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Attenuation, Appropriation, and Adaptation: The Confucian Revival Among the Urban Middle Class and the Chinese State’s Responses

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Abstract

This chapter investigates the Chinese state’s involvement in the rise of Confucian education among the urban middle class. The urban middle class is a rapidly burgeoning social stratum and it is expected that by 2025 almost half of the Chinese population would be urban middle class (McKinsey Global Institute, From “made in China” to “sold in China”: the rise of the Chinese urban consumer, 2006). This social group, together with their growing economic power and political participation, has become increasingly influential in shaping China’s political future. Given the importance of ideology for the CCP’s legitimacy, whether the CCP could keep at least some ideological hold over the urban middle class is significant for its rule.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The lower middle class overlaps with the meaning of “crowd” or “mass” as defined in previous literature, for example, “crowd” as defined by Thompson (1971) or Canetti (1960). The reason to exclude other disadvantageous social groups such as agricultural laborers and the unemployed, who are also unprivileged, from our study is because Confucianism does not enjoy robust popularity among these classes.

  2. 2.

    For details, please refer to http://www.chyxx.com/industry/201701/489699.html

  3. 3.

    Many empirical studies of China’s middle class were made by large multinational corporations for business purposes. Since these companies’ research methods may not necessarily meet academic standards, the numbers here can only be used as references for understanding the general picture of the middle class.

  4. 4.

    It is, in fact, difficult to obtain the exact number of these classes and schools, because quite a few do not register with the government. According to a relevant website, their number has risen to at least 40 in 2010. For details, see “Shenzhen Dujing Jiaoyu Jigou Yilan” (A survey of the organizations for reading the Confucian classics in Shenzhen), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5d6cf0360100lm4c.html (assessed on January 16, 2011). This list contains 40 organizations including contact persons, telephone numbers, emails, or QQ numbers. I have contacted some of these organizations and confirmed that their information is reliable.

  5. 5.

    Chen did not clearly state how or when this number was calculated.

  6. 6.

    There are approximately 30 influential network communities, among which some well-known ones are xuxue lianhe luantan (www.yuandao.com), huaxia fuxing luntan (www.hxfx.net/bbs), and rujiao fuxing luntan (www.rjfx.net).

  7. 7.

    The “ideological vacuum” has been vividly depicted by Professor He Guanghu from Renming University in Beijing as a “threefold crisis” (san xin weiji): “a crisis of confidence” (xinxin), “a crisis of trust” (xinren), and “a crisis of faith” (xinyang).

  8. 8.

    Other scholars have similar findings. For details, please see Billioud and Thoraval (2008).

  9. 9.

    “Dangqian zhongguoren weihe jiaolu? Jiaolu chengdu jihe?” (Why do Chinese feel anxious in Current Day? What are their Anxiety Levels?), Joint research conducted by Souhuwang (website of Souhu) and Renmin luntanwang (Website of People’s Forum) in 2013. For more details, please refer to http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2013-03/21/content_1214219.htm?div=-1

  10. 10.

    The research here only focuses on the educational activities in government-funded public schools, as they are the main venues where government policies are meant to be carried out.

  11. 11.

    The proposal was made in his letter to the emperor entitled “Ju Xianliang Duice” (“舉賢良對策”) in AD 134.

  12. 12.

    In fact, the late Qing court had already formally abrogated Confucian education in 1902. However, it still remained in place until 1912.

  13. 13.

    It mainly includes the Four Books and Five Classics.

  14. 14.

    Regarding the Communist mode of mobilizing popular consent, please refer to Beetham (1991).

  15. 15.

    These lectures are usually given by teachers at local universities who either do them voluntarily or for a small payment. They are usually organized by local Confucian organizations and are subject to the approval of local authorities.

  16. 16.

    During my fieldwork, I found some local communities organizing courses on Confucianism or Chinese traditional philosophy for residents. These courses were usually managed by committees in the local community and also subject to approval by local authorities.

  17. 17.

    Interviewee 8 and 9.

  18. 18.

    Except in Xinjiang and Tibet; this data is from Shi (2010).

  19. 19.

    During my fieldwork, I found that some Buddhist groups were heavily involved in supporting Confucian education. The reason, as explained by one of my interviewees, is that Buddhist groups consider financing such Confucian education a “virtuous act”. They viewed it as beneficial for spreading Buddhism among the urban middle class because Buddhism in China, after its more than 2000 years of localization, has now greatly overlapped with Confucianism (Interviewee 16).

  20. 20.

    For details, see www.tongxueguan.com

  21. 21.

    For details about the school, please visit www.xfjy9.com

  22. 22.

    Similar findings have already been noted by other scholars such as Makeham (2008) and Billioud (2007a, b).

  23. 23.

    Although “the classics” may have strong connotations of Confucianism, the documents never clearly denoted the classics as Confucian or Confucianism-related. During fieldwork, I found public schools often included Confucianism, Daoism, Marxism, and some Western classics such as Shakespeare’s works in their “classics education”.

  24. 24.

    “Red Scarf” is an official symbol of Communism for the Chinese children, whereas “national studies” simply implies traditional Chinese culture with Confucianism at the core. The title means children with communist beliefs studying traditional culture. For a detailed introduction of the activities, please refer to www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-01/07/content_1780081.htm

  25. 25.

