Fellows and Strangers in The Theory of Moral Sentiments

Abstract

Adam Smith thought that people form their morals through sympathy. Originally, they learn how they represent sympathy appropriately within their intimate and local spaces. Then, sympathy is “our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others,” but could be used to “denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever” (TMS, I. i 1. 5). Samuel Johnson defined “fellow” as “a companion; one with whom we consort” (Johnson 1755, “fellow”). In fellowship with others, one can share feelings with them and form a sense of moral sympathy. However, as this chapter argues, even in this space, people form morals by seeing themselves as strangers to their society. A stranger is not a fellow, a companion or a member of the community. Being a stranger is contextual; in the local space, a neighbor from a different cultural and social background could still be a stranger. In an international relationship, members of the same country are fellows. In the local, intimate space, one forms morals among fellows from the view of oneself as a stranger. The view can adapt sentiments and behavior to be accepted by others, and can form impartial morals.