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Cyber-Physical Energy Internet

  • Qiuye SunEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Renewable Energy Sources & Energy Storage book series (RESES)

Abstract

With the development of information technology, there are many important technology innovations in plenty of industries. The more innovations are used in industry, the harder we research information technology and traditional industry technology separately. So there is a new concept: Cyber-Physical Systems which are integrations of computation and physical processes [1]. These systems always integrate computer, communication and control technologies. As mentioned before, Energy Internet borrows from features of the Internet [2]. Many key technology features of Energy Internet are realized or will be realized by using Information Technology and more and more embedded computers have been designed into Energy Internet [3]. So Energy Internet which integrates energy technology and information technology can be seen as a complicated cyber-physical system. For the complicated cyber-physical system, there are many research interests in the new field. In this chapter, we explore some cyber-physical characteristics of Energy Internet mainly including the structure of cyber-physical energy internet, the relationship of the cyber resources and physical resources and the cyber security and safety of Energy Internet. In these characteristics, the security and safety of Energy Internet has attracted the attention of researchers and engineers. As Energy Internet presents an increased dependency on cyber resources which may be vulnerable to attack [4], the cyber-physical security and safety have become a new hot issue and this issue may include but not limited to the analysis of the influence of physical system by the cyber calculated attacks and the influence of structure failures to the whole system. Here we mainly analyze one of the calculated attacks for the some sub-system of Energy Internet.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.College of Information Science and EngineeringNortheastern UniversityShenyangChina

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