms.” According to Brazil, where the payments are not “used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms, such payments do not constitute export subsidy”. In the Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, ¶ 80, WTO Doc. WT/DS46/AB/RW (adopted Aug. 23, 2001), the Appellate Body noted as follows:

If Brazil had demonstrated that the payments made under the revised PROEX were not “used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms”, and that such payments were “payments” of Brazil of “all or part of the cost incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits”, then we would have been prepared to find that the payments made under the revised PROEX are justified under Item (k) of the Illustrative List.
48.
Aaron Fellmeth and Maurice Horwitz, Guide to Latin in International Law, 36 (Oxford University Press, 2009).
49.
Appellate Body Report, Australia — Subsidies provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, ¶ 6.24, WTO Doc. WT/DS 126/RW (adopted Feb. 11, 2000).
50.
The Latin maxim means, “it is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void”.
51.
Appellate Body Report, Canada — Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, ¶ 133, WTO Doc. WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R (adopted Oct. 27, 1999).
52.
Appellate Body Report, EC — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 181, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1999) [hereinafter EC — Hormones (AB Report)]; Appellate Body Report, India —Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Products, ¶ 45, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 1998).
53.
Appellate Body Report, Japan — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 12, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1998).
54.
Appellate Body Report, United States — Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 268, WTO Doc. WT/DS 350/AB/R (adopted Feb. 19, 2009); See also Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 399, WTO Doc. WT/DS 363/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2010).
55.
O’ Connor, supra note 45, at 4.
56.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶ 242–245, WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002); Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, ¶ 163, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1998), Appellate Body Report, India – Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain Agricultural Products, ¶ 5.77, WTO Doc. WT/DS430/AB/R (adopted Jun. 19, 2015).
57.
David Bulloch, China Doesn't Deserve Its 'Market Economy' Status By WTO, Forbes (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/douglasbulloch/2016/12/12/china-doesnt-deserve-its-market-economy-status-by-wto/#555a0622b937 (last visited Jul. 23, 2017).
58.
Mark Wu, The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenges to Global Trade Governance, 57 Harv. J. of Int’l L. 262 (2006).
59.
Id.
60.
Charlene Barshefsky, the United States Trade Representative at the time of the negotiations of the Protocol of Accession noted during a congressional hearing “[n]o agreement on WTO accession has ever contained stronger measures to strengthen guarantees of fair trade and to address practices that distort trade and investment.” See Hearing on the Accession of China to the WTO Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 39 (2000) (statement of Charlene Barshefsky, United Nations Trade Representative).
61.
EC — Hormones (AB Report), supra note 52, ¶ 195.
62.
Panel Report, China — Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 7.1169, WTO Doc. WT/DS363/R (adopted on Jan. 19, 2010).
63.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 3.2, May 23, 1969, 331 U.N.T.S. 1155.
64.
Julia Ya Qin, The Challenge of Interpreting ‘WTO-Plus’ Provisions, 44 J. World Trade 127, 172 (2010); Nedumpara and Subramanian, supra note 1, at 267.
65.
Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, recital 2, WTO Doc. WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001); See also Nedumpara and Subramanian, supra note 1.
66.
Julia Ya Qin, The Conundrum of WTO Accession Protocols: In Search of Legality and Legitimacy, 55(2) Va. J. Int’l L. 369, 392 (2015).
67.
Id.
68.
China’s Working Party Report, supra note 39, at annex. 9.
69.
Id., ¶ 1.2.
70.
Panel Report, European Union — Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS405/R (adopted Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter EU — Footwear (Panel Report)].
71.
China’s Working Party Report, supra note 39, ¶ 151(e) and (f).
72.
EU — Footwear (Panel Report), supra note 70, ¶ 7.181.
73.
Id.
74.
For an explanation of ‘circumstances existing’ see Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Greece v. Turkey, Judgment (Greece v. Turkey), 1978 ICJ Rep 3, ¶ 105–107 (December 19). In deciding the issue of whether the Turkey and Greece had, pursuant to a joint communication in May 1975, agreed to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the ICJ analysed the communication in light of the subsequent diplomatic exchanges between the two states. The ICJ held,

The information before the Court concerning the negotiations between the experts and the diplomatic exchanges subsequent to the Brussels Communiqué appears to confirm that the two Prime Ministers did not by their “decision” undertake an unconditional commitment to submit the continental shelf dispute to the Court…. Accordingly, having regard to the terms of the Joint Communiqué of 31 May 1975 and to the context in which it was agreed and issued, the Court can only conclude that it was not intended to, and did not, constitute an immediate commitment by the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, on behalf of their respective Governments, to accept unconditionally the unilateral submission of the present dispute to the Court.
