China’s Interests in the South China Sea

Raditio, Klaus Heinrich

doi:10.1007/978-981-13-1283-0_4

Klaus Heinrich Raditio²

1561 Accesses

Abstract

Whether China is defensive or offensive realist state can be tested from its interests. This chapter discusses China’s interests in five main fields, namely resources, security, geopolitics, Taiwan, and the Party’s legitimacy.

This chapter concludes that from the above-mentioned examination, China’s interests in the South China Sea (SCS) are not necessarily offensive—as often depicted by Western media. Even though China’s military power and interests grow exponentially, since 1995 until 2012, China did not involve in a high-profile confrontation in the SCS. In addition, from an in-depth analysis on China’s interests, there are defensive factors that are often ignored.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Chapter: USD 29.95; Price excludes VAT (USA)

eBook: USD 99.00; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Softcover Book: USD 129.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Hardcover Book: USD 129.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
Haijiang Henry Wang, “The Perplexing Dispute over Oil,” Resources Policy, 23, no. 4 (1997): 173–78.
2.
International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2015,” https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEO2015SUM.pdf.
3.
IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2010” cited in Nick A. Owen and Clive H. Schofield, “Disputed South China Sea Hydrocarbons in Perspective,” Marine Policy, 36, no. 3 (2012): 809–22.
4.
PBS Newshour, “5 Things You Should Know About the SCS Conflict,” 16 May 2015, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/5-things-didnt-know-south-china-sea-conflict/ (accessed 1 August 2016).
5.
Li Guoqiang, “China Sea Oil and Gas Resources,” China Institute of International Studies, 11 May 2015, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-05/11/content_7894391.htm (accessed 4 August 2016).
6.
Owen and Schofield, “Disputed South China Sea Hydrocarbons in Perspective,” 809–22.
7.
Daojiong Zha, “China’s Energy Security: Domestic and International Issues,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 48, no. 1 (2006): 179–90.
8.
Owen and Schofield, “Disputed South China Sea Hydrocarbons in Perspective,” 809–22.
9.
Adam Greer, “The South China Sea Is Really a Fishery Dispute,” The Diplomat, 20 July 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-south-china-sea-is-really-a-fishery-dispute/ (accessed 3 August 2016).
10.
Ibid.
11.
Ibid.
12.
Ibid.
13.
Simon Denyer, “China’s Fishermen on the Front Line in the South China Sea,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 April 2016, http://www.smh.com.au/world/chinas-fishermen-on-the-front-line-in-the-south-china-sea-20160413-go52bp.html (accessed 16 July 2016).
14.
李昌新曹云华, “美国崛起中的海权因素初探,” 当代亚太, [Cao Yunhua, Li Changxin, “The Initial Thoughts of Maritime Factors in America’s Rising,” Jinri Guoshi], 5 (2006): 23–29.
15.
杨勇, “发挥海陆兼备优势是大型海陆复合国家的必然选择,” 黑龙江社会科学, [Yang Yong, “Capitalizing the Consolidated Land and Maritime Advantage Is the Inevitable Path of Big Powers,” Heilongjiang Shehui Kexue], no. 3 (2004): 26–29.
16.
“Continental Power: Wang Gungwu Interview,” Global ARC Quarterly, Fall 2012, http://www.cwaholt.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Wang-Gungwu.pdf (accessed 8 August 2016).
17.
Ibid.
18.
Dutton, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea,” 42.
19.
Wenmu Zhang, “Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices,” China Security, 2, no. 2 (2006): 17–31.
20.
“Continental Power: Wang Gungwu Interview,” Global ARC Quarterly, Fall 2012.
21.
“Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices,” 17–31.
22.
Ibid., 24.
23.
Michael A. Glosny, Phillip C. Saunders, and Robert S. Ross, “Correspondence: Debating China’s Naval Nationalism,” International Security, 35, no. 2 (2010): 161–69.
24.
Chris Rahman and Martin Tsamenyi, “A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the South China Sea,” Ocean Development & International Law, 41, no. 4 (2010): 315–33.
25.
“SCS: Expert Clash over China Threat to Commercial Trade,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 January 2016, http://www.smh.com.au/world/south-china-sea-experts-clash-over-china-threat-to-commercial-trade-20160113-gm4s9c.html (accessed 10 August 2016)
26.
倪乐雄, “中国“海上生命线”问题凸显,” 同舟共进, [Ni Lexiong, “The Emerging of China’s ‘Maritime Life Line’ Problem” Tongzhou Gongjin], 11 (2009): 16–17; “海权即生命,” 今日国土, [Ni Lexiong, “Maritime Rights Is Vital,” Jinri Guotu], no. 7 (2010): 16–17.