    The NCWC is a branch of the Communist Youth League of China (CYLC). Many current CCP leaders such as former President Hu Jintao and Premier Li Keqiang were former leaders of the CYLC.

  26. 26.

    Interviewees 7 and 9. The information provided by the interviewee can be confirmed by a news report concerning national studies education in the Shenzhen Daily (2008).

  27. 27.

    Interviewees 7 and 9; for details of all these schools’ activities, please refer to http://bagxt.baoan.net.cn/wz_Class.asp?ClassID=8

  28. 28.

    Interviewee 19.

  29. 29.

    Interviews with teachers and students at No. 5 Middle School and Wudi Silu Primary School, in Qingdao in April 2011 (Interviewees 23, 24, 30, 31).

  30. 30.

    The other components of the core value system are Marxism, “Shared Ideal of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi gongtong lixiang) and “the zeitgeist of reform and innovation” (gaige he kaifang de shidai jinshen). It is interesting that while Confucianism has actively been restructured and reshaped to be wedged into patriotism and SCHD, no systematic efforts have been observed to connect Confucianism with the other components of the core value system. It may be because there are not many overlaps between Confucianism and the others.

  31. 31.

    For the differences between Confucianism and the official ideology in philosophical founding, see Chap. 1.

  32. 32.

    This regulation was issued on August 23, 1994, and has been used as the basic guidelines for patriotic education until now.

  33. 33.

    This document was given to me by the local educational authorities there. It can be downloaded from http://bagxt.baoan.net.cn/wz_Show.asp?ArticleID=511

  34. 34.

    These books were published by yuelu shushe in 2008. For details, see Zhang et al. (2008).

  35. 35.

    For details, see Dotson (2011).

  36. 36.

    For a detailed introduction of the OMRI, see case study one in Chap. 4. The program launched by the OMRI aimed to promulgate Confucian ethics among students and received financial support from the Beijing municipal government and some “relevant departments” within the Ministry of Education. The program involved 373 schools and universities in Beijing, Nanjing, Shandong, Heilongjiang, Chongqing, Sichuan, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Wuhan, and Xian. The information is also available at www.bjypc.edu.cn/dongfang/dongfangdao.htm

  37. 37.

    Interviewees 39, 40, and 41.

  38. 38.

    For an introduction to their specific activities, please refer to www.hgedu.cn/CMS/CMS/zzjg/dyk/lm3/2007-4-13_1176431894737.html

  39. 39.

    The Qingdao Daily has a detailed report concerning the creative education of “traditional culture”, especially elementary Confucian education, in its A11 section, January 24, 2007.

  40. 40.

    It is based on my fieldwork. Yangcheng Evening News (yangcheng wanbao) has a special report introducing the various creative methods used in the education of “national studies” in Bao’an, Shenzhen (Li and Yang 2010).

  41. 41.

    Interview with Shenzhen local official (Interviewee 7).

  42. 42.

    From interviews with teachers in Wudi Silu Primary school in Qingdao (Interviewees 30 and 31).

  43. 43.

    One explanation for the local educational authorities’ lack of motivation in providing innovative improvements to the education of official ideologies is that they are simply not given the authority to make any significant change in this field.

  44. 44.

    These Confucian private schools enjoy relative autonomy in their educational management and are not so strictly controlled by local educational authorities as the public schools. What’s more, they usually stick to fundamentalist principles, focusing on restoring traditional ways of teaching and learning. They deemed these government innovations as antithetical to their fundamentalist principles and therefore refused to imitate them (Interviewee 16).

  45. 45.

    According to my knowledge, these Confucian schools and classes use this teaching method partly because they are influenced by a Taiwanese educator, Wang Caigui, who postulates that there is no need for a child to understand the classics but just to recite them because children simply cannot comprehend the meaning of those classics until they have enough social experience. Thus, children should just try to recite them without understanding their meaning. See also Kang et al. (2010).

  46. 46.

    There is an official report concerning Confucian education in this county. Please refer to www.cppcc.gov.cn/page.do?pa=2c

  47. 47.

    In the case of the educational authorities at the town (xian) or district (qu) level, they are subject to the direct leadership of both the propaganda department (qu/xian xuan chuan bu) at the same level and the education bureau at the prefecture level (shi jiaoyu ju).

  48. 48.

    Interviewee 8.

  49. 49.

    I would like to thank Professor Andrew Nathan for suggesting these publications for me.

  50. 50.

    On the contrary, the indoctrination of official ideologies such as Marxism and “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” is not only mandatory for all public schools throughout China, but also strictly reinforced. The central authorities do not allow any contravention by local authorities. The centrally made “guidelines” (jiaoxue dagang) for teaching official ideologies, which clearly stipulate the content of ideological education in every particular way, do not allow for changes (interview with a local educational official in Qingdao—Interviewee 28).

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Pang, Q. (2019). Attenuation, Appropriation, and Adaptation: The Confucian Revival Among the Urban Middle Class and the Chinese State’s Responses. In: State-Society Relations and Confucian Revivalism in Contemporary China. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8312-9_6

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