75.
Press Release, World Trade Organisation, WTO successfully concludes negotiations on China’s entry (Sept. 17, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2017). Also see Hearing on the Accession of China to the WTO Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means (1999) (statement of Charlene Barshefsky, United States Trade Representative), http://lobby.la.psu.edu/069_WTO_Membership/Congressional_Hearings/Testimony/H_Ways_Means_Trade_021199.htm. According to Ms. Barshefsky:

Third, our trade policy will continue our progress toward integrating China, Russia and other economies in transition into the trading system…To support rather than undermine both domestic reform in these economies and the rules of the trading system, these countries must be brought into the WTO on commercially meaningful terms. The result must be enforceable commitments to open markets in goods, services and agricultural products; transparent, non-discriminatory regulatory systems; and effective national treatment at the border and in the domestic economy.
76.
China’s Working Party Report, supra note 39, ¶ 172.
77.
See Hearing on the Accession of China to the WTO Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 39 (2000) (statement of Steve Appel, President, Washington State Farm Bureau, and Co-Chairman, Trade Advisory Committee, American Farm Bureau Federation).
78.
Paul Rosenthal & Jeffrey S. Beckington, The People’s Republic of China: A Market Economy or a Non-market Economy in Anti-dumping Proceedings Starting on December 12, 2016 9(7) Global Trade & Customs J. 352,354 (2014).
79.
Miranda, supra note 42, at 249.
80.
Wu, supra note 58, at 306.
81.
Id., at 262–285.
82.
China’s Working Party Report, supra note 39, ¶ 151.
83.
Id.
84.
The chapeau to paragraph 151 of the Working Party Report states, “…In response to these concerns, members of the Working Party confirmed that in implementing subparagraph (a)(ii) of Section 15 of the Draft Protocol, WTO Members would comply with the following…”. See id.
85.
Graafsma and Kumashova, supra note 34, at 157.
86.
Id.
87.
China’s Working Party Report, supra note 39, ¶ 151 (b).
88.
Id., ¶ 151 (d).
89.
Id., ¶ 151 (e).
90.
Id., ¶ 151 (f).
91.
Working Party on the Accession of China, Draft Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, ¶ 12, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/SPEC/CHN/1/Rev.1 (Jul. 18, 2000).
92.
Working Party on the Accession of China, Draft Protocol on the Accession of China, www.insidetrade.com, art. 20.
93.
Working Party on the Accession of China, Draft Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WTO Doc. ¶ 12, WT/ACC/SPEC/CHN/1/Rev.1 (July 21, 2000).
94.
Id.
95.
Gatta, supra note 42, at 165.
96.
Section 773(c)(1) of the Tariff Act states,

In general, if (A) the subject merchandise is exported from a nonmarket economy country, and (B) the administering authority finds that available information does not permit the normal value of the subject merchandise to be determined under subsection (a), the administering authority shall determine the normal value of the subject merchandise on the basis of the value of the factors of production utilized in producing the merchandise and to which shall be added an amount for general expenses and profit plus the cost of containers, coverings, and other expenses. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the valuation of the factors of production shall be based on the best available information regarding the values of such factors in a market economy country or countries considered to be appropriate by the administering authority.

Tariff Act, supra note 28, § 773(c)(1).
97.
In making an NME country determination under section 771(18)(A) of the Act, section 771(18)(B) requires that the Department take into account: (i) the extent to which the currency of the foreign country is convertible into the currency of other countries; (ii) the extent to which wage rates in the foreign country are determined by free bargaining between labor and management; (iii) the extent to which joint ventures or other investments by firms of other foreign countries are permitted in the foreign country; (iv) the extent of government ownership or control of the means of production; (v) the extent of government control over the allocation of resources and over the price and output decisions of enterprises; (vi) such other factors as the administering authority considers appropriate.
98.
Tariff Act, supra note 28, § 771(18)(C)(1).
99.
Id., § 771(18)(D).
100.
Certain Aluminum Foil From the People’s Republic of China: Notice of Initiation of Inquiry Into the Status of the People’s Republic of China as a Nonmarket Economy Country Under the Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 82 Fed. Reg. 62, 16162 (U.S. Dep’t Com., March 29, 2017)(initiation notif.) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ pkg/FR-2017-04-03/pdf/2017-06535.pdf
101.
Id.
102.
Memorandum from Leah Wils-Owens, Office of Policy, Enforcement & Compliance to Gary Taverman, Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Operations, “China’s Status as a Non-Market Economy” (U.S. Dep’t Com., Oct. 26, 2017), https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-nme-status/prc-nme-review-final-103017.pdf [hereinafter China NME Memorandum].