27.
Zhang, “Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices,” 17–31; James R Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “ ‘China’s Caribbean’ in the South China Sea,” SAIS REVIEW, 26, no. 1 (2006): 79.
28.
倪乐雄, “中国“海上生命线”问题凸显,”[Ni Lexiong, “The Emerging of China’s ‘Maritime Life Line’ Problem,” Tongzhou Gongjin], 16–17.
29.
US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, Washington, DC, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf (accessed 26 September 2016).
30.
Ibid.
31.
“Explaining China’s Participation in Anti-Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden,” (Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009), 5.
32.
“Chinese Navy Sets Sail for Anti-Piracy Mission off Somalia,” Xinhuanet, 26 December 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/26/content_10562510.htm (accessed 25 September 2016).
33.
“China Thanks Malaysia for Pirate Rescue,” The Star Online, 23 December 2008, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2008/12/23/china-thanks-malaysia-for-pirate-rescue/ (accessed 28 September 2016).
34.
“Explaining China’s Participation in Anti-Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden,” 12.
35.
“ ‘Blockade’ Ship’s Cash Call,” South China Morning Post, 15 August 1993, http://www.scmp.com/article/40507/blockade-ships-cash-call (accessed 20 September 2016).
36.
Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Maritime Security and the ‘Malacca Dilemma’,” Asian Security, 4, no. 2 (2008): 143–61.
37.
Gurpreet S. Khurana, “China’s New Submarine Base at Hainan: Analyses of Recent Media Reports,” (2008).
38.
Ibid.
39.
Mark Valencia, “The Impeccable Incident: Truth and Consequences,” China Security, 5, no. 2 (2009): 22–28.
40.
Ibid., 24.
41.
Ian Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors,” (DTIC Document, 2004), 78.
42.
Ibid.; Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Victoria: Black Inc., 2013), 67–68.
43.
Storey and Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors,” 86.
44.
Ibid., 78; 倪乐雄, “海权即生命,” [Ni Lexiong, “Maritime Rights is Vital,” Jinri Guotu], 16–17.
45.
Joshua P. Rowan, “The US-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute,” Asian Survey, 45, no. 3 (2005): 414–36.
46.
Rahman and Tsamenyi, “A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the South China Sea,” 315–33.
47.
Rowan, “The US-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute,” 414–36.
48.
Holmes and Yoshihara, “ ‘China’s Caribbean’ in the South China Sea,” 79.
49.
John W. Garver, “China’s Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests,” The China Quarterly, 132 (1992): 999–1028.
50.
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics,” Orbis, 49, no. 4 (2005): 677–94. Liu Huaqing, the Chinese Admiral who served as commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from 1982–1988 and became a member of the Politburo Standing Committee afterwards until 1997 was known as the father of the modern Chinese Navy as well as the “Chinese Mahan”.
51.
Ibid.
52.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little Brown, and Company, 1890; reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1987), 71 cited in Holmes and Yoshihara, “ ‘China’s Caribbean’ in the South China Sea,” 79.
53.
Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs, 89, no. 3 (2010): 22–41.
54.
Storey and Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors,” 86.
55.
Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” 22–41.
56.
Jiang Shiliang, “The Command of Communications,” China Military Science, 2 October 2002, cited in Holmes and Yoshihara, “‘China’s Caribbean’ in the South China Sea,” 79.
57.
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Chinese Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century: The Turn to Mahan (London: Routledge, 2008), 74.
58.
“Can China Defend a ‘Core Interest’ in the South China Sea?” The Washington Quarterly, 34, no. 2 (2011): 45–59.
59.
Ibid., 48.
60.
US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf (accessed 2 January 2017).
61.
“Can China Defend a ‘Core Interest’ in the South China Sea?” 45–59.
62.
White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, 67.
63.
It is too early to assess the direction of the US-Philippines Defence Cooperation under President Duterte. He might distance himself from Washington, but he might not touch the defense cooperation between two countries. See Prashanth Parameswaran, “Recalibrating US-Philippine Alliance under Duterte,” Rappler, 1 October 2016, http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/147840-recalibrating-us-philippine-alliance-duterte (accessed 15 October 2016).
