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Achieving Communication Effectiveness of Web Authentication Protocol with Key Update

  • Zijian Zhang
  • Chongxi Shen
  • Liehuang Zhu
  • Chen Xu
  • Salabat Khan Wazir
  • Chuyi Chen
Conference paper
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 747)

Abstract

Today, with the presence of a large number of Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks, identity authentication plays an important role in computer communication network. Series of authentication protocols have been proposed to resist against MITM attacks. Due to the lack of two-way certification between the client and the server, an attack named Man-In-The-Middle-Script-In-The-Browser (MITM-SITB) still works in most protocols. In order to protect against this kind of attack, a Channel-ID based authentication protocol named Server-Invariance-with-Strong-Client-Authentication (SISCA) is put forward. This protocol can not support key update and execute inefficiently. To solve this problem, we propose a Communication-Effectiveness-of-Web-Authentication (CEWA) protocol. We design a new certification process to make the protocol support key update, thus avoiding the risk of key leaks. Simultaneously, We designed the key storage method to manage the keys. We improve the efficiency of implementation. We also analyze its security and the experimental analysis shows the better performance of the efficiency than that in SISCA protocol.

Keywords

Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) Attack TLS Channel ID Web authentication Key update 

Notes

Acknowledgment

This work is partially supported by China National Key Research and Development Program No. 2016YFB0800301.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Zijian Zhang
    • 1
  • Chongxi Shen
    • 1
  • Liehuang Zhu
    • 1
  • Chen Xu
    • 1
  • Salabat Khan Wazir
    • 1
  • Chuyi Chen
    • 1
  1. 1.Beijing Institute of TechnologyBeijingChina

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