103.
See supra note 97.
104.
China NME Memorandum, supra note 102, at 4, 13, 19.
105.
Id., at 4, 28.
106.
Id., at 5, 38, 51.
107.
Id., at 6, 115.
108.
Id., at 6–7, 178.
109.
Id., at 7, 194.
110.
Cast Iron Soil Pipe Fittings From the People’s Republic of China: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair Value Investigation 82 Fed. Reg. 37,053, 37,055 (U.S. Dep’t Com, 2017)(final find.) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-08-08/pdf/2017-16770.pdf.
111.
Id.
112.
Stainless Steel Flanges From India and the People’s Republic of China: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigations 82 Fed Reg. 42629, 42651 (U.S. Dep’t Com., 2017)(final find.) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-09-11/pdf/2017-19294.pdf.
113.
Id.
114.
Certain Polyester Staple Fiber from the People’s Republic of China: Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Results of the 2015–2016 Anti-dumping Duty Administrative Review (U.S. Dep’t Com., Feb. 27, 2017)(prelim. find.) http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2017-04134-1.pdf, at 3. In this case, the issue related to whether all the producers under investigation from a NME must be assigned at a single anti-dumping rate or whether the exporters/producers under investigation have demonstrated that they operate under market economy conditions, pursuant to which a separate rate is determinable for them; Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Results of Anti-dumping Duty…Citric Acid and Certain Citrate Salts from the People’s Republic of China, A-570-937, 3, (U.S. Dep’t Com., Jan. 31, 2017) (prelim. find.), http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2017-02528-1.pdf.
115.
Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Determination in the Anti-dumping Duty Investigation of Certain Hardwood Plywood Products from the People’s Republic of China, A-307-824, 9, (U.S. Dep’t Com., June 16, 2017)(prelim. find.) https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2017-13125-1.pdf.
116.
In choosing such a surrogate market economy, the USDOC is required to take into account the following: (i) whether the surrogate country is at a similar level of development comparable to the NME country; and (ii) whether the surrogate country has significant producers of comparable merchandise. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Non-Market Economy Surrogate Country Selection Process, Bulletin No. 04:1 (Mar. 1, 2004), http://enforcement.trade.gov/policy/bull04-1.html.
117.
Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination of the Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation of 1-Hydroxyethylidene-1, 1-Diphosphonic Acid from People’s Republic of China, A-570-045, 4 (U.S. Dep’t Com, Mar. 20, 2017)(final determ.), http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2017-05805-1.pdf.
118.
Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Results of Anti-dumping Duty Administrative Review: Glycine from the People’s Republic of China; 2015–2016, A-570-836, 11 (U.S. Dep’t Com., Mar. 31, 2017) (prelim. results), http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2017-06994-1.pdf.
119.
Issues and Decision Memorandum for Certain Cased Pencils from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results of Anti-dumping Duty Administrative Review; 2014–2015, A-570-827, 17 (U.S. Dep’t Com., May 22, 2017)(final determ.), http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2017-11053-1.pdf.
120.
Id.
121.
Id., at 18.
122.
Id., at 19.
123.
As of December 2016, the U.S. had initiated 141 anti-dumping investigations against China. See World Trade Organisation, Dumping Measures: Reporting Member v. Exporter (1/1/1995 – 30/6/2016), WTO Anti Dumping Gateway, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_MeasuresRepMemVsExpCty.pdf.
124.
While the negotiations in the Kennedy Round did not involve a discussion on PMS, it found a mention in the draft Anti-Dumping Code, which was circulated pursuant to the negotiations, see Sub-Committee on Non-Tariff Barriers, Report of the Group on Anti-Dumping Policies, WTO Doc. TN.64/NTB/W/16 (Mar. 3, 1967). It has been argued that the parties intended to have the term cover all circumstances (other than ordinary course of trade), which affects price comparability between domestic and export price, see Weihuan Zhou and Andrew Percival, Debunking the Myth of ‘Particular Market Situation’ in WTO Anti-dumping Law, 19 (4) J. Int’l Eco. L. 863, 874 (2016). At the Tokyo Round, the term was agreed by parties to be different than ‘sales at a loss’. See Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, List of Priority Issues in the Anti-Dumping Field, WTO Doc. COM.AD/W/79 (May 31, 1978). According to Zhou and Percival, the negotiating history of PMS indicates that Parties intended it to cover all situations (other than those referred in the Anti-Dumping Agreement i.e. ordinary course of trade and low volume of sales), which affect price comparability. See Weihuan Zhou and Andrew Percival, Debunking the Myth of ‘Particular Market Situation’ in WTO Anti-dumping Law, 19 (4) J. Int’l Eco. L. 863,890 (2016).
