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Do Judges Need to Be Human? The Implications of Technology for Responsive Judging

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Book cover The Responsive Judge

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 67))

Abstract

Judicial responsiveness requires judges to act from the perspective of conscious legal rationality and also with intuition, empathy and compassion. To what extent will the judicial role change in terms of responsiveness as many aspects of human activity, including aspects of the work of lawyers and judges, are not only augmented, but even taken over entirely by replacement technologies ? Such technologies are already reshaping the way the legal profession operates, with implications for judges by virtue of how cases are prepared and presented. In relation to courts, the judicial role is also being augmented, and modified, by technological advances, including the growth of online adjudication. There has even been speculation that the role of the judge not only could be taken online, but as computing techniques become more sophisticated, be fully automated. The role of the human judge though is not merely that of a data processor. To reduce judging to such a definition would be to reject not only the humanity of the judge, but also that of all those who come before them. A better understanding of the essential humanity of the judge will help ensure that technology plays a principled and appropriate role in advancing a responsive justice system. Insights from psychoanalytical thought will aid in that understanding, and in developing the code that drives future applications of artificial intelligence in judicial processes.

This Chapter also draws upon material in T. Sourdin (2018) forthcoming.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a helpful discussion of this issue see Sourdin and Zariski (2013).

  2. 2.

    See ‘Responsiveness and the jurisprudence of judging’ in Chapter “What is Responsive Judging?” of this book. For an overview see also Leiter (2010). Our concern in this chapter is primarily with the challenge of coding legal rules and reasoning, and how that touches on the formalism/realism debate. A further chapter would be required to engage in detail with the question of fact finding by Judge AI. On the essential relationship between facts and law Frank (1949, 14) noted that, “a legal rule… is a conditional statement referring to facts”. Facts may be even more uncertain than legal rules (see also Frank 1930, viii–xiii), and are arguably even less amenable to Judge AI. Our argument in this chapter about the limits of Judge AI in relation to coding legal reasoning must apply with even greater force regarding facts. From a computer science perspective see also MacCrimmon and Tillers (2002).

  3. 3.

    See also, for example, Tamburro (2012) for an analysis of computer-assisted document coding and review, often referred to as “predictive coding” with implications for the discovery process. The analysis of large sets of data is likely to have a “game-changing” impact. The technology collapses the time (and costs) needed to review millions of pages of discovered material, to identify relevant aspects without devoting massively costly person hours.

  4. 4.

    State v Loomis (2016). See critique in State v Loomis (2017) and Brooks (2017). The US Supreme Court declined to take the issue up: see Loomis v Wisconsin (2017).

  5. 5.

    We do not have space here to pursue this in detail. The essence of the critique is that executives (governments), for possibly quite innocent concerns of managerial efficiency can tend to view the work of the courts as merely part of the overall justice sector, including the police and prisons, and not as the operating of a distinct branch of the state. See discussion in Elias (2017).

  6. 6.

    It has been said that collaborative platforms, such as GroupMindExpress.com, are likely to be used more frequently in large multi-party disputes where information and participants are plentiful (Gaitenby 2004).

  7. 7.

    For an example of one mechanism supporting disputants, see MyLawBC (n.d.), available at: http://mylawbc.com/info/about.php.

  8. 8.

    The reforms fell because of the snap election called in 2017.

  9. 9.

    For further discussion, see Sourdin (2015b).

  10. 10.

    Tierney (2011) refers to a study of parole board decision-making reported in Danziger et al. (2011).

  11. 11.

    The researchers in this area suggest that there may be a bias away from attractive same sex individuals and a bias towards attractive other sex individuals.

  12. 12.

    For an interesting discussion of this phenomenon, see Brooks (2011, 220).

  13. 13.

    See also Smith (2016) regarding the use of algorithms in relation to recidivism.

  14. 14.

    For an interesting overview on affective technology, see Wikipedia (2017), quoting Picard (1997).

  15. 15.

    For a successful apparent bias challenge on the basis that a judge so clearly disliked aspects of criminal defendants’ rights protected in the European Convention on Human Rights, that a fair trial was not possible before an appellate court containing that judge, see: Hoekstra v. H.M. Advocate (No.2) (2000) S.L.T. 605; discussed in MacQueen and Wortley (1998).

  16. 16.

    Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 7C(2).

  17. 17.

    See discussion in Le Sueur and Cornes (2000, 53–97).

  18. 18.

    See, for example, Perry (2017), which provides a thorough treatment of the issues involved in translating law into computer code.

  19. 19.

    It is argued that the information that may be considered by a judge has expanded significantly in recent years. See, for example, Tashea (2016).

  20. 20.

    Contrast, for example, the views of Musk and Zuckerberg, outlined in Domonoske (2017) and Solon (2017).

  21. 21.

    While certainly linked to a number of laudable aims, and noting sensitivity issues in relation to, for example, medical data, see the proposals for “Data Trusts” in the UK to better facilitate data sharing provided by Hall and Pesenti (2017).

  22. 22.

    For an interesting critique of modern attitudes toward knowledge sharing, see Leith (2017).

  23. 23.

    See also Foer’s (2017) sustained critique of Big Tech; and from fiction, Eggers (2013).

  24. 24.

    For coverage of this event, see the European Commission (2017) and Vogel (2017).

  25. 25.

    For news see Future of Life Institute (n.d.-a).

  26. 26.

    See, for example: Baum (1998, 2008); and contributors in Klein and Mitchell (2010).

  27. 27.

    For some reasons as to why psychoanalytic-legal work receded after the 1960s see Weisstub et al. (2016), and in response, Sourdin and Cornes (2016). There is also a long running debate about the value of psychoanalysis and Freud’s insights per se. A good place to start for the contentions on either side is Menand (2017). It will be apparent from our discussion that we do see value in psychoanalytical concepts in assisting to better understand the work of judges.

  28. 28.

    See discussion in Freud (1923) and Frosh (2012, Chap. 7).

  29. 29.

    Space does not allow a wider discussion here of the nature of legal education, but for a CLS perspective see Kennedy (1982).

  30. 30.

    See discussion in Freud (2002, 2008).

  31. 31.

    For a neuro-psychoanalytical view of the unconscious see Solms (2013).

  32. 32.

    For further elucidation see discussion of the concepts of “fantasy” and “phantasy” in Brenner (2003).

  33. 33.

    See Portia’s speech on mercy in Shakespeare’s, The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Sc1, ll2125-46.

  34. 34.

    The role of the social unconscious and confidence in “the judge” is set out in detail in Cornes and Henaghan (forthcoming).

  35. 35.

    See e.g., New South Wales Department of Justice (n.d.) and Whitbourn (2015) for further detail on the new online court websites in New South Wales. The Federal Court of Australia has had an e-courtroom and expanding online lodgement services for some years, see Federal Court of Australia (n.d).

  36. 36.

    Issues about robot ethics are currently the subject of some limited discussion. See Devlin (2016).

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Sourdin, T., Cornes, R. (2018). Do Judges Need to Be Human? The Implications of Technology for Responsive Judging. In: Sourdin, T., Zariski, A. (eds) The Responsive Judge. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 67. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1023-2_4

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