Abstract
This chapter focuses its description on the relationship between intellectuals and marginalised community groups especially in the case of Lapindo mud victims in Porong sub-district of Sidoarjo. This chapter explains the role and position of the intellectuals as agents of the social movements which see themselves as intellectuals who are striving to facilitate the marginalised groups to fight for their interests and aspirations in governance practices especially as citizens victimised by Lapindo mudflow disaster.
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Notes
- 1.
The historical context of Indonesia’s intellectuals during the New Order era (the 1970s up to the 1990s) demonstrates the importance of NGOs as bases for intellectuals who organise civil society and criticise the government. The origin of Indonesia’s modern NGOs in the New Order era can be traced back to the early 1970s, when many intellectuals and former student activists who had been politically aligned with the military in 1965–66 tried to promote the ideology of modernisation outside the New Order political system. The reason intellectuals and former student activists were creating NGOs was because other spaces for political participation in the Soeharto political system were so narrow. The first wave of NGOs tended to compromise with the state, by also promoting the ideology of modernisation. However, since the 1970s and the failure of modernisation promises to deliver change for marginalised groups, a shift in orientation has occurred among intellectuals in NGOs-based on populist agendas. This trend has positioned intellectuals based within NGOs to challenge the elitism of the modernisation tradition and has created radical critics of the authoritarian regime (Aspinall 2005: 90; Eldridge 1995: 38–39). This critical tendency among NGOs was most marked in the 1990s—during the later years of the Soeharto era, after the New Order regime implemented keterbukaan, its ‘openness’ era. The willingness of intellectuals inside NGOs to criticise the government tradition was triggered also by corruption within the state realm—by the ruling party Golkar, the military and the bureaucracy, with land grabbing by military officers and the state apparatus—and by the absence of independent political parties inside the political system. This political situation contributed to the radicalisation of intellectuals in non-government and campus organisations and study clubs, and in political organisations such as PRD (People’s Democratic Party), which evolved into a critical culture of discourse towards the state in the New Order era. This situation contributed to the rise of NGOs as part of an alternative tradition among Indonesia intellectuals, one which tried to articulate marginalised people’s interests (Eldridge 1995; Dhakidae 2003: 509).
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
The expert witness to the court, Ir Agus Guntoro, a lecturer of geology in the Engineering Department of Trisakti University, convinced the panel of judges that the Lapindo mudflow was triggered by a Yogyakarta earthquake on May 27, 2006, and completely unrelated to human error. His explanation was backed by other experts, including Prof. Dr. Ir Sukendar Asikin, a professor of geology from the Engineering Department of the Institute of Bandung Engineering.
- 8.
This Indonesian NGO focuses on environmental and ecological problems in Indonesia. It was established in November 1980.
- 9.
Tjuk Sukiadi is senior lecturer in economics at the Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Airlangga. Ali Akbar Azhar is the author of Konspirasi SBY-Bakrie, a book which reports on the predatory oligarchy collaborations in the Lapindo mudflow case. Soeharto is a retired marine general who became involved in the fight to defend the Lapindo mudflow victims. Both Sukiadi and Azhar are among the activists who supported the efforts of Lapindo mudflow victims, including participating in the victims’ group which claimed that Lapindo Brantas Incorporated was guilty of causing the Lapindo mudflow disaster through its resource exploration near the mudflow site.
- 10.
Rakyat Merdeka Online, (2012, December 12). Putusan MK soal lumpur Lapindo dinginkan Porong. Retrieved from http://www.rmol.co/read/2012/12/13/89851/GKLL:-Putusan-MK-Soal-Lumpur-Lapindo-Dinginkan-Porong
- 11.
The emergence of Bakrie as a prominent domestic business player in Indonesia is connected historically to the introduction by Soeharto of Presidential Decisions (Keppres) 14, 14a and 10 in 1979 and 1990. Under the terms of Soeharto Keppres, the State Secretariat assumed control of allocation of contracts and of supply and construction related to government projects. The primary mechanism for allocation of the contracts was the so-called Team Ten. The State Secretariat’s important position within Soeharto’s complex politico-business relationships lay also in its control over Banpres (the Presidential Assistance Fund). This fund was an important access mechanism through which extra-budgetary funding was channelled to the president, to be spent as he pleased. However, the primary social impact of Sekneg and Team Ten’s authority lay in the recruitment and consolidation of the pribumi (indigenous/non-ethnic Chinese) business group, with regard to allocation of contracts for supply and construction. Sekneg and Team Ten used their authority and control to assist the pribumi bourgeoisie, who were linked to the Soeharto patronage system and the Soeharto family. Under Soeharto’s politico-business relations, some figures were connected to the aforementioned domestic bourgeois family, and to the former Pertamina Director Ibnu Sutowo. Among these business figures were Fadel Muhammad, Imam Taufik, Arifin Panigoro and, most important of all, Aburizal Bakrie (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 59–60; Winters 1996: 123–41). Bakrie’s business empire developed in the Soeharto era. Based on his connection with the inner circle of Soeharto’s oligarchical relations, Bakrie became an important supplier of steel pipes to Pertamina and expanded his interests though his involvement with the Soeharto family in plantations, mining, cattle ranching, oil distribution for Pertamina, and shares in Freeport mining (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 85–86). Bakrie’s access to New Order state power was further strengthened by his position in political arenas. He became one of the pribumi bourgeois layers and Soeharto cronies who took MPR seats as representatives of functional group delegates in 1997 (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 141–42). After Soeharto’s fall, Bakrie maintained his position and power. It is widely believed that one factor which made this possible was the subsidised credits which he obtained from the Minister of Co-operatives, Adi Sasono, during the short Habibie presidency. Bakrie’s successful adaptation in the post-Soeharto era is also widely believed to be related to his transition-era role as head of Kadin under the Habibie presidency. During this time, there was a general flood of capital from Chinese entrepreneurs out of Indonesia. As head of Kadin and Indonesia’s largest pribumi conglomerate , Bakrie called on the government to redistribute the Chinese conglomerates’ assets to pribumi (ethnically Indonesian, non-Chinese) entrepreneurs, in order to overcome the economic crisis. Bakrie even stated that the Chinese exodus was a golden opportunity for pribumi entrepreneurs to redistribute Chinese assets to pribumis. President Habibie took a similar attitude and arranged a meeting with Kadin in July 1998, stating that if the businessmen did not return in two weeks, he would instruct Kadin to take over the distribution of basic commodities. In terms of concrete policy, BULOG decided to allocate a quota of rice and other commodities to pribumi entrepreneurs (Eklof 2003: 232).
- 12.
Interview with Herlambang Perdana Wiratraman, a member of the Progressive Lecturers’ Union, July 10, 2013.
- 13.
Taufik Basari S.H. the officer of YLBHI in ‘Majelis Hakim Tolak Gugatan Lumpur Lapindo’ (The Panel of Judges Rejected the Lapindo Mud Lawsuit), on November 27, 2007, kapanlagi.com
- 14.
Faiq Assidiqi, Division Co-Ordinator of Land and Environment (LBH), Surabaya. Iddaily.net , December 31, 2008.
- 15.
Private communication with Ambo Tang Daeng Matteru, November 17, 2013.
- 16.
This group also obtained support from several senior lecturers at Airlangga University who contributed to Lapindo victim advocacy, including prominent sociologist Professor Soetandyo Wignjosoebroto and economics Professor Tjuk Kasturi Sukiadi .
- 17.
Interview with Herlambang Perdana Wiratraman, a member of the Progressive Lecturers’ Union, July 10, 2013, and Joeni Arianto Koerniawan, Co-ordinator of the Progressive Lecturers’ Union, September 17, 2013.
- 18.
Interview with Joeni Arianto Koerniawan, Co-ordinator of the Progressive Lecturers’ Union, SDP, September 17, 2013.
- 19.
PT Minarak Lapindo Jaya, a subsidiary of PT Lapindo Brantas Corporation, was responsible for distributing compensation payment on behalf of the latter, under a number of different schemes (www.tribunnews.com, June 19, 2015 ‘Menteri Basuki panggil PT Minarak Lapindo Jaya dalam waktu dekat’) (Basuki Minister Called PT Minarak Lapindo Jaya in the Near Future).
- 20.
The book in which this appears is entitled Bencana Industri: Kekalahan Negara dan Masyarakat Sipil dalam penanganan Lumpur Lapindo (Industrial Disaster: The State and Civil Society Defeat in the Lapindo Mudflow-Handling Processes). This book was published through a collaboration between local intellectuals in East Java and the Desantara Foundation (an activist publisher which has close connections with the religious organisation Nahdlatul Ulama).
- 21.
Interview with Joeni Arianto Koerniawan, the Co-ordinator of the Progressive Lecturers’ Union, SDP, September 17, 2013.
- 22.
Maiwa News, WALHI Pantau Keadilan Ekologis dan Lingkungan Hidup (Walhi Monitoring Ecological Justice and Environment).
- 23.
Interview with Oni Mahardhika, the Coordinator of East Java Walhi (Environmental Forum), November 23, 2012.
- 24.
Interview with Herlambang Perdana Wiratraman in Jakarta, August 10, 2013.
- 25.
Personal communication with Joeni Arianto Koerniawan, March 16, 2015.
- 26.
Interview with Oni Mahardhika, the Director of East Java Walhi, November 23, 2012.
- 27.
Pengujian UU APBN Bisa Rugikan Korban Lapindo (hukumonline.com, June 20, 2012) (The Legal Examination on National Budget Act can harm the Lapindo Victims).
- 28.
Bakrie Sudah Habis Rp. 6.2 Triliun untuk Korban Lapindo (Republika, September 10, 2009) (Bakrie has spent Rp. 6.2 Trillion for Lapindo victims).
- 29.
Pengujian UU APBN Bisa Rugikan Korban Lapindo (The Legal Examination on National Budget Act Can Harm the Lapindo Victims) (hukumonline.com, June 20, 2012).
- 30.
See ‘GKLL: Putusan MK Soal Lumpur Lapindo Dinginkan Porong’ (GKLL: Decision of the Constitutional Court on Lapindo Mudflow calms Porong) (RMOL.CO December 13, 2012).
- 31.
Menuntut Tanggung Jawab Lapindo (Kanal/Volume 1/August 2008) (Demand for Lapindo Responsibility).
- 32.
Paring Waluyo Utomo, Bangkit Ditengah Keterpurukan (The Victims Rise after the Downturn). Op.cit, 188–89.
- 33.
Rois Hariyanto’s accusation towards Emha Ainun Nadjib has been refuted by Khoirul Huda, who said that GKLL never collected cash from people in order to give cash to Nadjib personally. As Huda states, the cash collected from the people by GKLL had been used for group activities. Further, Huda stated that Nadjib’s role in liaising between GKLL and Minarak Lapindo Jaya and the then-President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono showed clearly that he was only a mediator and never directed the solution to the Lapindo Brantas Corporation (Mubahalah Kasus Lumpur Lapindo, August 12, 2008, bangbangwetan.com).
- 34.
Keluarga Bakrie Buka Puasa dengan Korban Lumpur (kompas.com, September 9, 2009) (Bakrie Family Iftar with Mudflow Victims).
- 35.
As mentioned previously, the terms of compensation have been changed from 20 per cent in upfront cash and 80 per cent in instalments to a ‘cash and resettlement’ mechanism, whereby Minarak Lapindo Jaya paid only a 20 per cent down payment and would then build housing as part of a resettlement scheme for Lapindo mudflow victims.
- 36.
The Pagar Rekontrak members was 600 family, compared with the much higher 11,000 family for GKLL.
- 37.
However, it should be noted that the commitment between GKLL and the state to approve Keppres No.14/2007 had been made before another dispute between the GKLL , Geppress and PT MLJ due to the other agreement between the company and GKLL , which changed the terms of compensation from cash and carry into cash and resettlement, which resulted in the split between the GKLL and Geppress.
- 38.
The traders’ market in Porong Sidoarjo had been used to accommodate the victims of the Lapindo mudflow. Subsequently, this market became the base camp of the Pagar Rekontrak group.
- 39.
Interview with Joeni Arianto Koerniawan, Co-ordinator of the Progressive Lecturers’ Union, SDP, September 17, 2013.
- 40.
State policy on Lapindo was framed by Keppres number 13/2006 and Perpres number 16/2007, which do not clarify whether the disaster was natural or triggered by human error. Policy was formulated gradually, based on the situation in the territories flooded by mud. The chronology of regulatory policies regarding the Lapindo case after September 8, 2006, includes the government-produced Presidential Decree number 13/2006, which concerned technical and social problems and set up a national team to handle the Sidoarjo mudflow financed by Lapindo Brantas. The government appointed the Badan Penanggulangan Lumpur Sidoarjo (The Agency of Lapindo Mud Prevention) as a representative body. The administration and infrastructure were to be financed from the national budget, while Lapindo Brantas was responsible for land-house transactions and earthworks to remove the mudflow. On July 17, 2008, the government issued Presidential Regulation number 48/2008, which related to additional substantial compensation for Lapindo victims and the people of Porong. This policy identified new victims as being the people who lived in areas that became submerged by mud flood after March 22, 2007 (as stated by Presidential Regulation number 14/2007), whose restoration should be financed from the national budget, with Lapindo Brantas only financing technical matters. This regulation was reinforced by Presidential Regulation number 40/2009, which regulates additional extensive compensation. This regulation appoints the BPLS to handle compensation for areas outside the Lapindo mudflow impact map. The compensation was to be financed only from the national budget.
- 41.
Gustomy, Rachmad (2010: 70–71). The intellectuals’ activities in the Lapindo Brantas social network are discussed in a previous section.
- 42.
Interview with Herlambang Perdana Wiratraman in Jakarta, August 10, 2013.
- 43.
Interview with JI, an employee of Lapindo Brantas (February 13, 2013); interview with Professor Soetandyo Wignjosoebroto, Professor of Sociology, Airlangga University, who was invited by Lapindo Brantas to make a commitment to support Bakrie at the Shangri-la meeting, but who declined the invitation (January 3, 2013).
- 44.
Interview with JI, an employee of Lapindo Brantas (February 13, 2013); interview with Herlambang Perdana Wiratraman in Jakarta, August 10, 2013.
- 45.
Such accounts contradict news published by the national daily newspaper Kompas. According to Kompas, on June 2, 2013, victims of the disaster numbered 11,881 families who were still waiting for Lapindo Brantas to fulfil its promises to them for payment for their submerged land as per purchase agreements. The newspaper reported that many people became trapped in a pattern of unemployment, and many experienced depression. Kompas also suggested that the economic benefit from new economic opportunities for the local population was limited at best. However, Kompas also devoted space to the arguments on the subject made by the prominent Airlangga University Political Science lecturer QE. Arguing along Neo-Institutionalist lines, he suggested that all strategic actors must collaborate and create networks of governance in order to construct a solution for the general interest. He also said that strategic actors must identify what kind of aspirations could be included to reach a broad solution.
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Kusman, A.P. (2019). Intellectuals and the Disorganised Social Movements in East Java: The Lapindo Mudflow Case. In: The Vortex of Power. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0155-1_7
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