125.
Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114–27, §504, 129 Stat. 362–419 (2015) [hereinafter TPEA].
126.
See Matthew R. Nicely and Brian Gatta, U.S. Trade Preferences Extension Act (TPEA) of 2015 Could Lead to Increased Use of “Particular Market Situation” in Calculating Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Cases, 11(5) Global Trade & Customs J., 238–243 (2016).
127.
TPEA, supra note 125, s. 504 (c).
128.
Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the 2014–2015 Administrative Review of the Anti-dumping Duty Order on Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the Republic of Korea, A-580-870, 40–41 (U.S. Dep’t Com., Apr. 10, 2017), http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/korea-south/2017-07684-1.pdf, at 40–41 [hereinafter Korea OCTG Decision].
129.
Id.
130.
See Memorandum from Gary Taverman, Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Operations, to Carole Showers, Executive Director, Office of Policy, Policy & Negotiations, 2014–2015 Administrative Review of the Anti-dumping Duty Order on Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the Republic of Korea: Memorandum on Particular Market Situation Allegations (U.S. Dep’t Com., Feb. 21, 2017).
131.
Korea OCTG Decision, supra note 128, at 40.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id., at 43.
135.
U.S. 'particular market situation' ruling on Korean steel sparks concern at WTO, Inside U.S. Trade (May 2, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/us-particular-market-situation-ruling-korean-steel-sparks-concern-wto.
136.
European Parliament resolution of 12 May 2016 on China’s market economy status (May 12, 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2016-0223+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
137.
Regulation 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on Protection Against Dumped Imports from Countries not Members of the European Union, art. 2.7 (a), 2016 O.J. (L176/21). Article 2.7 (a) states, “An appropriate market-economy third country shall be selected in a not unreasonable manner, due account being taken of any reliable information made available at the time of selection. Account shall also be taken of time limits. Where appropriate, a market-economy third country which is subject to the same investigation shall be used”.
138.
Id.
139.
European Commission, Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of new and retreaded tyres for buses or lorries originating in the People's Republic of China, 2017 O.J. (C 264) 14,16.
140.
European Commission, Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of lever arch mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China, 2017 O.J (C 290) 3, 5.
141.
European Commission, Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of tartaric acid originating in the People's Republic of China, 2017 O.J (C 122) 8, 10.
142.
European Commission, Commission implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/141 of 26 January 2017 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain stainless steel tube and pipe buttwelding fittings, whether or not finished, originating in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, 2017 O.J (L 22/14).
143.
Id., ¶ 108.
144.
Id., ¶ 109. The Commission noted, “In this regard, the Commission notes that it has no discretion on whether or not to apply the current rules as set out in the basic Regulation. This claim was therefore rejected”.
145.
European Commission, Commission implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 of 5 April 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China, 2017 O.J (L 92) 68.
146.
Id., ¶ 28. As per Art. 2(7)(b) of the EU Anti-dumping Regulation, the exporting producers have to demonstrate in particular that: (i) business decisions and costs are made in response to market conditions and without significant State interference; (ii) firms have one clear set of basic accounting records which are independently audited in line with international accounting standards and are applied for all purposes; (iii) there are no significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system; (iv) bankruptcy and property laws guarantee legal certainty and stability and (v) exchange rate conversions are carried out at market rates.
147.
Id., ¶ 28.
148.
European Commission, Commission implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/804 of 11 May 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of iron (other than cast iron) or steel (other than stainless steel), of circular cross-section, of an external diameter exceeding 406,4 mm, originating in the People's Republic of China 2017 O.J (L 121) 3.
149.
Id., ¶ 36.
150.
Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Union, 2017 O.J (L338/1) 60 [hereinafter EU Regulation].
151.
Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union, (2013) 192 final (Apr. 10, 2013).
152.
The regulation sets out a non-exhaustive list of criteria, including i) the widespread presence of enterprises which the state owns or which operate under its control, policy supervision or guidance, ii) the presence of the state in companies allowing interference with respect to prices and costs, iii) public policies or measures discriminating in favour of domestic companies, or otherwise influencing free market forces, and iv) the access to finance granted by institutions implementing public policy objectives.
153.
EU Regulation, supra note 150, art. 2(6a(a)).
154.
Id., art. 2(6a(b)).
155.
European Commission Press Release, Commission welcomes agreement on new anti-dumping methodology, IP/17/3668 (Oct. 3, 2017).
156.
