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Game Theory-Based Defense Mechanisms of Cyber Warfare

  • Monica Ravishankar
  • D. Vijay Rao
  • C. R. S. Kumar
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 705)

Abstract

Threat faced by wireless network users is not only dependant on their own security stance but is also affected by the security-related actions of their opponents. As this interdependence continues to grow in scope, the need to devise an efficient security solution has become challenging to the security researchers and practitioners. We aim to explore the potential applicability of game theory to model the strategic interactions between these agents. In this paper, the interaction between the attacker and the defender is modeled as both static and dynamic game and the optimal strategies for the players are obtained by computing the Nash equilibrium. Our goal is to refine the key insights to illustrate the current state of game theory, concentrating on areas relevant to security analysis in cyber warfare.

Keywords

Game theory Static game Dynamic game Nash equilibrium 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Monica Ravishankar
    • 1
  • D. Vijay Rao
    • 2
  • C. R. S. Kumar
    • 1
  1. 1.Defence Institute of Advanced TechnologyPuneIndia
  2. 2.Institute of Systems Studies & AnalysesDelhiIndia

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