Abstract
Corruption plagues both developed and developing countries. It is a serious obstacle to China’s development, perilous to ignore. However, characterised by the most secretive types of behaviour, studying corruption is particularly difficult. Applying the vector autoregressive model (VAR) to consecutive 36-month data, we analyse empirically the corruption status quo and its impact in China. We find a short-term negative impact of the current anti-corruption campaign in China on the economic growth of its state-owned industries, while any positive effect, e.g. improving the quality of economic growth, can not be demonstrated. The objective data used reduce significantly the confusion surrounding traditional (anti-)corruption studies, which have relied heavily on survey data or subjective evaluation.
The data, statistical code and supporting information can be found at Harvard Dataverse (view at doi:https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MK1NBK). The author thanks Dr. Weimin Jiang and Mike Bastin for the contribution to the earlier version.
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- 1.
Global Corruption Barometer 2013 Report <https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/report> [1 June 2014].
- 2.
Bid data on anti-corruption in 2015 <http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0115/c1001-28057743.html> [1 May 2016].
- 3.
Zhou Yongkang is a retired senior leader of the Communist Party of China (CPC). He was a member of the 17th Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), China’s highest decision-making body, and the Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (Zheng fawei) between 2007 and 2012.
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Appendix 1: The Economic Impact of Anti-corruption Campaigns: New Materials for New Research Agendas in China
Appendix 1: The Economic Impact of Anti-corruption Campaigns: New Materials for New Research Agendas in China
Spline interpolant (January 2014, 2015) data on income, costs and management fees, respectively; The spots in the figures are the filling data
The following are the monthly data showing the number of CPC discipline punishments, the main business income and costs and the management fees of state-owned industrial enterprises employed in cointegration VECM in the body of this chapter. Since the latter three have missing data in January of both years, we use the method of spline interpolant (by adding the data of December 2013 to improve the accuracy) (Table 3.11).
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Zang, L. (2019). The Economic Impact of Anti-corruption Campaigns: New Materials for New Research Agendas in China. In: Re-understanding of Contemporary Chinese Political Development . Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1250-2_3
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