EU Regulation, supra note 150, art. 2(6(c)).
157.
Id., art. 2(6a(b)).
158.
Id., art. 2(6a(a)).
159.
European Commission Press Release, The EU’s new trade defence rules and first country report, MEMO/17/5377 (Dec. 20, 2017).
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of People’s Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, SWD (2017) 483 final (Dec., 20, 2017).
163.
Id., at 39.
164.
Id., at 84.
165.
Id., at 109.
166.
Id., at 109.
167.
Id., at 150.
168.
Id., at 168.
169.
Id., at 200.
170.
Id., at 310.
171.
EU fails to quit “analogue country” practice on China as required by WTO, China Daily (Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2016-12/13/content_27656900.htm.
172.
Gatta, supra note 42, at 238.
173.
Custom Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination of Injury) Rules, Gazette of India, section II(3)(i), ¶ 7, annexure 1 (Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Indian Anti-dumping Rules].
174.
World Trade Organization, Dumping Measures: Reporting Member v. Exporter (1/1/1995 – 31/12/2016), WTO Anti Dumping Gateway, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_MeasuresRepMemVsExpCty.pdf.
175.
Indian Anti-dumping Rules, supra note 173, rule 8 (3).
176.
Amendment to the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Anti-dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995, Customs Notification No. 1/2002 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., Apr. 1, 2001), http://commerce.gov.in/writereaddata/traderemedies/compendium/comp8.pdf.
177.
Indian Anti-dumping Rules, supra note 173, rule 8 (2), Annexure 1.
178.
Sunset review (SSR) investigation of the anti-dumping duties imposed on the imports of Saccharin from China PR ¶ 46 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., Dec. 30, 2017) (final finding) http://www.dgtr.gov.in/sites/default/files/adfin_ssr_saccharin_chinapr.pdf.
179.
Indian Anti-dumping Rules, supra note 173, ¶ 7, Annexure 1.
180.
For example see, Anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of Solar Cells, whether or not assembled partially or fully in Modules or Panels or on glass or some other suitable substrates, originating in or exported from Malaysia, China PR, Chinese Taipei and USA (Ministry of Com. & Indus., May 22, 2001) (final find.) [hereinafter DGAD Solar Cells]. http://commerce.nic.in/writereaddata/traderemedies/adfin_Solar_Cells_Malaysia_ChinaPR_Chinese_Taipei_USA.pdf
181.
The EU and US authorities took into account factors such as the distortions created by an income tax system that favours certain companies and that the financial statements of certain Chinese companies did not adhere to international accounting standards.
182.
DGAD Solar Cells, supra note 180, ¶ 46.
183.
Anti-Dumping Investigations concerning imports of Diethyl Thio Phosphoryl Chloride originating in or exported from China PR, ¶ 68 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., May 6, 2010) (final find.); Anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of “Albendazole” originating in on exported from China PR, ¶ 29 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., Nov. 5, 2015) (final find.) http://www.dgtr.gov.in/sites/default/files/adfin_Diethyl_Thio_Phosphoryl_Chloride_ChinaPR.pdf.
184.
Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping duty on imports of ‘Melamine’ originating in or exported from China PR ¶ 31 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., Dec. 5, 2015) (final find.) http://www.dgtr.gov.in/sites/default/files/adfin_SSR_2_melamine_chinaPR.pdf.
185.
Anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of “Wire Rod of Alloy or Non-Alloy Steel” originating in or exported from China PR, ¶ 35 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., Aug. 30, 2017) (final find.) http://www.dgtr.gov.in/sites/default/files/FF%20WR-NCV.pdf.
186.
Anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of Castings for Wind Operated Electricity Generators, whether or not machined, in raw, finished or subassembled form…from China PR, ¶ 54 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., Jul. 28, 2017) (final find.) http://www.dgtr.gov.in/sites/default/files/casting.pdf.
187.
Anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of “Color coated/ prepainted flat products of alloy or non-alloy steel” originating in or exported from China PR and European Union-reg, ¶ 30 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., Aug. 30, 2017) (final find.), http://www.dgtr.gov.in/sites/default/files/FF%20CC-%20NCV.pdf; Anti-dumping Investigation concerning imports of ‘Toulene Di-Isocyanate (TDI)’ originating in or exported from China PR, Japan or Korea RP, ¶ 29, (Ministry of Com. & Indus., Mar. 28, 2017) (final find.), Sunset Review investigation of Anti-dumping duty imposed on the imports of Certain Rubber Chemicals, namely, TDQ & PX-13 originating in or exported from the European Union and MOR and MBTS originating in or exported from the Peoples Republic of China, ¶ 42 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., Sep. 2, 2017) (final find.) http://www.dgtr.gov.in/sites/default/files/RC.NCVdona.final-english.pdf; Anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of “Wire Rod of Alloy or Non-Alloy Steel” originating in or exported from China PR, ¶ 38 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., Aug. 30, 2017) (final find.), http://www.dgtr.gov.in/sites/default/files/FF%20WR-NCV.pdf; Sunset Review of Anti-dumping duty imposed on the imports of Sodium Nitrite originating in or exported from China PR, ¶ 27 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., Jul. 19, 2017) (final find.), http://www.dgtr.gov.in/sites/default/files/SNI-NCV.FFV1_.pdf; Final Findings in the Sunset Review of Anti-dumping duty imposed on the imports of Pentaerythritol originating in or exported from China PR, ¶ 24 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., May 12, 2017) (final find.), http://www.dgtr.gov.in/sites/default/files/penta%20FF.V1_0.pdf; Sunset Review (SSR) Anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of ‘1– Phenyl-3-Methyl-5-Pyrazolone’ originating in or exported from China PR, ¶ 21 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., Aug. 9, 2017(final find.)), http://www.dgtr.gov.in/sites/default/files/Final%20Finding%20-NCV%20Ver.%20Final.pdf, Anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of Castings for Wind Operated Electricity Generators, whether or not machined, in raw, finished or subassembled form…from China PR, ¶ 56 (Ministry of Com. & Indus., July 28, 2017) (final find.), http://www.dgtr.gov.in/sites/default/files/casting.pdf.
188.
Anti-dumping Agreement, supra note 19, art. 2.2.
189.
Zhou and Percival, supra note 124, at 865.
190.
Request for Consultations by Indonesia, Australia – Anti-Dumping Measures on A4 Copy Paper, WTO Doc. WT/DS529/1 (Sep. 5, 2017).
191.
Anti-Dumping Commission, Alleged Dumping of A4 Copy Paper Exported from the Federative Republic of Brazil, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of Thailand (March 17, 2017), http://adcommission.gov.au/cases/EPR%20301%20%20350/EPR%20341/221%20-%20Report%20-%20Final%20Report%20-%20REP%20341.pdf, at 30.
192.
Request for Consultations by Indonesia, Australia – Anti-Dumping Measures on A4 Copy Paper, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS529/1 (Sep. 5, 2017).
193.
Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Trade of Australia and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China on the Recognition of China’s Full Market Economy Status and the Commencement of Negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the People’s Republic of China (Dep’t of For. Affairs & Trade, Apr. 18, 2005), https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/chafta/Documents/mou_aust-china_fta.pdf.
194.
Stephanie Noel and Weihuan Zhou, Replacing the Non-Market Economy Methodology: Is the European Union’s Alternative Approach Justified under the World Trade Organization Anti-dumping Agreement? 11 Global Trade & Customs J., 559, 560 (2016).
195.
Customs Act, 1901, s. 269TAC (1) (Austl.).
196.
Ibid., s. 269TAC(2)(a)(ii).
197.
Anti-Dumping Commission, Dumping and Subsidy Manual 35 (Nov. 2015), http://www.adcommission.gov.au/accessadsystem/Documents/Dumping%20and%20Subsidy%20Manual%20-%20April%202017.pdf.
198.
Noel and Zhou, supra note 194, at 561.
199.
Decision of the Trade Measures Review Officer – Hollow Structural Sections (Trade Measures Rev. Officer, Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.adcommission.gov.au/cases/Documents/TMRO-HollowStructuralSections-Decision14Dec12.pdf [hereinafter HSS Decision].
200.
Id.
201.
Id.
202.
Id., ¶ 110.
203.
Weihuan Zhou, Australia’s Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Law and Practice: An Analysis of Current Issues Incompatible with Free Trade with China 49(6) J. World Trade, 980, 988 (2015).
204.
Decision of the Trade Measures Review Officer – Aluminum Road Wheels (Trade Measures Rev. Officer, Dec., 2012), http://www.adcommission.gov.au/cases/Documents/TMROReportDecember2012.pdf.
205.
Id.
206.
Id., ¶¶ 95–96.
207.
Id., ¶ 100.
208.
Id., ¶ 98.
209.
Id., ¶ 99.
210.
Id., at 579.
211.
Zhou, supra note 203, at 988.
212.
In Appellate Body Report, United States — Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada ¶ 140, WTO Doc. WT/DS397/AB/R (adopted Jul. 28, 2011), the Appellate Body held,
where the producer of the input is not the same entity as the producer of the processed product, it cannot be presumed…that the subsidy bestowed on the input passes through to the processed product. In such case, it is necessary to analyse to what extent subsidies on inputs may be included in the determination of the total amount of subsidies bestowed upon the processed products….
