Abstract
This chapter aims to explore how the Chinese state engaged with these “Confucian intellectuals” (those who produce discourses about Confucianism) and responded to the Confucian revival. It is crucial given the intrinsic closeness between ideology and intellectuals and the critical role intellectuals have played on China’s political stage. Intellectuals are the avant-garde in pushing ideological changes; and at the same time, they, by creating and transmitting culture, are also pivotal in maintaining or undermining the current regime’s legitimacy. This is especially the case within the Chinese context given that the Chinese political power had relied on intellectuals (ancient Confucian scholars) to sustain its legitimacy for over 2000 years of history.
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Notes
- 1.
This is a part of Lipset’s definition of intellectuals. He defined intellectuals as “all those who create, distribute and apply culture, that is, the symbolic world of man, including art, science and religion”. See Lipset (1981, p. 333).
- 2.
- 3.
The phrase “dominated fraction of the dominant class” comes from Bourdieu (1990, p. 145).
- 4.
According to Tu Weiming, Confucian intellectuals in ancient China were not only influential on the political stage but also in the social realm. They also took the function of priests and philosophers in Western society. For details, please see Tu (1993).
- 5.
- 6.
For details about the Chinese Democratic Party, see Wright (2004).
- 7.
According to Goldman (2011), the CCP has adopted this strategy since the early 1950s.
- 8.
For a detailed discussion of the cycles in the 1980s and 1990s, please refer to Ngeow (2007).
- 9.
- 10.
Jiang Qing’s “political Confucianism” advocates creating a Chinese-styled political system based on gongyang learning, a kind of Confucianism embodying Confucius’ “kingly heart and kingly way” (wang xin wang dao).
- 11.
Kang Xiaoguang argues that Confucius’s “benevolent governance” should act as the foundation of China’s political legitimacy and insists on “Confucianization” as the direction for future political development in China.
- 12.
Unlike Jiang and Kang, Ren does not openly claim the decay of official ideology in his academic works.
- 13.
Cai Degui advocates “Practical Confucianism”, which links Confucianism with social development such as rebuilding a Confucian spiritual home for the Chinese people.
- 14.
Guo Qiyong supports a “Life Confucianism” in which Confucianism serves as a way of living for the Chinese people; see Wang (2004).
- 15.
The title was given by Professor Fang Keli (方克力) from the Chinese Academy of Social Science. See Fang (2005). He also named the four representatives of the fourth generation: Chen Ming (陳明), Jiang Qing (蔣慶), Kang Xiaoguang (康曉光), and Shenghong (盛洪).
- 16.
There is a detailed analysis of the so-called cultural conservatism; see Sina.com (2004).
- 17.
- 18.
For example, both Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech at Harvard in 2003, ba muguang touxiang zhongguo (Looking towards China) and President Hu Jintao’s 2005 talks for provincial leading cadres, zai shengbuji zhuyao lingdao ganbu tigao goujian shehui zhuyi hexie shehui nengli zhuanti yantaoban shang de jianghua (Speech for provincial leading cadres at the seminar of building a harmonious socialist society) directly quoted words from the Confucian classics.
- 19.
For example, according to Richard Baum, “The Confucian idea of a ‘mandate of heaven,’ where the emperor ruled with a virtually absolute mandate, provided he took care of the people, is very close to the modern-day notion of a benevolent despotism”, quoted in Robertson and Liu (2006). There are similar views in China, only such views are expressed indirectly by commenting on the autocratic ROC (Republic of China) dictators’ use of Confucian education as a way to promote its authoritarian rule in the ROC; see Nanfang dushi bao (2011).
- 20.
Selected topics in the NFSS are classified into different categories such as philosophy, political science, history, and sociology; Confucianism is categorized as part of Chinese philosophy.
- 21.
It is the 18th topic that year, “comparative research on Marxism and Confucianism”.
- 22.
For details, please refer to www.npopss-cn.gov.cn/GB/219471/219473/14842789.html
- 23.
For details, please refer to www.npopss-cn.gov.cn/GB/219468/16505661.html
- 24.
Although there are some documents supporting research of “traditional culture”, but traditional culture in these documents does not necessarily mean Confucianism.
- 25.