64.
Yoshihara and Holmes, “Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics,” 677–94.
65.
Zhang, “Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices,” 17–31; Yoshihara and Holmes, “Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics,” 677–94.
66.
Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to US Maritime Strategy (Naval Institute Press, 2011), 53.
67.
Ibid., 21.
68.
倪乐雄, “国家海权战略的当代转型与威慑作用,” 国际观察, [Ni Lexiong, “The Modern Transformation and Deterrence Function of Maritime Strategy,” Guoji Guancha], (2012).
69.
Ibid.
70.
Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” 22–41; Yoshihara and Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to US Maritime Strategy, 6–7.
71.
Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism,” International Security, 23, no. 3 (1998): 114.
72.
“Outgoing Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou Visits Remote and Disputed Islands to ‘Assert Taipei’s Sovereignty’,” South China Morning Post, 9 April 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1934938/outgoing-taiwan-president-ma-ying-jeou-visits-remote-and-disputed-islands (accessed 19 October 2016).
73.
Interview with an Indonesian diplomat in Beijing, November 2015.
74.
Edward Wong, “China Hedges over Whether South China Sea Is a “Core Interest” Worth War,” The New York Times, 30 March 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/asia/31beijing.html?_r=0 (accessed 5 April 2016).
75.
Jessica Chen Welss, “Here’s What China’s People Really Think About the South China Sea,” The Washington Post, 14 July 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/14/heres-what-chinas-people-really-think-about-the-south-china-sea/ (accessed 19 July 2016).
76.
Bruce Gilley and Heike Holbig, “The Debate on Party Legitimacy in China: A Mixed Quantitative/Qualitative Analysis,” Journal of Contemporary China, 18, no. 59 (2009): 339–58.
77.
Ibid.
78.
Erik Beukel, “Popular Nationalism in China and the Sino-Japanese Relationship,” (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2011), 24.
79.
“Legality of China’s Claims in SCS ‘Not Weak’: George Yeo,” The Strait Times, 3 June 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/legality-of-chinas-claims-in-south-china-sea-not-weak-george-yeo (accessed 19 October 2016).
80.
Robert Sutter, “China’s Self-Absorbed Nationalism,” The Diplomat, 31 August 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/chinas-self-absorbed-nationalism/ (accessed 17 May 2016).
81.
Downs and Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism,” 114.
82.
Beukel, “Popular Nationalism in China and the Sino-Japanese Relationship,” 20.
83.
Ibid., 22.
84.
Suisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn,” Journal of Contemporary China, 22, no. 82 (2013): 535–53.
85.
Sutter, “China’s Self-Absorbed Nationalism,” The Diplomat, 31 August 2012.
86.
Bilahari Kausikan, “Pavlovian Conditioning and ‘Correct Thinking’ on the SCS,” The Strait Times, 1 April 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/pavlovian-conditioning-and-correct-thinking-on-the-south-china-sea (accessed 28 September 2016).
87.
Holmes and Yoshihara, “‘China’s Caribbean’ in the South China Sea,” 79; Jian Yang, “China’s Security Challenges: Priorities and Policy Implications,” Asia Pacific Countries’ Security Outlook and Its Implications for the Defense Sector, (2010): 141–59.
88.
Holmes and Yoshihara, “‘China’s Caribbean’ in the South China Sea,” 79.
89.
Shigeo Hiramatsu, “China’s Advances in the South China Sea: Strategies and Objectives,” Asia Pacific Review, 8, no. 1 (2001): 40–50.
90.
Ibid.
91.
US Department of Defense, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue “A Regional Security Architecture Where Everyone Rises” as delivered by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, 30 May 2015, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Article/606676 (accessed 9 November 2016).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Klaus Heinrich Raditio

Authors

Klaus Heinrich Raditio
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Raditio, K.H. (2019). China’s Interests in the South China Sea. In: Understanding China’s Behaviour in the South China Sea. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1283-0_4

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1283-0_4
Published: 26 August 2018
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-13-1282-3
Online ISBN: 978-981-13-1283-0
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics