Abstract
This chapter devoted to describe the interlinkages between development, migration, and conflict. It is specifically looking at the events that occurred in the mid-1990s at a time when the Suharto authoritarian government seems unchallenged. While the explanation on the realm of development, migration, and conflict is theoretical in nature, the realities that experiences in the mid-1990s are factual. The chapter basically argued that national development backed up by the centralization of political power easily led to social and economic disparities between regions. The old dichotomy is between Java and other islands, since the New Order is generally shifted into the dichotomy between more prosperous Western Indonesia and less prosperous Eastern Indonesia. Migration, as a natural response from the population to differences in spatial development, reflects the gap in human endowment between migrants and nonmigrants, between settlers and local communities. Social tensions and conflicts that flare up in several places in Eastern Indonesia strongly related with the realm of development and migration that are crucially interlinked within the Suharto’s repressive state.
Archipelagic in geography, eclectic in civilization and heterogeneous in culture, Indonesia flourishes when it accepts and capitalizes on its diversity and disintegrates when it denies and suppresses it …
Clifford Geertz (Quoted in Mackie (1980: 669))
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- 1.
After the Soviet Union broke up at the end of the 1980s, Indonesia became the fourth most densely populated country in the world, after China , India and the United States. In Indonesia, ethnicity has been omitted from the national census questionnaire as it is believed to potentially endanger social and national cohesion. The census, however, seeks information on language used at home and religious affiliation. According to the 1990 census, Javanese is spoken by the majority (40%), followed by Sundanese (25%), Indonesian (13%), Madurese (4.3%) and Batak (2.2 per cent), with the rest spoken by other minority ethnic groups. In the case of Chinese , there is no statistical data but the number is believed to be between 2 and 3%.
- 2.
Pancasila consists of five principles: belief in one God, a just and civilised humanity, national unity, people’s rule through consultation and representation and social justice. In 1990, the distribution of population according to religion was as follows: Muslim (87%), Protestant (6.5%), Catholic (3%), Hindu (2%), Buddhist (1%) and others (0.5%). The distribution of population according to religion, however, is more striking at the provincial level, as each province is often dominated by a certain religion. Some eastern Indonesian provinces, such as East Nusa Tenggara , East Timor and Irian Jaya , for example, are dominated by Christians.
- 3.
Since the 1970s, major studies on population mobility in Indonesia have focused primarily on spatial pattern and urbanisation-related issues (Suharso et al. 1976; Hugo 1978; Mantra 1981; Firman 1992). Migration studies that deal with ethnicity are very limited and mostly explain the events before Independence (McNicoll 1966; Naim 1976). The Minangkabauans of West Sumatra is the most studied ethnic group with regard to its voluntary migration behaviour.
- 4.
In this paper, ethnic conflict is identified by the occurrence of mass violence in the event of friction between migrant and local populations of different ethnicities.
- 5.
Indonesia is labeled by Hill as Southeast Asia’s emerging giant in his book (1996), which assesses the country’s economic achievements since 1966.
- 6.
See the paper by Iwan J. Azis , ‘Impacts of Economic Reform on Rural-Urban Welfare: A General Equilibrium Framework’ (n.d.).
- 7.
These seemingly ambiguous perceptions among the Indonesian elite of the nature of its population problems are not unique, however . Weiner (1975) suggests that many governments assume that some of the problems exemplified by rapid population growth can be alleviated by policies aimed at the dispersal of populations. He also notes that migration policies are frequently embraced for a variety of purposes but almost never for exclusively demographic reasons.
- 8.
This issue is discussed in detail in Chap. 1.
- 9.
The nation’s total fertility rate (TFR), for example, had fallen from around 6 in the mid-1960s to an average of 3.3 children per woman in the mid-1980s. During the same period, the labour force increase was about 3% per annum. For a comprehensive assessment of the demographic changes, particularly on family planning, education and labour force developments during the New Order , see Hull and Jones (1994).
- 10.
For a general discussion on this issue, see Malley (1999).
- 11.
An illustration of how these elites, particularly the military, have persistently regarded transmigration as an important undertaking is shown by a request from General Suharto to the US Ambassador in Indonesia, Marshall Green, at their first meeting on 29 May 1966. Suharto asked for US$500 million in grants or soft loans to assist the transmigration program (Hull 1988).
- 12.
These notions, as suggested by Koentjaraningrat, a senior Indonesian anthropologist, are strongly represented by President Suharto and his military men (Visser 1988).
- 13.
A noted Indonesian historian, Taufik Abdullah (1995), in an interview argues that Suharto has successfully cultivated himself as the single interpreter of Pancasila , the nation’s ideological basis and ultimate source of values. In this regard, Taufik Abdullah further notes that the political language and discourse have been sealed totally under Suharto’s hegemony.
- 14.
A major concern, due to the lack of political checks and balances, is a process of uncontrolled accumulation of economic power in the hands of a few people—the core being Suharto’s family and the Chinese tycoons close to the President. A survey in 1995 on the strengths and weaknesses of social integration indicates several important threats to national cohesion after 50 years of Independence. The study, conducted by researchers from the University of Indonesia , reveals that the major sources of threats to social integration were ‘ethnic parochialism’, ‘economic disparity between elite and masses’ and ‘unjust government’ (University of Indonesia 1995). The findings of the study, in fact, are not surprising. The largest national weekly news magazine, Gatra, in early August 1995, conducted a poll on what the public perceived to be national issues; the poll results are similar to the ‘three issues’ revealed earlier by the researchers of the University of Indonesia .
- 15.
In 1995 and 1996, a series of riots occurred in several cities in Java, such as Purwakarta, Pekalongan, Surabaya, Bekasi, Situbondo, Tasikmalaya and Rengasdengklok. These riots had a similar pattern, characterised by the mass actions of burning churches and Chinese shops. Many observers believed that social and economic inequalities between the Muslim majority and the Chinese and Christian minorities were the underlying causes of these mass riots. These riots seem like an aberration in the midst of the achievements of the New Order’s successful development. An investigative report in the Far Eastern Economic Review (13 March 1997) titled ‘The Dispossessed: Why Indonesia’s Boom Leaves Its Poor So Angry’ vividly depicts the hardship of common people in the urban areas of Java—the seeming paradox of development in Indonesia.
- 16.
All the formal religions have created their own intellectual associations, such as ICMI (Muslim), PIKI (Protestant), ICKI (Catholic), PCHI (Hindu) and ICBI (Buddhist).
- 17.
For a useful reference on this issue, see Guiness (1994).
- 18.
According to Choucri (1984), for a nation, security, stability and social cohesion, in the comprehensive sense, encompass the ability to adapt to a changing environment and to adapt at a cost that is deemed acceptable and affordable by the society. Such adaptation, she further notes, begins most fundamentally with the meeting of social demands. These demands are defined initially and most critically by the configuration of the population and its overall characteristics.
- 19.
In this paper, the Wallace Line, which lies between Kalimantan and Sulawesi , is used to divide Indonesia into two parts, western and eastern. This is slightly different from the government definition, which includes Kalimantan as part of eastern Indonesia.
- 20.
The level of outside intervention, from both government and nongovernment organisations (NGOs), to improve health conditions in West Nusa Tenggara is, in fact, quite remarkable. It is therefore no wonder that West Nusa Tenggara has become interesting to health development observers. West Nusa Tenggara represents a good example of the complicated and multifaceted linkages between internal cultural values and the various external interventions to increase the social wellbeing of the population. It seems that a great deal of outside intervention is not a guarantee for the improvement of human resource conditions. In such a situation, the attitude of the officials, peoples’ habits and social norms have their own dynamics, which can reverse the outcomes of the intervention.
- 21.
In Indonesia, the only source of information on population mobility or migration at the national level is the population census. The population census is taken every 10 years and the latest was in 1990. Information on two types of migrants can be derived from the population census. Lifetime migrants are those people whose province of birth is different from their current province of residence. In many ways, the data on recent migrants provide a more accurate picture on existing population mobility than the data on lifetime migrants.
- 22.
The preliminary result of 1995 intercensal survey shows the continuation of migration trends and patterns between 1990 and 1995 (Central Bureau of Statistics 1997).
- 23.
Since the 1980s large numbers of migrant workers have moved across the national boundaries, particularly to Malaysia. A government source estimates that the number of Indonesian migrants in Malaysia is around 1.5 million, of whom 600,000 are illegal (Kompas, 15 March 1997). The social and political impacts of the influx of Indonesian migrants in Malaysia are significant due to the crucial ethnic balance between the Malays and the Chinese (see Tirtosudarmo 1996 for a discussion on the politics of Indonesian illegal migration to Malaysia).
- 24.
Aditjondro’s monograph (1986a) is a useful source on the voluntary migration of the Bugis, Makasarese and Butonese in eastern Indonesia, particularly in Irian Jaya .
- 25.
Information on division of labour by ethnicity was observed by the author during intermittent visits to eastern Indonesia between 1991 and 1993.
- 26.
The migrants are pejoratively called by the locals ‘straight haired’, while the migrants call the locals ‘curly haired’.
- 27.
- 28.
- 29.
As a result of its disputed status in the international forum, East Timor warrants special consideration. The emergence of the underground movement, interestingly organised by young people, obtained more international attention, after the so-called Dili Incident on 12 November 1991, in which an estimated 100 people, while conducting a protest rally, were murdered by Indonesian soldiers. Since 1991, East Timor obviously has become the most troubled spot in Indonesia.
- 30.
The actual number of people who were killed in the Incident is very difficult to gauge. The local army commander estimated that about 300 people were killed, but nongovernmental sources believed that the actual number of deaths was much larger than the government estimate.
- 31.
King (1993) provides a comprehensive account of historical and social development in Kalimantan. The last chapter on modernisation and development is particularly relevant.
- 32.
Reference to Madurese migration, unfortunately, is lacking in the literature.
- 33.
Indonesian newspapers and magazines are rich sources of information on the incidence of ethnic conflicts.
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Tirtosudarmo, R. (2018). Development-Migration-Conflict: An Observation in the Mid-1990s. In: The Politics of Migration in Indonesia and Beyond. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-9032-5_2
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