213.
Zhou, supra note 203, at 988.
214.
Id., at 990.
215.
Dumping of Zinc Coated (Galvanised) Steel and Aluminum Zinc Coated Steel Exported from the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Report to the Minister No. 190, 60–63 (Austl. Customs & Border Protection Serv., Apr. 30, 2013). http://www.adcommission.gov.au/cases/Documents/142-REP190.pdf
216.
Zhou, supra note 203, at 990.
217.
EU — Biodiesel (AB Report), supra note 17, ¶ 6.76 and 6.76.
218.
Weihuan Zhou and Andrew Percival, Panel Report on EU-Biodiesel: A Glass Half Full? Implication for the Rising Issue of ‘Particular Market Situation’ 2 (2) Chinese J. Global Governance 142, 161 (2016).
219.
Noel and Zhou, supra note 194, at 561.
220.
Zhou, supra note 203, at 991.
221.
Zhou, supra note 203, at 985; Noel and Zhou, supra note 194, at 561.
222.
Noel and Zhou, supra note 194, at 587.
223.
Brazil recognizes China as market economy: Hu, Taipei Times (Nov. 14, 2004), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2004/11/14/2003211038.
224.
Embassy of People's Republic of China in Ireland, Brazil Recognizes China's Market Economy Status in the Memo (2004), http://ie.china-embassy.org/eng/jbwzlm/NewsPress/t170382.htm.
225.
International Bar Association - Divisions Project Team, Anti-Dumping Investigations Against China in Latin America (Feb. 1, 2010), 26 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1555619.
226.
International Trade Association, Business Guide to Trade Remedies in Brazil, 108 (2008), http://legacy.intracen.org/publications/Free-publications/Trade_Remedies_Brazil.pdf.
227.
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Notification Of Laws And Regulations under Article 18.5 Of The Agreement by Brazil, WTO Doc. G/ADP/N/1/BRA/3 (Sept. 20, 2013), http://enforcement.trade.gov/trcs/downloads/documents/brazil/GADPN1BRA3.pdf.
228.
Id., art. 4.
229.
Id., art. 15(1).
230.
Id., art. 16.
231.
Id., art. 17(1).
232.
Id., art. 15(3).
233.
Resolution No. 122 of December 18, 2014: Applies a trade defense measure, for a period of up to five (5) years, to Brazilian imports of technical porcelain, originating in the People's Republic of China (Ministry Indus., Foreign Trade & Serv., Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.camex.gov.br/component/content/article/62-resolucoes-da-camex/em-vigor/1446-resolucao-n-122-de-18-de-dezembro-de-2014 [hereinafter Technical Porcelain Decision].
234.
Id., ¶ 4.1.1.
235.
Id., ¶ 4.1.5.
236.
Id., ¶ 3.1.2; See Secretariat of Foreign Trade, Circular No. 59, dated 28 November 2001 (Nov., 2001), http://www.sice.oas.org/antidumping/legislation/brasil/SCX59_e.asp (Braz.). [hereinafter SECEX Circular] In the investigation, the producer/exporter under investigation and the respective government will be entitled to present elements of proof with the aim of requesting a reassessment of this qualification, involve information, inter alia, on exchange rates, interests, wages, prices, equity control, stock exchange, investment, price formation of relevant inputs and others that are considered adequate by the party or by SECEX. Article 3.3 of the SECEX Circular states, ‘for the assessment of the existence of market economy conditions, the following elements, “inter alia”, will be observed: (a) the degree of government control over the companies or over the means of production; (b) the level of state control over the allocation of resources, over prices and over the production decisions by companies; (c) the legislation to be applied in terms of ownership, investment, taxation and bankruptcy; (d) the degree of freedom in the determination of wages in negotiations between employers and employees; (e) the level at which distortions inherited from the centralized economy system persist in relation to, inter alia, assets amortization, other assets deductions, direct swap of assets and payments in the form of debt compensation; and (f) the level of state interference on currency exchange operations.
237.
Technical Porcelain Decision, supra note 233, ¶ 4.1.5.
238.
Turkey was chosen as a third market economy since the analysis of exports from Turkey showed that the country is proven to be globally representative in technical porcelain exports. In addition, in comparison with the other alternatives proposed, this country presents consumer market and socioeconomic conditions more similar to those existing in China. Russia was chosen as the country of destination since Russia represents the seventh largest importer of technical porcelain in the world in the period of investigation, which is closer to the volumes imported by Brazil.