For this piece of information, I would like to thank Professor Peng Guoxiang from Beijing University for pointing it out to me.
- 26.
- 27.
In fact, the three interviewed critical intellectuals did not blame the central government during the interview.
- 28.
Specifically, for a hundred plus universities that are affiliated with the central government, their presidents and CCP secretaries are assigned by the Ministry of Education (among these universities, however, approximately ten are directly controlled by the State Council). As for other higher educational institutes, their leaders are appointed by different levels of local government.
- 29.
The full list of CSAs in China is available at the website of “Chinese Contemporary Confucianism” (zhongguo dangdai ruxue wang): http://www.cccrx.org/index.php
- 30.
Interviewee 16.
- 31.
Interviewee 19.
- 32.
Interviewee 42 and 43; there are actually two directors in the OMRI. One is the dean and the other is the CCP Secretary there. Both of them agreed to be interviewed.
- 33.
During the early stage of the OMRI, Professor Wang had had experienced delays in publishing his works as well as criticism from one newspaper controlled by the central government. However, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the OMRI’s two leaders said that their research and educational programs had received greater support from the BMG and some social organizations.
- 34.
According to the dean, the BMG allocates some funding for their operational use, but the amount is not enough. Some of their income and operational fees rely on the donation of enterprises and some unofficial organizations. They are now allowed and even encouraged to collaborate with other segments of society.
- 35.
For a detailed list of their research projects, please refer to http://baike.baidu.com/view/1471002.htm
- 36.
Interviewee 41, 48, and 49.
- 37.
In order to protect my informant, I will not provide the name of this institute here.
- 38.
Interviewee 37.
- 39.
For details, please refer to www.chinakongzi.org/rjwh/ddmj/jiangqing/200705/t20070523_2176686.htm
- 40.
For details, please refer to www.scuphilosophy.org/ScholarsLibrary_display.asp?userid=563&art_id=6955
- 41.
The central government gave its permission for the establishment of the NSC. On the day of the opening ceremony, one of the associate heads in the Ministry of Education came and delivered a speech as a sign of the center’s approval. However, this approval cannot be exaggerated as the central authorities’ support for Confucian studies. The establishment of NSC, to a large extent, remains a conduct of local authorities.
- 42.
For details, please visit its official website: www.guoxuejiaoyu.com/
- 43.
The nine figures are Zhao Puchu (趙朴初), Bing Xin (冰心), Cao Yu (曹禺), Xia Yan (夏衍), Ye Zhishan (葉至善), Qi Gong (啟功), Wu Lengxi (吳冷西), Chen Huangmei (陳荒煤), and Zhang Zhigong (張志公).
- 44.
Interviewee 49.
- 45.
Including one from the NFSS.
- 46.
Ji resigned from the post of president in late 2011.
- 47.
Interviewee 32, 39, and 49.
- 48.
The PRS’s full name is “President Responsibility System under the Leadership of the CCP Committee” (dangwei lingdaoxia de xiaozhang fuzezhi). The CCP committee here means the grassroots CCP committees in the tertiary educational institutions. The PRS system has been reshaped again and again since the early 1980s. The Central CCP has issued several major documents to implement the system such as 1985s Decisions on Reforming the Educational System; 1990s Document on Strengthening the Construction of the Party Organization in Higher Educational Institutes; 1996s Regulations on the Grass-Roots Organizational Work of the Communist Party of China in Higher Learning Institutes; and 1998s Higher Education Law. For details, please refer to www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Elementals/InBeijing/StudyingInBJ/Laws/t1017526.htm
- 49.
For details, please refer to www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Elementals/InBeijing/StudyingInBJ/Laws/t1017526.htm. For a detailed discussion of the PRS system, please see Law (1995).
- 50.
President Ji himself has never implied that to attain managing achievements was one of his considerations in building the NSC. However, one of my interviewees informed me that the PRS was so significant for officials like Ji that he simply could not ignore this factor when he made his decision to build the NSC.
- 51.
For details, please see http://guoxue.ruc.edu.cn/displaynews.asp?id=682
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Pang, Q. (2019). The Confucian Revival Among Intellectuals and the State Responses. In: State-Society Relations and Confucian Revivalism in Contemporary China. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8312-9_4
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