239.
Resolution No. 46 of July 5, 2017: Extending a definitive anti-dumping duty for a period of up to five (5) years, applied to Brazilian imports of thermal bottles originating in the People's Republic of China (Ministry Indus., Foreign Trade & Serv., July 5, 2017), http://www.camex.gov.br/component/content/article/62-resolucoes-da-camex/em-vigor/1878-(resolucao-n-46-de-5-de-julho-de-2017.
240.
Id., ¶ 5.
241.
Resolution No. 07 of February 16, 2017: Extending a definitive anti-dumping duty for a period up to 5 (five) years in respect of Brazilian imports of viscose fabrics originating in the People’s Republic of China (Ministry Indus., Foreign Trade & Serv., Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.camex.gov.br/component/content/article/62-resolucoes-da-camex/em-vigor/1787-resolucao-n-07-de-16-de-fevereiro-de-2017.
242.
Resolution No. 5 of February 16, 2017: Imposes definitive anti-dumping duty for a period of up to five (5) years on Brazilian imports of tempered and rolled automotive glass originating in the People's Republic of China (Ministry Indus., Foreign Trade & Serv., Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.camex.gov.br/component/content/article/62-resolucoes-da-camex/em-vigor/1785-resolucao-n-05-de-16-de-fevereiro-de-2017.
243.
Id., ¶ 5.3.
244.
Id., ¶ 5.3.
245.
Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-15 (Can.) [hereinafter SIMA].
246.
Special Import Measures Regulations, SOR/84-927 (1984) (Can.) [hereinafter SIMR].
247.
Information on the Application of Section 20 of the Special Import Measures Act (“Non-market Economies”), August 2007, WTO, G/ADP/Q1/CAN/15, at 14.
248.
See SIMR, supra note 246, Regulation 17.1.
249.
See SIMR, supra note 246, Regulation 17.1, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-84-927/section-17.1-20060322.html#wb-cont.
250.
Regulations Amending the Special Import Measures Regulations, SOR/2013-81, s. 1 (2013)(Can.) http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2013/2013-05-08/html/sor-dors81-eng.html.
251.
See Regulations amending the Special Import Measures Regulations – Regulatory Impact and Analysis Statement (Jun. 14, 2013), http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2013/2013-05-08/html/sor-dors81-eng.html.
252.
Certain Silicon Metal Originating In Or Exported From The People's Republic Of China- Statement Of Reasons, AD1400/4214-39 (Can. Border. Serv. Agency, May 21, 2013).
253.
Large diameter carbon and alloy steel line pipe from China and Japan-Statement of Reasons, AD1408/4214-47 (Can. Border Serv. Agency, Nov. 28, 2016).
254.
Certain Polyethylene Terephthalate Resin Statement of Reasons, PETR 2017 IN (Can. Border Serv. Agency, Sep. 1, 2017).
255.
Certain Fabricated Industrial Steel Components-Statement of Reasons, FISC 2016 IN (Can. Border Serv. Agency, May 10, 2017).
256.
Certain Concrete Reinforcing Bar from Republic of Belarus (Belarus), Chinese Taipei, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain- Notice of Initiation of Section 20 Inquiry, RB 2017 RI (Can. Border Serv. Agency, Nov. 7, 2016).
257.
Panel Report, European Union — Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS473/R (adopted on Oct. 26, 2016).
258.
Id., ¶ 5.5.
259.
Id., ¶ 7.113.
260.
Id., ¶ 7.257.
261.
See generally Zhou and Percival, supra note 124.
262.
EU — Biodiesel (AB Report), supra note 17, ¶ 6.82 and 6.76.
263.
Id., ¶ 6.70.
264.
Id., ¶ 6.37.
265.
Id., ¶ 6.41.
266.
See Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China (preliminary determinations of sales at less than fair value) 56 Fed. Reg. 25,664, 25,667 (U.S. Dep’t Com., 1991)(prelim. deter.); Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 46,153, 46,154 (U.S. Dep’t Com., 1991)(final deter.).
267.
Submission of the United States, European Union – Measures related to Price Comparison Methodologies, WT/DS 516, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/WTO/US.Legal.Interp.Doc.fin.%28public%29.pdf.

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James J. Nedumpara & Archana Subramanian

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James J. Nedumpara
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Weihuan Zhou

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Nedumpara, J.J., Subramanian, A. (2018). China’s Long March to Market Economy Status: An Analysis of China’s WTO Protocol of Accession and Member Practices. In: Nedumpara, J., Zhou, W. (eds) Non-market Economies in the Global Trading System. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1331-8_2

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